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When Theodore Roosevelt became President of the United
States in 1901 it was the navy to which he turned as the

vehicle for his diplomacy.
cautiously.

At first Roosevelt proceeded

He pushed through the Congress legislation for

the construction of new battleships and armored cruisers,
and he began bringing the navy's scattered warships together
in the Atl antic as a single powerful force

.

During the win-

ter. of 1902-03 this fleet held the navy's first peacetime

maneuvers, and by the summer of 1903 Roosevelt's battleships
were conducting naval exercises off the Azores in the mid-

Atlantic

.

All of this prepared the way for

a

naval display which

dwarfed anything similar in the past, and which took the

American navy in large numbers into the Mediterranean Sea.
During the summer of 1904 a total of fourteen warships (60%
of the navy's first-class armored ships;

and over 30% of the

navy's strength, cruiser-class and above), along with

a

num-

ber of support vessels, embarked on this cruise; the greatest

demonstration of American naval power ever seen outside of

the Western Hemisphere.

The heart of the fleet were the six

battleships of the Battleship Squadron, the single
most
powerful unit the navy possessed.
The cruise served
a

a

number of purposes.

It gave Europe

first-hand exhibition of American naval strength.

Roosevelt was to participate on

a

If

basis of equality with the

great powers he had to establish the robustness and reach of
the American navy, and what better way to do this than a

cruise by

a

powerful fleet off the coasts of Europe.

Also,

on a more practical level, Roosevelt decided to employ the

fleet in putting pressure on the Ottoman Empire to settle

certain outstanding problems which the United States had
long been trying to resolve with Constantinople.
However, before this demonstration could take place the
fleet was involved in another bit of gunboat diplomacy.

The

kidnapping of an American in Morocco coincided with the arrival of the fleet in European waters,

and Roosevelt had no

hesitation about using its presence to put pressure on the
Sultan of Morocco.

For almost two months American warships

prowled the Straits area, much to the discomfort of Spain
and France.

To cruise the Mediterranean with such

a

large force was

in its own right an important and significant employment of

United States sea power, but the use of the fleet in aggressive naval demonstrations against the Sultans of Morocco and

Turkey underlined for Europe the practical capabilities of
Roosevelt's navy.

What the President established by

displaying his battleships at close range to the great powers
was a concrete exhibit of America's right to be accepted as
an equal.

Historians who have dealt with the role of the navy

during the Roosevelt years have generally examined two distinct manifestations.

growth of the navy
States to

a

—

The first of these was the physical
a

growth which brought the United

position as the third largest naval power in the

world by the time Roosevelt left office.

The second was the

sending of the fleet on an epic round the world voyage

during Roosevelt's second term.
ignored

,

however

,

What has been largely

was the use of this naval power in the

years between 1902 and 1905.

The Mediterranean cruise of

1904 was an important chapter in
the navy as a diplomatic tool,

a

growing application of

and it represents the culmi-

nation of Rooseveltian naval policy in the first three years
of his presidency.
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INTRODUCTION
"It is said

being so distant

...

a Power,

in some quarters that America,

can have no good reason for inter-

ference; but that, surely, is /77 matter for her own decision,
not the decision of Europe.

She has as much right to her own

ambitions, her own purposes, and her own complaints as any

other Power.

.

.

.

Seated on two oceans, with unlimited

wealth, and a population possibly more patriotic than that of
any white State, her weight must be

felfc

m

every corner of

the world.

There was nothing unusual about this editorial opinion which appeared in the influential English periodical The

Spectator during the summer of 1904.

The imperialistic im-

pulse held full sway in the world The Spectator
knew,

'

s

readers

and the casual racism and unapologetic acceptance of

Europe's right to exert its power across the globe was not
questioned.

This was also

a

time when diplomatic relations

between the United States and Great Britain were becoming increasingly warm after over
nism, and,

a

century of thinly veiled antago-

for the most part, Britons were now looking at

Brother Johnarhan as an undeclared ally in

a

world in-

creasingly divided by potentially dangerous alliances.
Wnat was exceptional about the editorial was that it

did not refer to the United States in the Caribbean or South

America as one might have expected; nor did it
concern
American penetration in the Orient
the "ambitions^'

—

which

were alluded to lay in Europe, specifically in
the

Mediterranean.
The United States had, in a sense, taken on the

status of

a

world power with its victory over Spain in 1898,

and in the acquisition of a fairly substantial colonial burden
in the Caribbean and the Far East.

But what was the basis

upon which this new world power rested?

The American army at

the turn of the century was a small force composed mainly of

regiments more skilled in Indian fighting than in modern warfare.

A large, unwieldy and inefficient militia system

existed, but it was an anachronism in the tv/entieth century
and could not compare with the well-trained conscript armies

of Europe.

Only in its navy did the United States possess

a

respected tool which gave substance to its newly gained great
power status.

In an age lacking air power and interconti-

nental ballistic missiles it was the battleship which was the

principal agent of national pride and aggrandizement.

When Theodore Roosevelt became President in late
1901 it was the navy to which he turned as the vehicle for

his diplomacy.

The fleet was to be his "big stick."

first Roosevelt proceeded cautiously.

He pushed

At

through

Congress legislation for the construction of many new battleships and armored cruisers, and he began bringing the navy's

scattered warships together in the Atlantic as
powerful force.

a

single

During the winter of 1902-03 this fleet
VI

held the navy's first peacetime maneuvers in
the Caribbe an.
and by the summer of 190 3 Roosevelt's
battleships

were con-

ducting naval exercises off the Azores in the
mid-Atlantic.
All of this prepared the way for a naval display

which would dwarf anything similar in the past, and which

would take the American navy in full force into the

Mediterranean Sea.

During the summer of 1904

fourteen warships, along with

a

a

total of

number of support vessels,

were to embark on this cruise; the largest demonstration of

United States naval power ever seen outside of the Western
Hemisphere.

The heart of the fleet would be the six battle-

ships of the Battleship Squadron, the single most powerful

unit the navy possessed.

These were the navy's newest and

best armored vessels, and comprised over one-half of its

strength in first-class warships.
The cruise would serve a number of purposes, both

diplomatic and practical.

It would give to Europeans a

first-hand exhibition of American naval strength.
Roosevelt was to participate on

a

If

basis of equality with

Europe he would have to establish the robustness and reach of

American naval power, and what better way to do this than
voyage by

a

powerful war fleet off the coast of Europe.

a

Also,

the cruise would give the navy a splendid chance to train and

exercise both its personnel and ships.
The presence of the American navy in the

Mediterranean in such large numbers would alone have justified the comm.ents in The Spectator
vii

,

but the cruise was to

serve an even more useful purpose.

ploy the fleet in putting

Roosevelt decided to em-

pressure upon the Ottoman Empire

to settle certain outstanding problems which
the United States

had long been trying to resolve with Constantinople.

latter part of 1904 would see an election, and

a

The

successful

naval display against Turkey could be of great benefit to the

President in an age in which the use of force was generally
seen as the right and proper response of a great pov^er seeking
to establish its proper place in the world.

Also, the "sick

man of Europe" was easy prey, and Roosevelt could be fairly
sure of a prestigious yet unexacting victory.

However, before this demonstration could take place
the fleet was involved in another bit of gunboat diplomacy.

The kidnapping of an American in Morocco by

a

bandit chief-

tain coincided with the arrival of the fleet in Europe, and

Roosevelt had no hesitation about using its presence to put

pressure on the Sultan of Morocco.

For over a month American

warships prov^led the Straits area, much to the discomfort of
Spain and France.
To cruise the Mediterranean with such a large force

was in its own right an important and significant employment
of American sea power, but the use of the fleet in aggressive

naval demonstrations against the Sultans of Morocco and

Turkey underlined for Europe the practical capabilities of
Roosevelt's navy.

The role the President was to play in

world diplomacy in the course of the next two years

at

Portsmouth and Algeciras was undoubtedly helped by cha
viii

expression of sea power shown by the 1904 cruise.

What the

President established by displaying his battleships
at close
range to Europe was a concrete exhibit of
America's right to
be accepted as a great power, a right underscored
by the ag-

gressive use of the fleet in Morocco and Turkey, and

recognized by The Spectator
and feared in

strength alone

\:his

—

itself necessarily

a

right

What made a nation respected

.

age of imperialism was not economic

nor was a large population or land mass in
a

factor

—

the key lay in a nation's

military strength and its willingness to make use of this
factor.

Historians who have dealt with the role of the navy

during the Roosevelt years have generally examined two distinct manifestations.

growth of the navy

—

The first of these was the physical
a

growth which brought the United

States to a position as the third largest naval power in the

world by the time Roosevelt left office.

The second

the

v/as

sending of the fleet on an epic round the world voyage during
Roosevelt's second term.

What has been largely ignored, how-

ever, was the use of this naval power in the years between

1902 and 1905.

The Mediterranean cruise of 1904 was an im-

portant chapter in

a

growing application of the navy as

a

diplomatic tool, and it represents the culmination of

Rooseveltian naval policy in the first three years of his
presidency.

What this study will attempt to do will be to

deal with this cruise and the events which occurred during

it, examine its wider
ra.if icat.ons

proper historical perspective.

X

,

and place it in

.

CHAPTER

I

THE ROOSEVELT NAVY
The great bay of Guantanamo lies some forty miles

east of Santiago de Cuba, and sixty miles from the eastern

end of Cuba's southern coast.

It is a large well-sheltered

bay some ten miles in length and about five miles at its
widest, boasting a narrow, easily-defended entrance.

The

bay flanks the strategic Windward Passage which provides access from the Atlantic into the Caribbean.

During most of

its history it played a role of little importance as the

port of Santiago had been the main focal point of Spain's

interests in the area.

After the Spanish American War, due

to increased United States naval penetration of the

Caribbean and the distinct possibility of

a

transoceanic

canal being built across the Central American isthmus, the

bay was leased in 1903 for use as an American naval

base."''

Today "Gitmo," as it is called by navy personnel,
is a well-developed base of marginal military/ importance.

Surrounding the bay there exist large complexes of buildings,
docks,

and repairshops.

In February, 1904, when its military

significance was much greater, only

a

few rudimentary shore

installations were visible against the low green hills and
white beaches.

presented

a

The broad waters of the lower bay, however,

picture that was anything but tranquil, for

2

anchored there was

a

gleaming array of white-hulled battle-

ships, cruisers, gunboats, and auxiliary
vessels.

'

The

resting armada included the Battleship Squadron of
the North
Atlantic Station under the command of Rear Admiral Albert
S.

Barker.
In the years following the Spanish American War the
navy,

attending to Admiral Mahan's concept of concentration,

had consolidated its main strength in the waters off the east
coast of the United States on its North Atlantic Station.
Of the several squadrons in this fleet Barker's was by far
the most important, comprising six of the navy's eleven

first-class battleships.
it within a month.
I ndiana

One more, the Iowa, was due to join

Of the remaining battleships, the

was out of commission at the New York Navy Yard; the

Oregon and Wisconsin were in the Orient; and the eleventh,
the Kentucky

,

was on her way home from the Asiatic Station.

2

Barker's six battleships were the K^arsarge (flag),
Missouri

,

Alabama

like Massachusetts

Maine

,

alone,
fore.

Maine

,

.

,

Illinois

,

and the squat, monitor-

All were grouped together except for the

which because of an outbreak of measles on board lay
"far from the rest with the yellow flag at the

..." 3

Clustered around the battleships were

ber of smaller warships.

a

num-

Among them puttered steam launches,

tenders, whaleboats, and officers' barges.
The senior officer present at Guantanamo was Rear

Admiral Barker.

A Massachusetts native, he had graduated

from the Naval Academy in 1861, and had been aboard the steam

.

frigate Mississippi when she sailed with Farragufs squadron
to capture New Orleans in 1862.

After a long and distin-

guished career he had been promoted to rear admiral in 1899,
and was commandant of the New York Navy Yard before taking

over the Battleship Squadron in early 1903.

Theodore Roosevelt noted in

Barker was, as

letter to Mahan, an officer

a

"excellent in point of decisions," and one who shows a
....

"willingness to accept responsibility." 4
In July of 1903 Barker had led his battleships,

along with other warships, in maneuvers off the Azores in the

mid-Atlantic

—

a

radical strategic departure in that American

ships had never before moved out of the Western Hemisphere in

such numbers during peacetime.

After an autumn naval review

by President Roosevelt off the Maine coast Barker brought his

command south into the Caribbean.

He arrived at Guantanamo

Bay on December 7th, and took possession of the anchorage for
the United States.^

For the next two months the battleships were oc-

cupied off the island of Culebra "in drilling, maneuvering,
boat exercises, etc., and for the greater part of the time

under war conditions."

On the 15th of February the squadron

returned to Guantanamo and found the battleship Maine there
in quarantine.

The Missouri came in on the 17th bringing the

squadron's strength to six.

Rear Admiral Sigsbee, the former

captain of the old Maine sunk at Havana in 1898, anchored on
Atlantic
the 18th with the cruisers which made up his South

Squadron

6

.

4

On the 26th the converted yacht Mayflower
entered
the bay.

With her large marble bathtub and other luxuries,

the Mayflower would one day serve as a presidential
yacht.

Now she bore the Admiral of the Fleet, George Dewey; the
head of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Admiral Henry Clay
Taylor;

Loomis

and the Assistant Secretary of State, Francis Butler
7

Adrairal Dewey

x>7as

at Guantanamo primarily to view

the winter exercises of the fleet, however, he also had

secondary commission.

a

He had been ordered by President

Roosevelt to "go to Santo Domingo, investigate conditions
and give a full, impartial searching account of the situa-

tion as it now presents itself to your eyes." g

Santo Domingo

was going through one of its periodic revolutions, and the

delicate diplomatic situation which existed in the Caribbean
in 1904 gave the potential change in government increased

importance in Roosevelt's eyes.
On the morning of the 29th, a Saturday, the entire

fleet cleared the bay and stood out to sea where the battle-

ships maneuvered against the cruisers, while Dewey and Taylor

watched from the bridge of the Mayf lov/er
Taylor was, like Dewey and Barker,
War.

a

.

Rear Admiral

veteran of the Civil

A former president of the Naval War College, he had

commanded the battleship Indiana during the Spanish American
War,

and his present position as head of the Bureau of

Navigation corresponded with that of the Chief of Naval
Operations today.

Taylor found neither the battleships nor

cruisers brilliant in their evolutions, but
he felt that this
was only natural, "for with all our efforts in
the last
two

or three years we find it difficult to induce
fleets to have

these really effective drills, their tendency being
to confine themselves to purposeless wheelings and
countermarches."

Overall, however, he found the Battleship Squadron in good
order,

and the individual ships efficient.

He saw some room

for encouragement, and he wrote the Secretary of the Navy,

William K. Moody, that "we still go forward, though perhaps
for the moment a little slowly."^

That evening, after the warships had returned to the
bay, Taylor revealed a startling aspect of that forward move-

ment.

Barker, it seemed, was to command an operation of un-

precedented scope

—

a

cruise of the Mediterranean with his

battleships and other units.

"^^

The battleships would join with the European

Squadron and "visit Lisbon, Trieste, and possibly one of the

French Mediterranean ports, remaining in each port about six
weeks,

after v/hich they would proceed together to Gibraltar."

It would be,

as Secretary of State John Hay wrote,

"by far

the most formidable fleet of battleships ever sent by this

Government tc Europe

.

.

.

."

traversing the Mediterranean

While these two squadrons were
a third,

the South Atlantic,

11
would be cruising along the North African coast.

The combined strength of the three squadrons would
total fourteen warships, not counting a number of auxiliary

vessels.

This was approximately 30% of the commissioned

,

fighting strength of the navy, cruiser
class and above; and
about 60% of its firsr-class vessels
an impressive undertaking by any measure, and one which could
have a number of
diplomatic repercussions.

-

Before examining the strategic considerations
that

dominated United States naval thinking in 1904, and lay
behind the cruise, it would be advantageous to briefly
review
the growth of the modern American steel navy from its
incep-

tion almost a quarter century before.

In 1880 the navy of

the United States was distinctly that of a third-class power

lagging behind such nations as Chile and Turkey.

It con-

sisted almost totally of rotting wooden steam frigates, corvettes, and sloops, as well as

a

monitors.

s,

During the mid-1870'

number of rusting Civil War
in a move born of despera-

tion, the navy surreptitiously laid down five large iron-

hulled monitors and gave them the names of useless older
monitors.

It was only through the deception of repairing

existing ships that funds could be wrung from
Congress.

a

reluctant

The period was typified by Grant's Secretary of

the Navy George

jyi.

Robeson, who was once described as

a

"first-rate judge of wines, second-rate trout fisherman, and
a

third-rate New Jersey lawyer."

12

Congress, in 1383, finally passed an appropriation
for the construction of

a

number of new steel ships.

The

first four authorized were the protected cruisers Chicago

Boston

Atlanta, and the despatch vessel Dolphin

.

,

The ships

.

were built by the John Roach Company of Chester,
Pa., which

'

unfortunately went into bankruptcy in 1885 while
work was
still in progress.

by the navy
gQ^'^Q^

They were completed in Roach's shipyard

the Dolphin in 1835, the Atlanta in 1886, the
and the Chicago not until 1889.

1887,

They were

transitional vessels, carrying tall wooden masts and sailing
rig above their steel hulls, and their performance was

generally less than satisfactory.

resented

a

Yet their building rep-

major breakthrough for the navy, and the four

ships with their while hulls
of the old navy

—

—

a

change from the black hulls

provided the foundation upon which the new

navy would be built. 13
The first battleships for the navy were authorized
in 1886 but not commissioned until 1895.

They too were

hybrid, smallish steel ships, variously designated as second-

class battleships or as armored cruisers.

They were unlucky

The Maine blew up in Havana harbor, and the Texas

vessels.

was accident-prone, developing a reputation as

a

"hoodoo."

By the time of their commissioning both were considered
14

^.
u
anachronistic
.

The navy's first true battleships were the three

vessels of the Indi ana class

authorized in 1890.
battleships,

a

(

Oregon and Massachusetts

)

These ships were designated as coast

misleading term which, for political reasons,

was applied to all capital ships until 1901.

strong armament and heavy armor.

They carried

Critical weaknesses in-

volved slow speed and poor seagoing qualities.

They were.

a

6

8

in a cense, simply an advancement on the monitor design which

had dominated naval thinking since the Civil War.
battleship, the Iowa

laid down in 1892.

,

A fourth

an improvement on the Indiana type, was

These four battleships formed the

pivotal strength of the navy during the Spanish Am.erican War.
Of the other ships built prior to the war

stand out from
gunboats.

a

a

couple

heterogeneous collection of cruisers and

The two armored cruisers New York and Brooklyn

were excellent, well-founded fighting craft.

These armored

cruisers were the only vessels of this type the navy possessed until 1905.

Another, the large protected cruiser

Olympia was one of the finest warships built in this era,
"with her admirable blend of heavy armament, thick protected
deck, high speed,

and great endurance."

At 5,870 tons she

was the navy's third largest protected cruiser, and she still

exists today at a berth on the Delaware River in Philadelphia,
the only vessel to survive from the period.

1

Between the end of the war and 1903, seven battleships joined the five pre-war armorclads for a total of

Most were products of the patriotic excitement in-

twelve.

duced by the war.

By 1901 this fervor had expended itself

and no battleships were authorized by Congress in that year.

When commissioned in early 1900, the Rears arge and Kentucky
were the first new capital ships to join the fleet since
1897.

Both possessed the unusual feature of superposed

turrets.

Within eighteen months the three battleships of

(Alabama and
the Illinois class had been commissioned

;

9

Wisconsin)

.

They in turn were joined in 1902 by the Maine

and finally in December, 1903, by the Missouri

vessel in this class, the Ohio

,

.

.

The third

was not put into service

until late in 1904.-'^
In this era the battleship was the primary index of

national strength, and by early 1904 the existence of twelve
gave America a rank of fifth or sixth place among the powers.

However, the United States had in various stages of completion, authorized, or to be shortly authorized fourteen
more battleships and ten armored cruisers.

This paper total

of twenty-six battleships and twelve armored cruisers was

expected to raise the United States to third place after
Great Britain and France.

Behind this second spurt of

American naval power lay the energy and decermination of
Theodore Roosevelt.

18

The strategic considerations which dominated

American naval thinking in the nineteenth century were profoundly conservative and defensive.

They rested on the twin

pillars of coastal defense and the disruption of an enemy's
commerce.

The navy fought the War of 1812 with Jefferson's

gunboats and the large frigates of the Constitution class.
The latter were the pocket battleships of their day.

Very

fast, they could run away from British ships-of-the-line

heavily-gunned, they could overcome most of the frigate
types then extant in the Royal

xNavy.

Their primary target

was an enemy's commerce, not his fleet.

10

The Civil War underlined the use of this strategy.

Confederate raiders such as the Alabama showed what commerce
destroyers could do, while the Union monitors were the direct,
albeit more successful, heirs of Jefferson's gunboats.
the war the navy continued this policy,

as much as funds al-

lowed, when they began building the monitors Puritan

Amphi trite

,

Mi antonomoh

,

After

,

Monadnock, and Terror in 1874-75.

They also introduced the fast cruisers of the Wampanoag type.
The latter failed not because of technical problems, but be-

cause of economic ones.

They were felt to be too costly to

9

As late as the 1890 's the navy was

run and thus laid up.

1

still building monitors and commerce raiders v;ith even less

success.

After 1865 United States warships returned to their

historically fixed peacetime occupation

—

cruising in for-

eign waters and showing the stars and stripes, nearly always
singlv, and never more than two or three ships at a time.

There was little thought given to operating as
being.
V.

•

a

fleet in

20

The concepts of coast defense and commerce raiding
posihad considerable logic to them given the geographical

tion of the United States.

The wide expanse of two great

and as
oceans provided an important barrier to aggression

for most of the
long as the nation looked inward, as it did
no need for a
nineteenth century, it was felt that there was

powerful, wide ranging navy.

Even Commander Alfred T. Mahan,

deterrent will be a
in 1885, could write that the "surest

fleet of swift cruisers to prey upon the enemy's com-

....

merce

Running away is demoralizing" to the enemy.

However, Mahan also included the important caveat that his

observations were "based upon the supposition that we don't
have interests out of our own borders

When, in the

1890' s, the eyes of Americans began to lift beyond the

limits of their own coastlines, Mahan was there with new
naval concepts to fit the political and emotional change.
At first the navy's tactical arrangements were

largely based upon lessons gained in 1866 at the naval
battle of Lissa,

In that action the Austrians had defeated

the Italians by using tactics "of ramming, line abreast

formation, and bow fire."

The results of this engagement

influenced naval tactics and architecture for almost thirty
years.

and the navy's first two armored vessels, Texas and

rams,

Maine

Most of the warships in this period were built with

,

were especially constructed to give their strongest

performance while firing at the charge.

22

The development of the self-propelled torpedo in the
1870 's and 1880

'

s

effectively destroyed the concept of the

charge and of ramming,

as it

became next to impossible for

warships to close with one another.

In the next great naval

engagement after Lissa the Japanese at the battle of the Yalu
in 1894 used the old, classical in column, or line ahead

tactics of Nelson's time to defeat the Chinese charge.

American naval tactics changed too, but slowly.

In 1898

Spanish at
Dewev used the line ahead evolution against the

Manila, while at Santiago Sarapson used
against Cevera's armored cruisers

—

a

modified charge

the last use of the

maneuver in naval warfare.
The Sprouts' have characterized the period from the

end of the Spanish American War to the advent of Theodore
Roosevelt to the presidency in 1901 as one of "reaction and
drift" for the navy.

The armored ships were dispersed to

overseas cruising stations, and the Bureau of Navigation had
"frankly no fleet policy."

Long, the Secretary of the Navy

under McKinley was, as Roosevelt wrote to Mahan in 1897,
"only lukewarm about building up of our Navy, at any rate as

regards battleships."

Long was still the Secretary of the

Navy in 1901, and still as conservative.

The entrance of

Theodore Roosevelt as President changed all of this, for

with him "Mahan'

s

philosophy entered the White House." 24

Roosevelt's military service had been limited to a
brief tour of duty with the Rough Riders in Cuba, however
his identification with the navy was a strong one and it
As a child he had

stretched back to his early years.
idolized his two Bulloch uncles, one

Confederate Navy, and the other
served on the raider Alabama

.

a

a

former Admiral in the

junior officer who had

His choice of a subject for

his first literary effort was a naval one.

He began writing

The Naval Wa r of 1812 while still an undergraduate at

Harvard, and completed it in his spare time while attending

law school at Columbia.

Roosevelt found the study of the

law boring and used the writing of the book as an escape.

.

It was,

as he wrote Anna Roosevelt,

en- espaqne of mine

.

.

.

."^^

that "favourite chate au

The work was a labor of love

and it remains today the most readable of his efforts,

Roosevelt's appointment as Assistant Secretary of the Navy
in 1897,

and his later succession to President gave him the

stage upon which to develop this early interest in the navy
and the uses of seapower

The link between Roosevelt and Mahan began in the

early 1890'

s.

He was deeply influenced by Mahan'

s

writings,

and when he became Assistant Secretary of the Navy he wrote

him that he was doing all he could "toward pressing our
ideas into effect

.

.

.

."

It was an unusually humble

Roosevelt who could write Mahan that there "is no question
that you stand head and shoulders above the rest of us."

Mahan 's naval philosophy was neither new nor radical-

It was profoundly conservative in that it went back to

the naval concepts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

for its inspiration.

The battleship was to be used in the

same way as Rodney and Nelson used the ship-of-the-line

.

The

old wooden walls of 1800 became the high tensile steel armor

walls of 1900.

Mahan "stressed the significance of the sea

as logistical highway and avenue of enemy approach:

he

emphasized the power which 'due use and control' of sea com-

munication would endow any belligerent, and argued that this
•due use and control'

had been and was attainable by power-

units."
ful battle fleets organized and operating as
was only one primary function for the fleet:

the

There

"destruction or confinement of the enemy's fighting fleet,
as
a

preliminary to commercial blockade or military invasion."

The old concepts of coast defense and commerce raiding
while
not abandoned were relegated to a secondary role.

The pro-

tection of one's own commerce and trade routes were best
achieved by the destruction of the enemy's battle fleet.
The defensive role assigned to the navy since the late

eighteenth century was now abandoned in favor of an offensive one.
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The strategic consequence of this conception was

that of concentration.

The fleet must never be divided and

must, through constant practice, learn to operate as a unit.
In this fleet in being principle lay the origin of the North

Atlantic Battleship Squadron.

The General Board of the

Navy, that intellectual heart of American naval strategic

thinking, declared in 1903 that "the proper military policy,

taken as

a

general principal, for the distribution of the

fleet, is the concentration of all the battleships in the

Atlantic

"
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.

No longer did United States warships prowl the
oceans of the world as lone sentinals of American power.
Now, more often than not, they were found in groups.

Before

1902 the navy had never engaged in formal fleet exercises

during peacetime.
firmed,

The need to,

as Rear Admiral Taylor af-

"think in squadrons," was first satisfied by the

navy's fleet maneuvers in the Caribbean during the winter

months of 190 2-0 3.

Roosevelt felt the exercises were of

great importance, and he personally wrote
Admiral Dewey
asking him to take overall command of "our
first effort to
have maneuvers on a large scale in time of
"^^
peace.

The crisis with Germany over Venezuela v/hich
oc-

curred during the exercises has tended to obscure their
importance, but for the navy they marked

a

new departure.

Roosevelt was beginning to use the navy as

a

tool,

and in

the months following these first maneuvers he constantly ex-

panded its range.

By the summer of 1903 his battleships

were cruising off the Azores, halfway to Europe.

During the

summer of 1904 they were to reach the Old World, steaming
along the southern coasts of its periphery, announcing the

new naval might of the United States at first hand to the

European pov/ers.
Planning sessions required the designation of projected enem.ies.

After 1898 Great Britain the nemesis of the

American navy in the nineteenth century began to recede as

a

threat, although Roosevelt felt that America's new friend-

ship with England was based more upon practicality than on

Anglo-Saxon brotherhood.
he said,

"If we quit building our fleet,"

"England's friendship would immediately cool."

The growth of Japan as
1905 and Tsushima.

a
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viable enemy had to wait until after

The primary adversary during the period

from 1898 to 1905 then, at least in the minds of most

strategists,

v;as

the German Empire.

As early as May, 1900, the General Board

over

a

month after its first formal meeting

—

—

a

little

suggested the

development of

a

war plan positing,

"an attempt by Germany

to occupy a portion of /the/ South American continent south
of Rio /de/ Janeriro /sic/ in 1905.

the United States.

A declaration of war by

Possession of the Cape Verde Islands by

Germany.

Advance of the Germans upon Puerto Rico and Hayti

/si£/ and

a

consequent centering of the theater of action in

those Islands."

approved

a

As late as July,

190

3,

the General Board

memorandum which suggested "that the most impor-

tant war problem to be studied is that which is based upon
the supposition that Germany is the enemy

.

.

.

."

American mistrust of Germany was not without some
foundation.

In December, 1899, the Kaiser ordered the Chief

of Staff of the Navy Admiral von Diederichs, and the cele-

brated General von Schlieffen to develop
conflict with the United States,

a

war plan for a

The Kaiser wanted

a

plan

to seize Cuba, draw out the fleet and defeat it, and then
The Army General Staff, how-

invade the American mainland.

ever, preferred a direct attack on the United States,

focussing on Cape Cod and using Massachusetts Bay and
This scheme was

Provincetown as the center of operations.

dropped in 1902, but the Kaiser continued his interest in
other plans "at least until March, 190 3."
The War Game, or Kriegspiel

,
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was a favorite pastime

The most famous of these was

of naval officers before 1914.

the Jane Naval War Game, developed by the influential com-

piler of Jane'

s

Fighting Ships

.

The only Kriegspiel ever to

the
appear in that then quarterly Bible of the American navy

United _States Naval Institute Proceedings
September, 1903.

,

was published in

It featured a naval war between the United

States and Germany of almost Wagnerian proportions.

destruction of warships was frightful.
sea battles lead up to

a

Six mutually costly

final action off Key West, Florida,

where the American navy achieved

a

Pyrrhic victory only by

the successful use of its submarines

prophetic denouement.

The

—

an unusually

^

This Kriegspiel is interesting because it reveals,
like the war plans of the General Board, the essentially de-

fensive nature of American naval thinking vis-a-vis

European antagonist before 1904.

a

The navy would wait off

the coast of the United States for the German High Seas

Fleet or any other enemy to come to it.

This was a per-

fectly viable strategy given the strength of the American
navy

—

with

a

Japan would use this strategy in 1904-05 to deal

numerically superior Russi an navy

.

The United States

had only fourteen armored warships (excluding monitors) in
1904, but it fully expected to have almost forty in commis-

sion within two years.

More than enough to defend the coast

and yet take aggressive action.

The naval \^sso\\ for

Europe, particularly Germany, which would be underlined by
the Mediterranean operations of 1904 was clear; if the

United States could bring six battleships with attendant
cruisers and auxiliaries to Trieste, Austria, it could just
as easily bring them to the mouth of the Elbe.

'

The advantages to the prestige, as well as to the

diplomacy, of the United States by the 1904 cruise are more

difficult to measure than the strictly naval considerations
we have previously examined.

in Arms and Men

,

One historian, Walter Millis

sees the navy and its ships as providing

"the dramatic and obvious symbols of the new militarism that

ruled after 1898."

However, he also sees them as of "no

visible use under the actual international contexts of the
time

.

.

.

."

They had, Millis asserts, "no more than a

peripheral effect upon the main streams of American foreign
policy."

This judgement is incorrect.

The navy, especially

after Roosevelt became president, was the primary tool of

American foreign policy.
aptly put it,

It was,

"the 'cutting edge'

as

another historian has

—

—

of _/that^/ diplomacy."
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One might paraphrase von Clausewitz's dictum that

war was an extension of diplomacy, by saying that the tools
of war are also an extension of diplomacy.

What indeed

would be the effect on European perceptions of the United
States by the steaming of a fleet composed of some fourteen

highly visible, powerful warships through the Mediterranean,

visiting various ports, and conducting naval exercises?
The ostentatious employment of fleets of warships

to gain prestige, and to influence or celebrate diplomatic

events was well known to the European powers.

In the early

1890 's a large French fleet that visited Kronstadt had a

great deal to do with cementing the Franco-Russian rapproachment.

the
The fleet's visit "was a diplomatic gesture of

most open type; it was not misunderstood
anywhere

.

.

.

."35

Another, even more graphic example of the
use of

fleets occurred in 1903.

The Kaiser, feeling that the young

King of Spain Alfonso XIII was impressionable,
sent his seagoing brother Prince Henry of Prussia to Vigo in
May,

with eight cruisers.

1903,

"The object of the demonstration was

to impress the King with German military might and, in-

directly, to show her ability to help Spain."

The French,

with the encouragement of Prime Minister Silvela of Spain,
sent twenty-one warships commanded by Admiral Pottier to

Cartagena in June to counterbalance the effect of the German
visit.
The United States also began to play this naval

game of prestige diplomacy with its new navy.

After the

commissioning of the Chicago in 1889 the navy sent its first
three cruisers, along with the gunboat Yorktown, on
in European waters.

a

cruise

It was on this voyage of what came to

be known as the squadron of evolution that American naval

officers "received their first real experience in m.odern
fleet operations."

A permanent European Squadron, composed

of cruisers and gunboats, was established in 1901 and the

"appearance of Tunerican warships in European ports took on
a

political meaning unconnected with the traditional duties

of promoting American commerce and protecting American

property."

37

However, it was not until 1903 that any peace-

time cruise would equal the effect of the squadron of

evolution.

20

In that year the European Squadron consisted
of

four warships under Rear Admiral Charles
his flag on the armored cruiser Brooklyn

be

a

S,
.

Cotton, flying
Its cruise would

successful dress rehersal for the more powerful demon-

stration which would follow in 1904.

The Caribbean exercises

in the winter of 1902-03, the maneuvers of the Battleship

Squadron off the Azores during the summer of 1903, and now
the cruise of the European Squadron were all part of a

gradual outward movement of American naval power toward
Europe.

The master diplomat behind this movement was

Theodore Roosevelt.

Like chess pieces he pushed his ships

further and further from American shores, and the great
cruise of 1904 was part and parcel of this policy.

That

Roosevelt was behind this naval development cannot be
doubted.

He jealously guarded his control of the fleet and

woe to anyone who interfered with their movements without

consulting him.

Once, when he thought that Secretary of

State John Hay had done this in 1903 with the Battleship

Squadron, he sent the startled Hay

ended

v/ith the

curt order:

a

vigorous telegram which

"Do not let the fleet alter ar-

rangements without my sanction."
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If warships were to be

moved only Roosevelt would do it.
The European Squadron was at Marseilles on April 30,
1903, to participate in ceremonies welcoming back President

Loubet of France from
Africa.

a

highly important tour of French North

Cotton met with Loubet on board the French armored

to
cruiser Jeanne d'Arc, and then accompanied the President

Paris as an honored guest of the French
government.

Germany

looked askance at these developments and exerted
strong

diplomatic pressure on the United States to send
Cotton's
warships to the annual Regatta Week at Kiel where
the Kaiser

would be reviewing the fleet.
the Kaiser,

Roosevelt, in order to pacify

and to prevent embarrassment to his friend Speck

von Sternburg (the German Ambassador), detached the
Ke arsarqe from Barker's squadron in the Azores.

hoisted his flag on her
his ships to Kiel.

Cotton

Southampton and proceeded with

at

In the hothouse atmosphere that typified

the European power balance of the period the British govern-

ment now requested an official visit, and the squadron

steamed to Portsmouth for

a

naval review celebrating

President Loubet's visit to England. 39

Cotton was to cap the cruise by spending the rest
of the year in Turkish waters around the port of Beirut.

The squadron was in the eastern Mediterranean engaging in
the not so subtle use of naval diplomacy in wringing con-

cessions from Turkey.

Although Roosevelt's dispatch of the

cruisers to Beirut in August, 1903, was initiated by the
false report of an attack upon the local American consul,
the warships were kept in Turkish waters for another reason.

Roosevelt and the State Department had been under strong
pressure from missionary societies in the United States because of the highly ambiguous status of American run schools
in the Ottoman Empire.

40
"

answer to that pressure.

Sending Cotton to Beirut was one

The European nations had already come to
satis-

factory agreements with Turkey on the school question.
France even seized part of the Aegean island of
Mytilene
(Lesbos) in 1901 in order to underline her demands.

As mis-

sionary pressure mounted Roosevelt attempted to engage by

letter in direct personal diplomacy with the Turkish Sultan,
a

favorite Rooseveltian tactic.

It failed,

and the naval

operations in 1903 were an attempt to redress this failure.
The Turkish government marked time, and the ships were

finally withdrawn.

In part because the Porte indicated that

it would be more amenable to a settlement if the vessels

were recalled, but mostly because the Navy Department wanted

them back. 41
It was an election year in 1904 and this fact was

never far from Roosevelt's thoughts.

He had already pro-

tested Russian actions against their Jewish minority, and
the domestic political benefits which could be obtained from
a highly visible parade of naval diplomacy against Turkey

were obvious.
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It was decided that along with the prestige

to be garnered from the battleship cruise, perhaps an even

more concrete benefit might be gained.

Secretary of State John Hay in

a

letter found no-

•

where in the official despatches of the period, but in his

personal papers, put the case bluntly.
weeks,"

"Within the next six

May wrote to the American Minister at

Constantinople in late May, 1S04, "an imposing naval force
will move in the direction of Turkey.

You ought to be able

to make some judicious use of this fleet in your negotiations

without committing the Government to any action."

The care-

ful Hay ordered the Minister to "keep this letter absolutely

confidential, and not place it upon your files."

He closed

by asking him to "destroy it, and so report to me."^"^

The road that began at Guantanamo in late February
was the result of a number of trends in American naval and

diplomatic thinking.

It was a road which would lead Barker's

warships from one end of the Mediterranean to the other; from

Tangier by the Straits of Gibraltar to Smyrna in Asia Minor;
from the island of Corfu in the Ionian Sea, through the

Straits of Otranto

,

to Trieste in the Gulf of Venice

•

The

screws of six American battleships would churn the waters of
the Aegean and the Adriatic, and the strength they repre-

sented would humble two Sultans.

Commenting on the cruise, the Italian newspaper
Nuova Antologia (Rome) pointed out that

it was

"certain that

the period of American indifference to questions non-American
is closed,

or material

and that their policy is one of expansion, moral

....

American imperialism has assumed an ag-

gressive character, not only in South America and the extreme East, but also in Asia Minor, and now in the

Mediterranean,

—

that is to say, in Europe itself."
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CHAPTER II
PREPARATIONS FOR A CRUISE
Two months were to pass before the warships that lay
at anchor in Guantanamo Bay would move out of the Caribbean

and begin their voyage to the Mediterranean.

Two months in

which the fleet would engage in training exercises and maneuvers, and lose one-third of Barker's Battleship Squadron to

explosion and collision.

It was also to be two months filled

with diplomatic preparations by the State Department for the
cruise
"In my judgement, we never had as good
of the Navy

.

.

.

."

a

Secretary

The man Theodore Roosevelt extolled

was V7illiam H. Moody, who along with Admiral Taylor would

carry out the planning of the cruise.

When Roosevelt became

president one of the first cabinet changes he initiated was
the replacement of the conservative Long by Moody, who, be-

sides being

a

personal friend of Roosevelt, had

philosophy of naval power.

Moody had made

a

a

similar

name for him-

self in Massachusetts as a state prosecutor in the notorious

Lizzie Borden murder trial of the early 1890'

s,

and on the

strength of that reputation was elected to the U.
of Representatives in 1895.
as Attorney General

S.

House

He would later serve Roosevelt

and finally be appointed by him to a

seat on the Supreme Court."*"
24

In its search of the greatest possible exposure
for
its naval power the Roosevelt administration had begun

planning the Mediterranean cruise as early

as June,

1903,

in

the afterglow of the successful Caribbean maneuvers, and

while the summer exercises off the Azores were just getting

underway.

It was decided to begin the operation following

the spring Caribbean exercises of 1904, and February 20th of

that year

sav;

the beginning of detailed discussions between

the State and Navy departments.

After suggesting to Hay certain ports the navy preferred to visit, Moody asked about the "propriety of sending
the battleships on such a cruise," and whether the State

Department was of the opinion that they could be sent "with.

out giving offense."
.

sary one.

3

The question of propriety was a neces-

Although most of Europe

vi/as

at peace in mid-

February the balance of power on the continent was tenuous,
and the alliances which the powers would take into V/orld War
One were at this time in the process of assuming their final

configurations.

On February 8th war had broken out between

Russia and Japan, and some of these newly fashioned alliances
were experiencing their first real tests.
On the 25th of February Hay replied to Moody's
query,

approving the suggested itinerary and finding no in-

surmountable barriers to overcome in carrying it out.

Hay

wrote that he had that same day sent despatches to the

American ministers in Portugal and Austria-Hungary appraising
them of our intentions.

The United States ambassador in

Paris was also informed of the navy's desire to touch at

a

French Mediterranean port, but since the port had not as yet

been selected this request was to be left in abeyance for
the time being.

No firm dates for the visits were fixed ex-

cept that they would occur sometime between June and August.
No other countries were mentioned, and Hay went out of his
way to tell United States missions in the principal countries
of Europe that any invitations to the fleet "would be in-

convenient and embarrassing in consequence of the derangement" it would cause. 4

Europe in 1904 lay basking under the high sun of
general peace which, except for

a

a

brief conflict between

Russia and Turkey, had lasted unbroken since the FrancoPrussian War.

Almost thirty-five years of war-scares, al-

liances, counter-alliances, and tensions -- but no war.

The

soldiers of Europe still died, but not along the Rhine or in
the fir forests of East Prussia; instead they fought and
fell at such exotic places as Isandhlwana, Majuba Hill,

Tel-el-Kebir

,

El Obeid, Adov/a,

and Omdurman.

The tensions

of Europe were played out in Asia and Africa, and when

colonial expansion reached its limits
more spoils to be divided

—

—

when there were no

only then would the great

powers turn on themselves.
The tranquility which Europe enjoyed, however, was
in the process of becoming unravelled.

The alliance system

with which Bismarck insured the peace of Europe and the
since
security of Germany had come under increasing strain

his departure from power in 1890.

Kaiser William II

ser-

's

vile ministers could not match the skill and daring of
the
iron chancellor.

First France broke through her isolation

in the early 1890 -s and allied herself with Russia

riage of opposites

—

England had gone from

neutrality tov/ard Germany in 1890 to

im.portantly

,

a

mar-

the most republican of European powers

and the most autocratic.

enmity by 1904.

—

a

a

friendly

poorly-concealed

In the Kruger telegram of 1896,

and, more

the great naval expansion undertaken by Germany

after 1898 lay the basis of this change.
The Russo-Japanese War which broke out in February,
1904, demonstrated the potential fragility of the European

Japan was allied with Great Britain and Russia with

peace.

France, yet in Europe both England and France were beginning
to come together out of a mutual fear of Germany.

If this

new war should spread it could bring about agonizing conflicts of interests.

It was into this seething cauldron of

shifting interests and alliances that the American fleet
would steam.
When Hay informed United States ambassadors and

ministers in Europe of the proposed cruise he stressed its
peaceful intent.

"The object of this visit," he emphasized,

was "simply to afford the vessels and their crews the oppor-

tunities for practice incident to an extended trans-Atlantic

voyage

.

.

.

the visit is without significance of any kind."

If some of the European nations did not quite believe this

explanation, they at least suspended judgement.

Hay's
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clarification would later be seen as important in partly
allaying Russian alarm about the fleet's movements.
At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War American

sympathies lay with the Japanese.

Not only was Japan seen as

the underdog, but Russia's recent harsh treatment of her

Jewish subjects had been deplored by Americans and protested
by their government.

Russia was regarded as the aggressor,

hungry for land and warm water ports.

Later, with Japanese

successes, both official and popular support declined as

Japan slowly became the embodiment of the yellow peril with

each additional Russian defeat.

But in the beginning

American opinion supported Japan and the Russian government
was well aware of it.^
In an article which appeared in the respected monthly
The Nineteenth Century in April, 1904, an important connection

was drawn between the United States, its fleet, and Russia.

Demetrius C. Boulger's "Coming Continental Complications,"

examined the Russo-Japanese War and its effect on the
European power balance, especially Great Britain's relation
to it in the light of her two-year-old treaty with Japan.
It would be a "distinctly pacific measure" by President

Roosevelt, Boulger wrote, if the "United States were to send

half a dozen battleships across the Atlantic to spend the
next few months at the mouth of the Thames, the evidence
thus afforded that England did not stand alone in the world

would effectually baffle German machinations, and procure
solid on
the interval needed for French opinion to become

29

the point that sentimental grounds are not sufficient for

France to risk her whole future on behalf of Russia

.

.

.

."^

Boulger's curious article predicting the exact num-

ber of battleships the navy planned to send to Europe before
that information had been officially revealed evidently wor-

ried the Czar's government.
Robert

The American Minister to Russia,

McCormick, brought this to Hay's attention in

S.

long despatch on April 4th.

a

McCormick contended that the

foresight with which Hay and the State Department had com-

municated through him to the Russian government the peaceful
intent of the cruise would mitigate the article's unfortunate

effect.^
It is doubtful that Russian suspicions as to the

intent of the Voyage were settled by McCormick 's assurances,
and the later movements of the fleet off the Turkish coast

would do even less for Russia's peace of mind.

Toward the

end of the cruise the St. Petersburg daily Novoe Vremya

would be editorially complaining that America had "evidently

decided to take advantage of the present moment to establish
her supremacy in the Near East."

9

The first port which the fleet would visit was not
in the Mediterranean, but in the Atlantic.

In 1903 the

in midEuropean Squadron under Cotton had visited Lisbon

July with

a

great deal of success.

Later the King of

presence in
Portugal had fondly recalled the American

a

the request
speech to the Cortes, and with this background

that

a

in 1904
larger fleet be allowed to touch at Lisbon

.
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was readily accepted by the Portuguese government.

Charles

Page Bryan, the American Minister in Lisbon, foresaw no prob-

lems arising to hamper the visit.

Preparations for

easily expedited.

a

"'"'^

call at Trieste were not as

The American Minister in Vienna, Bellariy

Storer, approached the Austro-Hungarian foreign office un-

officially and received
April 12th.

somewhat unenthusiastic reply on

a

The Austrian Under Secretary of State Ritter von

Merey acknowledged Storer'

s

request, saying the "naval section

of the war department of Austro-Hungary has received the
new^s

.

.

.

with the greatest pleasure."

But there existed a

certain problem, the Austrian added, which would limit the
scope of the visit.

"''^

Merey said the Austro-Hungarian law forbade more
than three warships "of the same foreign navy to anchor at
the same time in the same port."

The law also extended to

the number of foreign warships allowed in Austro-Hungarian

waters, no more than six at any time.

that the American fleet

Merey, having heard

far exceeded these limitations, in-

formed Storer that "special authorization through the diplomatic channel" must be applied for by the United States.
asked
Hay acquainted Moody with the restriction, and Moody

they be
the State Department to officially request that

temporarily suspended.

This request was duly made by

Storer

After

a

short delay the necessary permission was

contingent upon
granted by the Vienna government, but it was

certain modifications to be made in the fleet's schedule.

Although the proposal appears to have been offered by Storer
it was probably suggested to him by the Austro-Hungarian

foreign office as an acknowledgment to Hungarian national

sensibilities. 13

Trieste was the chief port of the Austrian

part of the Empire, but about 150 miles by sea from Trieste,
on the other side of the Istrian peninsula, lay Fiume

,

the

principal seaport of Hungary.
Storer wrote Hay that in "view of the intense
national pride that Hungary has in her only seaport," one or
two of the navy's ships should be sent to Fiume as

"politically gracious act."

a

Storer pointed out that the

State Department, in emphasizing America's "old sympathy and

friendship" with Hungary would gain

a

great deal of prestige

as an enticement to gain the Navy Department's ap-

Also,

proval for the visit, he noted that Fiume "is the head-

quarters of the Austro-Hungarian torpedo boat fleet and the
place of manufacture of the Whitehead /Torpedo/ Company /and

this/ would be in itself ample apparent reason for such
visit

a

.,14
"

•

.

Thus the port of Fiume was added to the itinerary
of the cruise.

Villefranche was selected as the French

Mediterranean port to be visited, and by the middle of May
all of the necessary diplomatic maneuvering to prepare the

way for the fleet had been accomplished.

s

The government was somewhat premature in telling

other nations that they would be visited by six battleships.
The fleet at Guantanamo lost its first major unit when Taylor
and Dewey decided that the Massachusetts

.

which they had

observed in maneuvers with the newer battleships, must be
taken out of the Battleship Squadron and sent to join the

...

Coast Squadron.

Although "her battery is

as any vessel's

in the world," Taylor judged that "her in-

as formidable

ferior speed" and "low freeboard with seas breaking con-

tinually over her decks makes her unfit" for service in
Barker's squadron. 15
arrived Iow a.

Her place

v>70uld

be taken by the newly

There was to be no easy replacement for the

next loss.
On March 1st the battleships again left Guantanamo

for further exercises as well as to see Admiral Dewey's

Mayflow er off to Santo Domingo.

In the midst of a drill,

with the battleships steaming at ten knots, the Missouri

'

steering engine broke down causing her to swerve and ram the
Illinois

.

The collision was serious enough to force the

fleet back into Guantanamo, while the Mayflower and Dewey

went on to Santo Domingo.

Back in the confines of the bay

it was discovered that while there was only minor damage to

the bow of the Missouri

,

the

I

llinois had suffered

shaft and could not use her port engine.

a

bent

The damage was

temporarily repaired, but the Illinois had to be sent north
for more extensive repairs and would be lost for at least

part of the Mediterranean cruise.
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The Court of Inquiry which investigated the
colli-

sion caused not a little embarrassment to
President

Roosevelt, for the captain of the Missouri was
William
Cowles, Roosevelt's brother-in-law.

S.

Cowles was fifty-seven

years old, and had commanded the Missouri

.

the newest of the

navy's battleships, since her commissioning in December,
1903.

In the 1890 -s he had been naval attache at the U.

S.

Embassy in London, and during the Spanish American War com-

manded the gunboat Topeka
Missouri

.

.

Prior to his command of the

Cowles held the prestigious post of naval aide to

the President.

He was a well-connected, much smiled-upon

naval officer at the pinnacle of his career.
The official proceedings of the Court praised the

captain of the Illinois as well as Cowles for correct
actions taken after the collision.

The Court seem.ed in-

clined, however, to hold Cowles partly responsible for

causing the accident, the primary accusation stressing

a

failure on Cov^les' part to display the correct signals

warning the Illinois of the coming collision.
said the Court,

"This failure,'

"to convey to the Illinois as to the actual

conditions on board the Missouri was, in the opinion of the
Court,

after the accident to the steering gear, the secondary

cause of the collision."

18

Proper signals, it was stated, could have allowed
the Illinois to avoid the Missouri

.

The Court recommended,

however, that no further proceedings be taken against Cowles.
His battleship,

after all, was

a

newly commissioned ship,

"

"

"introduced into

a

squadron of evolution without previous"

experience in such maneuvers

Moody was

a

.

-"-^

bit troubled by the obvious ambiguous

findings of the Court and wrote to Admiral Dewey
asking him
to review all the facts in the case.

asked Moody,
the Court,

Was the Navy Department,

"justified in acting upon the recommendation of

approved by the Commander-in-Chief, that no

further proceedings in the premises be taken, or, if, in

your opinion, the Department is not justified, what actions
would you recommend?"

Dewey carefully reviewed the Court's

proceedings and advised the Navy Department to approve the
findings

.

Roosevelt wrote Cowles after the inquiry saying
that the Court had used language which "conveyed an entirely

wrong impression,"

He felt that they laid too much stress

on the unimportant point of the signals, while not giving

enough credit to Cowles' quick reactions afrer the collision.
Roosevelt then, somewhat ungraciously, told Cowles that if
the Missouri had to come back to the United States for re-

pairs he would be best advised to "stay pretty steadily
the ship and not come up to Washington

.

election was over, Roosevelt said, "there
lesser degree the
on mine

.

sanie

.

.

."

viith

Until the

/^would_/ be

in a

necessity for caution on your part as

,.21

Cowles' problems were far from over.

Reviewing the

accident and the actions of the Court of Inquiry in its

April issue. The Army and Navy Journal brought attention to

"

.

the family connection between Roosevelt and
Cowles, as well
as the ambiguous nature of the final report.

The Journal

also stated that the members of the Court received
two tele-

grams from influential sources to save Cowles from

martial and removal from his command.

a

courts

Roosevelt ordered

Moody to investigate these allegations, and Moody reported
back on April 4th that

a

careful preliminary investigation

"does not show that anyone sent telegrams to the court of in-

quiry

.

22

Suspicions of the Court's results still lingered in
the air.

lucky,

If Cowles was not incompetent he was certainly un-

and in the military an unlucky commander was one to be

avoided.

Undoubtedly the naval high command did not receive

any direct pressure, but it certainly was aware of Cowles'

position vis-a-vis the President and drew its own conclusions
The fate of a less well-connected commander might have been

unhappier
After the accident the Battleship Squadron remained
at Guantanamo until the afternoon of the 9th of March, when

it steamed for Pensacola,

Florida.

Barker arrived there on

the 14th and found in the anchorage nearly all the warships
of the North Atlantic fleet,

including those of the South

Atlantic and European squadrons.
went through

a

At Pensacola the squadrons

reorganization with ships detailed to new

assignments and new commanders appointed.

Except for

bringing the warships out of the harbor to engage in target
practice off the Santa Rosa Island ranges the fleet stayed

at the Pensaccla anchorage for almost two months.

^

Two events would break the boredom in this period

between cruises:

a

riot of considerable proportions and the

reduction of Barker's strength by yet another battleship.
The Saturday night riot took place on April 16th

when a large group of sailors from the fleet and "a few

artillery men from Fort Barancas" fought
the Pensacola police.

a

battle royal with

One soldier was killed,

and four

sailors from the Iowa and Al abama were wounded.

Over three

hundred soldiers and sailors were involved in the riot, which
began when the police attempted to arrest an obstreperous
sailor.

The police had fired into a yelling mob while being

rushed under

a

barrage of stones and bottles.

The situation

was prevented from becoming more serious when Barker ordered
the fleet's marines ashore to disperse the men and patrol
the port.

Numerous attempts by sailors to smuggle arms and

ammunition in from the warships were aborted and many bluejackets arrested and sent back to their ships in chains.

24

The loss of the second battleship occurred just

three days before the riot.

Cowles'

Missouri was at target

practice about ten miles off Pensacola in the company of the
Texas and Brooklyn

.

The Missouri had fired a number of

rounds from each of her four twelve-inch guns when, around
There was no

noon, an explosion shook her main aft battery.

loud report, but only a dull thud followed by flames and
^ ^
V
billowing black smoke pouring from the wounded turret.
X.
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s

37

Five officers and twenty-eight enlisted men died

that day.

The few who were not immediately killed in the

explosion survived only
Marine Lt.

J.

P.

V.

a short time.

Among the dead was

Gridley, the son of Dewey's commander

of the Olympia at Manila Bay.

All of the casualties were

located in the turret and the handling room.

Below the

latter lay the magazine, and only quick action prevented an

explosion which would have torn the stern off the navy's
newest battleship and sent her to the bottom.
The most important of these actions in insuring the

Missouri

'

survival was that of Chief Gunner's Mate Monson.

On hearing the explosion Monson immediately entered the

magazine, put out the fire he found there, and secured the
hatches.

He remained locked in the magazine when Captain

Cowles had the compartment flooded.

Some hours later he

found up to his neck in water and barely alive.

v-zas

Monson was

decorated for his heroism and Admiral Barker later wrote
that naval history "records no more heroic acr than that of

Monson who crawled through
put out the flames."

a

hole into

a

burning magazine to

27

Captain Cowles' quick response in the crisis also
came in for praise.

Before rushing from the bridge he

ordered the affected area flooded, and had the Missouri steam
for shallow water so that if she sank there would be

chance of salvaging her.

a

better

He then hurried aft and personally

led a number of attempts to enter the still smoldering turonly
Driven back by the intense heat and smoke he could
ret.
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manage to bring out one already dying man.^^
The dead, with the exception of those bodies
which

were sent home at the request of the family,
were buried near
the Pensacola Navy Yard.

sions of grief,

a

Roosevelt and iMoody sent expres-

fund was set up, and numerous benefits for

the victims staged throughout the country.

Inquiry, headed by Rear Admiral French

cluded that the explosion was caused by

A Court of

E.

Chadwick, con-

a

flare-back, or

back-flame; an "inexplicable combination of oxygen with certain latent gasses in smokeless powder.

Admiral Barker, in his endorsement of the report
issued by the Court, was critical of the navy's smokeless
powder.

The "'properties of which," he complained,

"have not

been fully understood either by those using it on board our
ships or by those who make and issue it for service." 30
No blame accrued to Cowles because of the accident;
indeed, a similar, if less grave, mishap had occurred on the

Massachusetts in 1903. 31

But his unlucky Missouri was now

unable to participate in the cruise and had to limp north
for repairs.

With the loss of the Missouri and the Illinois

Barker's battleship force was now down to four.

There re-

mained some hope of regaining the two cripples while the
fleet was still in the Mediterranean if damages could be re-

paired in time.

By the end of April, 1904, the three squadrons in-

volved in the cruise were ready for their departure from

39

Pensacola.

Two of them, the Battleship and the European,

left on May 5th and headed south for Guantanamo.

The re-

organized European Squadron consisted of the Olympia (flag),
Baltimore

.

and Cleveland

.

It also had a nev; commander, Rear

Admiral Theodore Frelinghuysen Jewell.

He had captained the

cruiser Minneapolis in Schley's Flying Squadron during the
Spanish American War.

The command of the European Squadron

was to be his final service before retirement.
The two squadrons reached Guantanamo on the 9th of

May where the ships took on stores for the voyage.

On the

13th Barker ordered Jewell to steam for St. Thomas in the

Virgin Islands to coal, and then sail for the Azores where
both squadrons would rendezvous at the port of Horta.

Mean-

while Barker's four battleships coaled at Guantanamo and on
the afternoon of the 15th, forming a double column, headed

out of the bay bound for the Azores.

33

Although glad to be finally underv;ay Barker felt
some concern about the condition of his battleships.

"bottoms of the vessels," he grumbled,

The

"were more or less

foul from having been out of dock a long time, but for some

reason the Navy Department did not wish us to touch at any

Navy Yard before proceeding to Europe."

34

The third squadron to steam for the Mediterranean
was the South Atlantic.

Commanded by Rear Admiral French

E.

Chadwick, it was composed of the armored cruiser Brooklyn
(flag), the old protected cruiser Atlanta

ounboats Machias and C as tine.

Chadwick

,

v;as

and the two large

perhaps the most

.

40

interesting of the three admirals on the cruise.

Known as

an "intellectual," he was a writer and a naval
theorist of

no mean accomplishment.

A veteran of the Civil War,

Chadwick served as the first United States naval attache
in

London from 1632 to 1889.

He commanded the gunboat Yorktown

on the squadron of evolution's European cruise,

and later

headed the Naval Intelligence Office and the Bureau of
Equipment.

New York

,

During the war he captained the armored cruiser
and was Sampson's chief of staff.

was cited for his "eminent

battle.

and.

At Santiago he

conspicuous" conduct in the

Between 1900 and 190 3 he had held the prestigious

post as head of the Naval War College at Newport,

Characterized by

a

contemporary as

direct in speech, even almost to brusqueness

I

man "very

a
,

R.

"

it was as a

vzriter that Chadwick had achieved his greatest eminence.

His best-known work was a highly praised and quite popular

two-volume edition on the diplomacy and military operations
of the Spanish American War.

Indeed, it served as an early

official history of the conflict.

Chadwick was well known

to President Roosevelt and John Hay, and had

personal relationship with the latter.

3

a

fairly close

6

Chadv/ick took command of the South Atlantic Squadron

on April 9th, left Pensacola later that month, and arrived at

San Juan, Puerto Rico, on May 6th.

On the morning of the

14th he sailed, bound for Santa Cruz, Teneriffe, in the

Canary Islands.

The operational plan of the squadron called

for it to steam along the coast of North Africa, calling at

s

Gibraltar, Algiers, and Alexandria, Egypt, before passing

through the Suez Canal.

Chadwick

v/as

to cruise independently

from Barker's and Jewell's warships, but would be in the same

general area during the month of June.
That the Navy and the State departments may have had

other plans for Chadwick's squadron was hinted at in
sent to him by the Bureau of Navigation

a

letter

inserts to be

(v/ith

delivered to the ships of his squadron) containing illustrations of the various Turkish flags and signals.

gesture?

Perhaps.

An innocent

But since Chadwick's plans called for him

to go nowhere near the Turkish coast why was he sent the in-

serts,

and why only for Turkey?

Hay's instructions to the

American minister in Constantinople informing him of

a

large

fleet heading for Turkey also mentions Chadwick's squadron
as part of this force.
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The voyage across the Atlantic was uneventful except
for the gunboats.

The Machias broke down on the 17th and had

to be towed most of the way by the Bro oklyn

most ran out of coal.

Lt.

Commander Edward

;

the Casti ne alJ.

Dorn of the

Castine lamented in his diary that he would "never get over
this seasickness."

The gunboats were built to serve in

coastal waters and in the deep mid-Atlantic swells they wal-

lowed dreadfully.
Broo klyn'

Late in the afternoon of the 26th the

lookout sighted the great mountain rising from

the ocean which was Teneriffe,
blossom.ed the signal:

and from the flagship's yard

"We see the Peak!"
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The ships entered the harbor of Santa Cruz on the

morning of the 27th, but their stay was to be brief for
waiting were emergency orders from the Navy Department
sending the entire force to Tangier, Morocco

—

an American

citizen had been kidnapped by bandits and was being held for
ransom. 40

Over

a

thousand miles to the northwest the same

scene was shortly to take place at Horta in the Azores.

Barker had arrived on the 26th and coaled from two colliers
he found waiting for him in the harbor.

Early on the 28th

Jewell's cruisers came in, and that afternoon the fleet, except the Iowa (her departure delayed because of

a

very ill

41
crewman), cleared Horta bound for Lisbon.
.

The warships were not yet over the horizon when the

Kearsarge

,

which had been testing her new wireless with the

Iowa back at Horta, received an urgent message from her

ordering Jewell and his squadron to Tangier.

Jewell's ships

immediately broke away from the battleships and headed for
Morocco.

As Barker later ruminated, this little experience

showed "how easy it is to reduce the strength of

a

fleet."

From an originally planned force of six battleships and
three cruisers. Barker steamed on to Lisbon reduced in

strength to four battleships.
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There were now seven American warships heading

toward

a

small Moroccan seaport near the Straits of Gibraltar

Their mission:

to rescue a single American citizen of Greek

descent by the name of Ion Perdicaris, living in

a

dusty

.

43

third-rate se aport at the fringe of civili zation

1

;

CHAPTER

III

A KIDNAPPING
From aesthete to imperialist:

Perdicaris can be summed up in

if the life of Ion

phrase, this might be it.

a

The kidnapping of Perdicaris was a strange affair, but it
was no stranger than the life of this long-term American ex-

patriate living in Morocco.

Independently wealthy; painter;

sculptor; playwright; businessman; novelist; wif e-stealer

imperialist; and humanitarian.

He had been a resident of

Tangier for thirty years, and was the wealthiest and bestknown of that port city's foreign residents.

The path which

had led Ion Perdicaris from Trenton, New Jersey, to Tangier,

Morocco was no less uncommon than the man himself.
His father, Gregory Perdicaris, was born in Greece
but had been forced to flee that country after becoming in-

volved in revolutionary activity.
tunate, was beheaded by the Turks.

States in the 1820

's he

His brother, not as for-

Arriving in the United

graduated from Amherst Collage and

became an instructor of Greek at Harvard, rising to

a

Professorship of Latin and modern Greek and Greek history.
into
He later settled in South Carolina where he married

well-established Charleston family, the Hanfords.
father was

cousin

a

a

His wife'

professor at South Carolina College, and

justice on the state Supreme Court.
44

a

a

Perdicaris

firs

,

45

returned to Greece as the Van Buren-appointed Consul-General
in Athens,

and it was here that his only son. Ion Hanfcrd,

was born in 1840.

Deprived of his diplomatic appointment by

the Whig victory in that same year, Perdicaris and his

family returned to the United States.

By now the revolution-

ary ardor of Gregory's early years had substantially cooled,

and he began to turn his attention toward the making of

fortune

a not

a

unusual desire in Jacksonian America."*"

Gregory proceeded to amass

a

considerable amount of

money in the illuminating gas industry.
in a number of American cities,

He built gas works

including Charleston and

Trenton, New Jersey, and it was in the latter city that the

Perdicaris family settled in the years before the Civil War.
In

1

ater life Gregory went to live with his son in Tangier

and v^hen he died there in the early 1880

inheritance of over

a

million dollars.

's he

left Ion an

Ion received his

early education at the Trenton Academy, and in 1856 he

entered Harvard but left at the end of the first term of his
sophomore year.

Later, when he was in his fifties and

sixties, Perdicaris took great pride in having gone to

Harvard, if only for a brief time, and kept in regular cor-

respondence with the class secretary.
The Class of 1360, of which Ion was a part, was one
of those Harvard classes decimated by the Civil War, names

which can now be found on brass plaques lining the walls of
Memorial Hall.
the conflict,

It lost about one-third of its graduates in

including Robert Gould Shaw, the young

commander of the Army's first black regiment.^
Ion was more fortunate.

studied art in Europe, including

After leaving Harvard he
a

period

at the Ecole des

Beaux Arts in Paris.

The outbreak of the Civil War found

him in Athens, and in

a

very curious position.

Still a legal

resident of South Carolina, he was given the option of re-

turning to America and serving with the Confederate forces
or losing part of his inheritance.

Perdicaris took

a

third

road, initiating proceedings designed to divest him of his

American citizenship.

Forty-two years later this attempt

would come back to haunt both him and Theodore Roosevelt.'^
The next few years were spent by Ion in Europe and

the United States studying, painting,

and writing a number of

articles dealing with literary and aesthetic subjects.
v;as

He

also a serious student of spiritualism and occult

phenomenon

—

a

then quite respectable fad which had swept

the United States and Europe during the mid-nineteenth century.

In the late 1850

s

he went to live in England,

studying under and living in the home of the well-known
electrical engineer Cromwell Fleetwood Varley.

Varley was

a

5

fellow of the Royal Society and had

been associated with the development and construction of the
first Atlantic cable.

It was their mutual interest in

spiritualism which had brought the two men together; however,
the relationship was suddenly and dramatically ended when

Perdicaris ran off with Varley 's young wife.

After the di-

vorce in 1872, Ellen Varley and he were married at Wiesbaden,

Germany.

The newlyweds

then settled for

,

along with Ellen's four children,

time in the United States.

a

Family respon-

sibilities seem to have settled Ion down, for he now ceased
his peripatetic life and began to look for

place in which

a

to establish a permanent residence.

Perdicaris found this haven in Tangier, Morocco;

although he and his family spent

a

great deal of time

traveling in Europe, Tangier remained home at least for the
summer m.onths
manently.

,

and then, from 1884 on, more or less per-

He loved the old Moorish port "with its ruined

battlements overlooking the horseshoe curve of its silver
beach.

In one lyrical description of Tangier he wrote of

"

the "white walls of the terraced houses, the mosques and

minarets

,

"

and the "emerald verdure " of the gardens

"now

,

redolent with the perfume of the orange and lemon, and over-

looked by the v/ooded slopes of the Spartello headland-"
From here one had

a

view "commanding

a

wide range of sea and

mountain, whilst the distant peaks of the Beni Hassan range
add the lustre of their snow-tipped summits."

7

Some of his paintings were exhibited at the

Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia during 1876, and one

called Tent Life was critically acclaimed.
a

As vehicles for

stage-struck step-daughter, he wrote and produced

of plays.

a

number

One was a comedy called Social Questions and an-

other, Nadi ne, was a melodrama.

In 1879 he brought the lat-

ter from England to New York where it ran for

a

week.

but his
Perdicaris persevered, putting the play on the road,

48

stepdaughter

—

stage name was Nard Alymane -- ran

v/hose

away with the leading man,

Decker.

an alcoholic actor by the name of

Ton disinherited his stepdaughter, who had married

Decker, went to England, had

a son,

and sued for divorce.

When Perdicaris took back his stepdaughter he also accepted
the child as his own. g
In Tangier Perdicaris became an important member of

the foreign community.

He had two handsome residences.

One

in Tangier, called El Minzah (Beautiful View), was a "villa

standing in extensive grounds,

a

walls,

visitor remembered it, "in

an ideal house,"

as one

little outside the city

which the Orient and the Occident meet in comfort and adornment."

The other was a former royal residence on the

Spartello headland about five miles west of the port.
was called Aidonia

rested on

(The Place of the Nightingales),

a small hill

"with green shutters,

dining table,

a

a

and

patriotically renamed Mount

Washington by Perdicaris.

Aidonia was

It

9

Moorish styled building painted white
an open forecourt,

red candles on the

large telescope on the terrace, and groves

of myrtle, roses and arbutus falling into the sea."

monkeys, some tame pheasants, and

a

Several

demoiselle crane

scampered and strutted about the well-kept grounds.

In the

cork woods surrounding the estate Perdicaris often sat at an
easel painting, according to

a

wry observation by Sir Arthur

Nicolson (British Minister in Tangier), "huge, symbolic
pictures of Virtue pursuing Vice

..10
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Perdicaris welcomed many foreign visitors, espe-

cially any American who might happen to wander into Tangier.
With over thirty servants dressed in scarlet knee pants and

gold-embroidered jackets he enjoyed "an Edwardian gentleman's
life amid elegant bric-a-brac of Oriental rugs, damasks /and/
rare porcelains

.

.

.

."

Just prior to his kidnapping he

had royally entertained Princess Louise of SchleswigHolstein.

""""^

One American visitor to Tangier, Linn Boyd Porter,

had on occasion observed an oared boat in the harbor, handled
by sailors in bright uniforms, with

from its stern.
guide replied,

a

strange flag fluttering

He asked his Arab guide what it

"English boat."

,

and the

Porter responded that the

flag was not the English "bandera," and asked

represented.

v;as

The guide calmly answered,

v;hat

nation it

"Perdicaris."

12

Taking an important role in the public life of
Tangier, Perdicaris showed yet another side of his character.
Ke organized and subsidized a sanitary commission in the
1880' s, which turned Tangier "from a pest-hole into a

healthy town."

The Tangier Hygienic Commission of which he

was the Vice President was known to the native officials as
the "Street Sweeping Commission," but it was, over and above
its sanitary function, the chief foreign-controlled organi-

zation in Tangier, actually

a

government within

a

government.

When he first settled in Morocco Perdicaris engaged in some
casual importing, but by 1895 he had no "active occupation

developing /his?
on account of defective health, other than

50

properties at or near Tangier

""'^
.

As he grew older the aesthete of the 1860 's gave way

to the humanitarian-imperialist of the 1880

'

s

and 90' s,

an

age in which these terms were seldom contradictory, one some-

times rationalizing the other.

Perdicaris' humanitarian aims

appear to have been honest, though he was not known for ig-

noring the economic side of imperialism.

He was not engaged

in business in Morocco, but he did own a great deal of prop-

erty and had a vested interest in the stability of the
country.

A stability which the crumbling power of the

Sultanate could not provide, and which, in Perdicaris' view

could only come from an outside force.
He was a staunch defender of the native population,

and had developed some very deep and close personal relation-

ships with a number of upper-class Moors, particularly the

Wazan family.

In the mid-1880

's

this stance led to a ser-

ious conflict with the United States Consul in Tangier, an

individual by the name of Mathews;

and at one point

Perdicaris found himself thrown into the Kasbah (Fortress) at

Tangier for twenty-four hours, after harboring

a

native who

had complained to him of extortion at the hands of the

American Consulate.
The experience was such that Perdicaris wrote his

first and only novel, detailing the encounter, and as with

most first novels it is autobiographically revealing.
The Case of Mohammed Benani

:

Titled

A Story of Today and published

Consul into
in London in 1888, the novel changes the American

the Russian Consul; Tangier was called Tingizirah;

Perdicaris renamed Ivan Paulovitch.

and

Perdicaris/Paulovitch

was portrayed as a defender of the natives of Tingizirah

against the claims of money lenders supported by the Russian
Consul, Count Mazenoff (Mathews ).

'"^

To resolve the case of one such native Paulovitch
goes to Russia (United States) to bring the problem to the

highest authority.

He tells his story to the Foreign

Minister, de Giers (Secretary of State Bayard), and attempts
to obtain an interview with the Czar (President Cleveland).

The matter was finally settled through the good offices of
the leader of the Civil Service Party, Curtieff (George

William Curtis); Paulovitch sees the Czar and the issue is

satisfactorily resolved with the recall of Count Mazenoff.
At one point in the novel Perdicaris describes his alter

ego Ivan, as a "preux chevalier,"

a

"knight errant," and

"one of the most perfect gentlemen social life could shov;."~

The novel was based on actual events, for

Perdicaris did go to the United States and did manage to
The case caused something

have Mathews removed from office.

of a stir in the European and American press and gained

Perdicaris some notoriety on both continents.

The young

lawyer who helped represent him in America, Samuel Rene
Gummere, would later become with Perdicaris' help the United

States Consul-General at Tangier.
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In his desire to protect the natives

his own interests

—

—

as well

as

Perdicaris saw the answer in more, not

less,

foreign con-rol

spokesman for

a

Here the humanitarian becomes the

.

benevolent imperialism.

of conditions in Morocco during the 1880

The rapid breakdown
's

and 1890 's pro-

vided the basis for this attitude, and the clearest expression of his position on foreign intervention can be found in
his writings on Morocco.
In 1386 Perdicaris published a book in London, sup-

posedly authored by

a

foreign resident, containing

a

of long essays on Morocco by Perdicaris and others.

American CI aims and the Protection of Native Subjects
Morocco

,

number

Called
i_n

the work was essentially concerned with the absence

of law and order;

and the Moorish administration was con-

demned as being "so defective that it offers no security
18
either for property, liberty, or life."

Perdicaris carefully pointed out the benefits to be

derived from intervention.

"If Tangier and the surrounding

territory could be rendered secure," he wrote, the growth in
trade would be "highly advantageous to European commerce."
The nation which took the first step in this direction could

"look back with pride and satisfaction /on/ the beneficial

results that cannot fail to attend the consummation" of such
a take-over.

At one point in the book he declared that he

violence was
was an American citizen and because of local
nationals in
very concerned with the protection of American
to remember
a concern which he would have cause
Morocco

—

eighteen years later.

.

Throughout the 1890

Perdicaris was

's

tributor and letter-writer to

a

prolific con-

a

number of American and

English periodicals and newspapers.

In a series of articles

for The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly he consistently
wrote
on the impending collapse of Morocco as an independent
power,

expressing the hope for eventual English intervention

as he

did not look upon either French or Spanish control with any
equ animity 20
.

.

By early 1904 he was writing that "/aZny day, any

hour now, may give the Sultan's tottering authority the last
fatal push which will send him at last, all unwilling though
he may be, reeling into the arms of France

.

.

.

."^-^

Little

did Ion realize when he wrote these lines that he would, albeit unwillingly, supply some of the force behind that fatal
push.

At the turn of the nineteenth century only three

nations on the continent of Africa had managed to maintain
their independence against decades of European incursions.
Liberia, lying on the inhospitable Guinea coast, kept its

freedom by combining

a

vague sort of protection afforded by

its association with the United States with
of any exploitable resources.

a

complete lack

In East Africa Abyssinia,

ruled by the warrior-emperor Menelik II, had recently thrown
back an Italian attempt at conquest.

The third nation was

Morocco, a vulnerable feudal state lying too close to Europe
to be ignored, with only jealously betv/een the great powers

preventing her partition.

The Moroccan Empire by 1900 was

drifting into anarchy and chaos, waiting for European
power
politics to decide whose colony she would become.
The French conquest of Algeria in 1830 had presented
a

potentially grave threat to Morocco's autonomy.

Conflicts

with France in 1830, 1844, and 1851 brought the Sultanate the

bombardment of its seaports and

a

not too advantageous set-

tlement of her eastern border with Algeria.

engaged Morocco in

a

In 1859 Spain

short, successful war, and by 1873 only

the combination of Morocco's last strong ruler and the defeat
of France by Germany gave the country thirty more years of

relative independence. 22
The Sultan who came to power in 1873 was Moulay el

Hassan, and he was to spend over twenty years in the saddle

trying to repress an endless series of rebellions against
his authority.

Indeed it took him two months of hard

fighting to gain control of his capital after he came to the
throne.

Commanding an army of 40,000 men, he campaigned

through the Atlas Mountains, with the Scotsman Sir Harry

Maclean drilling his infantry and a former French Army
lieutenant directing his artillery.

While campaigning in

the Tadla region of the Middle Atlas in 1894 he died, worn
out like the country he had tried to hold together.

At the age of fourteen Moulay'

s

23

son Abd el Aziz,

became Sultan, with the crafty Vizier Ba Ahmed (sometimes
called the "Bismarck of Morocco") and the Sultan's

Circassian mother as the powers behind the throne.

Shortly

after Ba Ahmed's death in 1900, French forces from Algeria

began a series of border attacks and backed
lion within Morocco.

a

serious rebel-

Abd el Aziz was young and weak, com-

pletely unfitted for the role which he inherited, and without
Ba Ahmed he could not even begin to grasp the reins of
power.
Sir Arthur Nicolson, appointed the British Minister
to Morocco in 1895, described the then fifteen-year old

Sultan as "not bad looking, but podgy and puffy," just like
"a boy who ate too much."

One of the presents which Nicolson

brought from Queen Victoria was that black metal symbol of

British military superiority over these swarthy lesser
breeds,

The young Sultan was a little nervous

Maxim gun.

a

when the gun was first fired but soon became interested.
"He fired off a good many rounds himself and was delighted,"

said Nicolson,
a

"biting his lips to prevent breaking out into

broad grin of delight."

25

As the threat of a European take-over grew, the

Sultan retreated into his Palace at Fez which was equipped
Corres-

with the latest wonders of European technology.

pondent of The Times (London) Walter

visitor at the Palace, provided

a

B.

Harris,

a

frequent

ludicrous picture of the

Sultan "playing bicycle-pole with some of his European suite,
which included at this time an architect,

a

conjurer,

a

watchmaker, an American portrait-painter, two photographers,
a German lion-tamer,

a

French soda-water manufacturer,
Scottish piper.
•

chauffeur,

a fire-work expert, and

a

V.

..26

a

.

.

56

By 1904 Morocco was in a state of anarchy, rebel-

lion spreading throughout the countryside and local bandits

making life unsafe for European and native alike.

The royal

prerogative existed only in the towns and cities, and even
then only tenuously.

2

6

It was France which had the greatest interest in

Morocco.

Except for Spanish enclaves in the north and south,

French colonies surrounded the country on its land borders.
In the late 1890 's France, under the direction of its Foreign

Minister Theophile Delcasse, began to move forward on

a

"very circumspect policy" of gaining full control in Morocco

French forces
southwest

,

,

in 1900,

first seized the Tuat oasis in the

and then the fertile Road of the Palms

a

line

of oases stretching along the caravan route to Timbuctu

20

But the most important barrier to French hegemony
in the Sultanate lay in Europe,

and in December of 1900

Delcasse obtained an agreement with Italy giving France, as
far as Italy was concerned,

a

free hand in Morocco in return

for the same Italian right in Tripoli.

This agreement was

the first official European recognition of the primacy of

France in Morocco.
.

29

From 1901 Morocco "ceased to be

a

backwater in

European diplomacy," and quickly "became one of the main
channels through which, with ever-increasing speed and
volume, the water of policy poured towards the cataract."
to
Great Britain represented the chief stumbling block

French control.

England's interest in Morocco lay mainly

in Tangier,

and a glance at a map shows what the
strategic

location of the port meant; for if Gibraltar
commands the
Mediterranean and the life line to India, then
Tangier commands Gibraltar.

Britain could not tolerate

a

Tangier in

unfriendly hands and in 1901, only three years after
Fashoda
France was still suspect.
As conditions in Morocco deteriorated, and French

incursions on the border grew more frequent,
became increasingly desirable.

a

settlement

France was especially con-

cerned over the numerous English advisors around the Sultan

—

the so-called Engling Ring

—

in particular Kaid Maclean,

the commander of the Sultan's army, who,

ban and

a

"/"a/r rayed in

a

tur

white bernous," would often stride around the

Palace grounds "blowing into his bagpipes.*' 31
In 1902 France opened negotiations with Spain for

Moroccan settlement

,

a

and on August 6th of that year the

French Ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, tried to sound out

Lord Lansdowne (the British Foreign Minister) on England's
attitude "in the event of Morocco passing into liquidation."

Lansdowne put Cambon off this time, but as

a

result of King

Edward's amicable visit to France in 1903, negotiations were

opened between Lansdowne and Delcasse.

Lord Lansdowne was

concerned with the status of Tangier as well as the maintenance of an "open door" for British investment.

Delcasse

gave him assurances on these points and also of German lack
of interest in the country.

Whether or not the Germans

lacked interest in Morocco, they were surprised and shocked

58

by the signing of the Entente Cordiale; the
Kaiser's Foreign

Office had felt that Great Britain and France could
never
settle their historical and colonial differences.^^
The accord was signed on April 8, 1904, and gave

Great Britain

a

free hand in Egypt while France "pledged not

to alter the political status of Morocco"; Britain agreed,

however, that France "should preserve order in Morocco and
assist in all necessary reforms."

The remainder of the ac-

cord, including some secret clauses, dealt with Spain's

rights in the Sultanate, as well as various adjustments of

Franco-British territorial problems and spheres of influence
throughout the world. 33
It was the term "preserve order" which would give

France the excuse to introduce armed force into Morocco, and
then use this wedge to obtain full control.

One month after

the accord was signed the kidnapping of Ion Perdicaris pro-

vided an excuse for the establishment of

a

French-Algerian

police force and a permanent French naval presence at

—

Tangier

the first steps in the eventual French domination

of Morocco.

The evening of Wednesday, May 18, 1904, saw the

start of

a

of Morocco,

tangled episode involving the decaying Sultanate
an elderly American expatriate,

and the navy of

the United States.
It had been a typically mild late-spring day,

only

a

and

slight haze on the sea interfered with the view of the

Spanish mainland from the Spartello headland.

Perdicaris

and his wife had come to Aidonia from Tangier on Monday,

ac-

companied by Cromwell Varley, Ion's stepson, with his wife
and two daughters.

After dinner on Wednesday they had all

gathered in the drawing room, when about 8:30 P.M. they were

interrupted by

a

series of loud screams emanating from the

servant's quarters. 34
Perdicaris and Varley rushed out, thinking at first
that it was

a

squabble among the servants, for Perdicaris had

in his employ a German housekeeper from Switzerland and a

French chef,

"a fiery ex-Zouave," who v/ere feuding.

The chef

had recently come to blows with the housekeeper after being

"irritated by some insulting allusions to the French defeats
at Metz and Sedan,"

and when the German butler Albrecht ran

past him in the hall Ion thought that the "zouave has been
too much for the Fatherland all long the line."

35

What he and Varley found in the servants' hall was
not a group of enraged domestics but a party of armed Moors,

who Perdicaris at first assumed were members of his household
guard.

Then he noticed that some of his servants were bound

and helpless.

When he asked the identity of the armed men

they only smiled blandly.

Next Albrecht came running back,

closely followed by Moors who were beating him with their
rifle butts.

When Perdicaris attempted to interfere he was

also seized and clubbed, and his arms bound behind his back.

Varley was repeatedly struck by rifle butts and received
knife slash across the hand when he tried to seize one of

a

s

.
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the intruders by the throat
The two bound men were pushed out of the house and

down the hill toward the stables.

As they passed the guard-

house where the government had stationed

a

few soldiers, Ion

saw by lamp-light "our guards, our gardners, and the other

native servants under cover of the rifles of another party
of mountaineers

.

•

.

The government soldiers were

arguing with one of the bandits who stood apart from the
rest,

and here Perdicaris recognized the leader of his as-

sailants

the infamous brigand Mulai Ahmed ben Mohammed,

better known as the Raisuli. 37
In a Morocco teeming with petty bandits Raisuli had

already won a notorious name for himself.

cording to Walter

B.

Harris

,

His ancestry,

ac-

was of "particularly ancient

and holy lineage," and as a young man he had studied law and

theology in Tetuan.
a

reputation as

a

He later turned to banditry and gained

cattle-stealer.

had been imprisoned at Mogador for

Captured by treachery, he
a

Here

number of years.

he was chained to the wall of a dungeon,

and the scars left

by the chains on his wrists and ankles were

a

perpetual re-

minder to him of the men who had put him in prison.

One of

these men was the Governor, or Pasha, of Tangier, Raisuli'

bitterest enemy

38

Released in 1894 in

a

general amnesty granted by the

new Sultan, an embittered Raisuli returned to the mountains
of northern Morocco and to his career as a brigand.

Over

the years the Moroccan government had sent troops after

61

Raisuli, but they had never managed to run
him to ground.
In 1903 a particularly strong effort to take
him was mounted.
It almost succeeded, but Raisuli seized Walter
B. Harris

while the correspondent was covering the campaign
and held

him for ransom.

In return for Harris the brigand obtained

not only the withdrawal of the government troops but
also

the return of some of his men who had been captured.

When

Moorish forces began another campaign against Raisuli in 1904
he reacted,

as he said later,

by searching out another

European,

"an important man who would make the world realize
39
my wrongs."
His choice was Perdicaris.

Raisuli was in his late thirties, well built but
i

short and heavy looking.
head,

He had a meager beard and a shaven

"with the exception of one long scalp-lock, which,

neatly plaited, he /wore/ tucked under the folds" of his
turban.

Harris described him as having strikingly white

skin, with very red lips which "gave him almost an effemi-

nate look."

He had under his command between 400 and lOOO

tribesmen, and possessed

a

renown for great cruelty.

time a nobleman who was m.arried to Raisuli

nounced his intention of taking

a

's

At one

sister an-

second wife.

The sister

complained to her brother, and an enraged Raisuli "proceeded
from the mountains to his brother-in-law's house, where he

broke in by force and shot the girl and her mother."

40

Perdicaris was familiar with the reputation of
Raisuli, and,

as wrote later,

which to conjure."

the name "was indeed one with

Ion accepted the brigand's assurances of

62

safety provided he and Varley did not attempt to escape.
Then, mounting horses brought from the stables the two men,

along with their captors, moved off, carefully circling

Tangier and struck out east towards the mountains.

41
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CHAPTER IV
"WARSHIPS WILL BE SENT"

In 1867 Mark Twain left the United States for

cruise of the Mediterranean and the Holy Land.

a

His steamer

touched at Tangier on the way over, and Twain's adverse reaction to the small port town was summed up in

a

bit of

gratuitous advice he gave to the American government.

"I

would seriously recommend," he wrote tongue-in-cheek in The
Innocents Abroad, "that when

a

man commits a crime so heinous

that the law provides no adequate punishment for it, they

make him Consul-General at Tangier."

With Samuel Rene

Gummere s appointment to the post in 1898 the government had
'

not exactly taken Twain*

s

suggestion, but the relative ob-

scurity which the famous traveller found had changed little
The representative of the United

in the intervening years.

States to the Sultan of Morocco was not one of those positions avidly sought out by fevered hoards of Washington
pi ace-seekers

Gumm.ere had been born in Trenton, New Jersey in

The

1849, the son of a well-known and respected lawyer.

family was descended from

a

certain Johann Gomere,

a

Huguenot who emigrated from French Flanders and settled in

Pennsylvania in the early eighteenth century.

Gummere,

as

had Perdicaris, received his early education at the Trenton
63
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Academy.

He graduated from Princeton in 1870, was
admitted

to the New Jersey Bar in 1873, and worked in his father's

law office for a number of years.

He experienced his first

taste of the diplomatic life when he served as secretary to
the American Minister at The Hague from 1881 to 1884.

Both

the Perdicaris and Gummere families were well acquainted

with each other and Samuel, who was an inveterate European
traveller, often stayed with Perdicaris in Tangier.

Gummere

helped represent him in the United States during the Mathews
affair,

and as a result Perdicaris used his influence to

clear the way for his friend's appointment as ConsulGene ral

^
.

A bachelor, Gummere has been described as
of some polish and ability,

sationalist and reconteur."

as well

as

a

a

diplomat

"brilliant conver-

Another, somewhat caustic ap-

preciation was later given by Commander Dorn of the Castine

,

who "did not take /a/ fancy to" the fifty-five year old
Consul.

Dorn particularly did not think much of his overly

fastidious style of dress, as well as his affected English
accent.

He found him a man "swelled /up/ with

/.hi_s/

own

/sense of/ importance."'^

Gummere was also

a

child of his age and quite

willing to make use of force in order to increase the influence of the United States in the Sultanate.

Less than a

year after taking his post in Tangier he was asking the State

Department to send an American warship in order that certain

outstanding problems be settled with Morocco.

He eagerly

pointed out that German and British claims against
the
Sultanate were quickly settled by naval visitations,
and
that this "only goes to prove what was told me by
some of my

colleagues shortly after my arrival here that only in this
way can claims for damages be collected."

State approved

the request and sent it on to the Navy Department which in

turn despatched

a

warship to Tangier, where Gummere was able

to make use of its presence in obtaining a settlement."^

was a lesson well-learned,

It

and in 1904 he would make good

use of it when faced with a greater challenge.

Gummere was dining with some of his friends in the

diplomatic community on the evening of May 18th, when around
nine o'clock he received word of the events at Aidonia.

The

brigands had not thought to cut the telephone line to
Tangier,

and a housekeeper had immediately called for help.

Gummere first contacted the British Minister, Sir Arthur
Nicolson, and then rushed to see the Lt. Governor of Tangier,
as well

as the

Minister of Foreign Affairs and asked them

that government troops from the city garrison be sent out

after the fleeing bandits.

Ke then gathered together his

own three guards and an interpreter and hurried to Aidonia

where he tried to calm the Perdicaris household.

There was

to be no sleep for the indefatigable little Consul that

night,

and by the morning of the 19th he was back in Tangier

conferring with Nicolson as to the best way they should proceed in the crisis.

5

Cromwell Varley was

a

British subject and this

brought Arthur Nicolson into the affair.

Nicolson was the

senior member of the diplomatic community, and since it was
Great Britain which has the greatest interest in the strategic future of Tangier he was a valuable confidant for

Gummere.

The latter considered himself "fortunate in having

the aid /and./ the trained experience" of Nicolson,

whom

/_he

was^/

"with

co-operating in every particular."^

At fifty-five Sir Arthur Nicolson was the same age
as Gummere,

but unlike the American he had behind him

lengthy career at important diplomatic posts.

a

The youngest

son of a knighted British admiral, Nicolson was originally

intended for the Royal Navy

,

but after brief service as a

midshipman he had gone on to Rugby and then to Brasenose
College

,

Oxford.

Entering the Foreign Office in 1870

,

he

rose steadily in the service at such varied posts as Berlin,

Peking, Constantinople,

and Athens.

as Secretary of Legation in Teheran,

Between 1885 and 1888,
Persia, he played an im-

portant part in the revival of British influence in that
country.

He followed this with service as Consul-General in

Budapest, and later as legation secretary in Sofia and

Constantinople.

In 1895 he was appointed as British Minister

to the Sultanate of Morocco.

His son Harold was later to

describe him as "neither imaginative nor intellectual; he was

merely intelligent, honest, sensible, high-minded and
fair.

"

7
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Both Gummere and Nicolson agreed that
the situation
was serious.
Acting in concert they immediately despatched
on the 19th a strong message to the Grand
Vizier
at Fez de-

manding that orders be sent to the Sultan's
Minister of
Foreign Affairs at Tangier, Sid El Hadj Mohamed
Ben

Arby

Torres, that "all demands made by the bandit chief
should be

accorded at once

The same morning they held a hur-

ried consultation with Torres, and found him very upset and
well aware of the "gravity of the situation."

from him

a

They received

promise of all possible aid in order to free the

two men.

Around noon on the 19th two messengers came into
Tangier from Raisuli with
wife.

The letter was

a

letter from Perdicaris to his

brief one informing her that he and

a

Varley had not been treated badly, and asking that some

clothing and other necessities be packed and sent to them
with the messengers.

In questioning the two men it was

learned that the captives were at

a

place called L'homs in

the Benider Mountains east of Tangier and would soon be car-

There was

ried further back into these rocky fastnesses.
no communication from Raisuli on his demands,

fairs which Gummere found rather ominous.

a

state of af-

9

In his initial despatch to the State Department

Gummere requested that

a

warship be immediately sent to

Tangier to enforce demands upon the Moorish government.

He

also hoped that this vessel would "be of sufficient size and

importance to impress /the/ natives."

The situation, he felt,

.
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was very serious and he considered it of "immense importance
to have a war vessel here to show what gravity my Government

consider the situation and support me."

He saw the standing

of the United States in Morocco as a somev;hat less than im-

portant one, and impressed upon State that only strong measures would gain the respect of the Moors.

"'"^

Nicolson notified the British Foreign Office of the
steps he and Gummere had taken, and that the latter had re-

quested

a

warship.

The Foreign Office replied that Nicolson

should let them know if he felt British naval units v/ould be
desirable, but cautioned that as "a general rule such demon-

strations tend rather to make negotiations for release of
captives more difficult."

Nicolson agreed, "for the present

at any rate," especially since the Americans were sending a

vessel.

However, on the 20th

a

small torpedo boat was sent

over to Tangier from Gibraltar to serve as

a

despatch

vessel

Gummere'

s

report of the kidnapping reachad Washington

in the late morning of the 19th.

Secretary of State Hay was

absent from the capital, and Assistant Secretary Loomis

could present little opposition to whatever action the
President would decide to take.

The diversion of warships

to Tangier was a serious decision and could not have been

made without Roosevelt's direct approval, as witnessed by
he mistakenly
the President's quick reaction in 1903 to what
of the
thought was an unauthorized change in the itinerary

s

Battleship Squadron.

In the past Hay had often helped to

dampen Roosevelt's enthusiasms by acting as

exuberant President.

a

break upon the

Henry Adams saw Hay as playing

Seneca to Roosevelt's Nero,

a role

a

with which the President

was, like Nero, becoming increasingly uncomfortable.

It was

quite possible that Hay might have managed to soften

Roosevelt's action, but he had left Washington on the 13th
to represent the President at the St. Louis Exposition and

would not return until the 23rd.

"'"^

The President quickly decided to make use of one of
the squadrons heading for Europe.

request for
as he

a

Loomis referred Gummere

'

warship to the Navy Department on the same day

received it.

The next day, the 20th, Loomis and

Admiral Taylor held consultations, and orders were cabled
ahead of Chadwick to Tenerife directing him to take his en13
tire squadron to Tangier.

The State Department sent Gummere

a

despatch in-

forming him that "warships will be sent" to Tangier as soon
as possible.

Gummere was undoubtedly reassured by the in-

crease in naval strength which was to be put at his service

—

he had asked for one vessel and now he was to get at

least two.

He little realized that he would shortly see the

small harbor of Tangier filled with seven of his country's

fighting ships.

In addition State told the Consul that the

warships would arrive in "two or three days."

Here the

Department badly miscalculated the time element for
Chadwick'

s

squadron was still struggling across the Atlantic,
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unaware of what was happening in Tangier, being
held back by
its two slow and balky gunboats '"^
.

Political pressure quickly arose in the United
States
over the outrage, although its effect on the President's
de-

cision to send Chadwick's squadron can only be conjectured.
The name of Perdicaris was well-known in New Jersey and
both
of that state's senators wired the State Department asking
it to do all it possibly could to secure his release.

Senator John Kean referred to Ion as "his intimate personal
friend," and Senator Dryden urged that vigorous measures be

taken and demanded the "punishment of his captors."

telegram expressing concern came from

Representative

W.

N. Lanning.

Nev\?

Another

Jersey

"'"^

The reaction of the American press was, with some

exceptions, in full accord with the administration's action
in sending warships to Tangier.

It was still the age of

Hearst, Grozier and the yellow press, and both reporting
and editorial comment mirrored that muscular imperialism to

which most Americans subscribed at the turn of the century.
The Clevel and PI ain Dealer, in an editorial titled "Teaching

Morocco A Lesson," called for sending guns and men instead
of a ransom.

The government of Morocco "must be taught at

this late date," warned the Plain Dealer

,

"the lesson which

other Barbary states learned from American gunners more than
a

century ago."

The heroic shades of Decatur, Preble,

and

Bainbridge were consistently drawn upon as an historical
reference point by many newspapers.

It

vvas

felt that what
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the young American navy had done to the Deys of
Algiers and

Tripoli in the early 1800»s, it should be quite willing
to
do in 1904.

The Boston Globe

,

while admitting that "Ion

Perdicaris isn't exactly what you would call

Yankee name,"

a

affirmed that he was an American citizen and fully deserved
the protection of his country.

In New York, The World felt

the abduction had laid Morocco "fairly open to

blessings of civilization from the mouth of
gun."

a

dose of the

thirteen-inch

a

The Washington Times caught much of the popular mood

when it reacted to the decision to use naval force by de-

claring that, "if the lawless people of Morocco need

a

les-

son on the danger of monkeying with the Anglo-Saxon they
will probably get it."

note of Perdicaris

Like the Globe

,

the Times also made

dubious heritage but affirmed that he

•

"was born in this country,

and is better entitled to the

protection of the Stars and Stripes than are
bers of Tammany Hall."

a

good many mem-
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Roosevelt's action drew some muted protests in the
press, mainly from newspapers with Democratic sympathies.
The chief newspaper in Perdicaris* home town of Trenton, the

Daily True American

,

urged that before the United States

pro-

ceeded to the use of force it should wait for all the facts
to be presented.

Morocco "was

a

It also said that Perdicaris'

residence in

known risk," and this must be given due con-

sideration by the government.

The newspaper had full

sympathy for the plight of its native son, but the situation

.

was so complicated "as to make any rash
act most mom.entous

Nothing would be secured by threatening Morocco,
and instead
of force the ransom should be paid by Perdicaris
who was

quite wealthy, and not the United States.^®

The central character in the affair remained unaware of the widening diplomatic ripples caused by his
ab-

duction.

As the horsemen struck cut across the plain of

Bubana toward the mountains, Perdicaris remembered thinking
how unfamiliar the land was at night.

He recalled the many

games of polo and the steeple-chases he had engaged in on
this plain, but now in the dark it was all strange and new
to him.

There were, he wrote, "no applauding public; /but/

only the black night, /and/ the wild mountaineers striking
our horses with their guns and dragging us over rocks and
across streams

.

.

.

."
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As dawn broke the party halted for a brief rest.

Perdicaris approached Raisuli and asked that he be allowed
to communicate with his wife in Tangier, explaining that he

needed certain medicines and heavier clothing.

Without re-

plying the bandit chief took paper and pencil from beneath
his cloak and gave them to Ion.

Perdicaris wrote down what

he needed and the note was taken back to Tangier by a some-

what reluctant messenger, but only after Perdicaris promised

Raisuli that he would not be arrested.

Ion also wrote a

second letter to be taken to the Wazan family asking that
they help obtain his release.
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Before starting out again Raisuli had his two
captives dress in Moorish turbans and haiks (cloaks) so
that

they would not draw undue attention.

As the party rode on

the heat steadily became more oppressive and both
Perdicaris
and Varley suffered acute discomfort.

afternoon they stopped to dine on

About one in the

"few very gritty dried

a

figs /^and/ a little hard and pungent /""goat/ cheese."

Perdicaris was sickened after a few mouthfulls and was only
too glad to mount his horse and be

off.^"'"

They now began to climb the rocky foothills into
the mountains

—

a

district inhabited by the Beni M'Saour,

the Beni Idder, and the Beni Arroze.

These three Kabyles,

or tribes, had for some time been united into

a

successful

military confederation against the Fez government and were
friendly to Raisuli.

The ground became steeper and more im-

passable wdth each mile, and as they passed through the small

miserable villages which lay along the primitive road ragged
women and children would emerge from wretched huts to hoot
and jeer at the two captives.
was extremely fatigued,

By now the elderly Perdicaris

and his condition was not helped

when he fell from his horse while scrambling up the side of
a

ravine.
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Late that evening, about ten or eleven, the weary

procession reached its destination
lage called Terdants,
of Mount Nazul

,

"

a

"perched upon

a

small mountain vil-

spur or extended flank

about forty-eight miles from Tangier.

Perdicaris was in great pain as

a

result of the fall and
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could not lift his damaged leg "which was swollen from
the
calf to the waist."

Both men were roughly shown into

a

small, primitive hut containing two rooms with a dirt floor.

Neither got much sleep that first night at Terdants, and because of his injury Ion was forced to stay in bed for two
full days.^^

The second morning after they arrived Raisuli,

alarmed at the state of his elderly captive's health, visited
the hut.

The brigand was assured by Perdicaris that he was

now feeling much better, and Raisuli then told him what he
intended to demand for his release.

Even though he promised

Ion that he would not be harmed, and that the goods and

horses taken from his house would be returned, Perdicaris
later wrote that "he felt his heart sink" at what Raisuli
was demanding.

He was sure the conditions would never be

granted and told the bandit,

"

/w /hy not ask to be proclaimed,

out and out. Sultan of Morocco."

He then wearily settled

down for what he envisaged would be

.

a

long captivity.
.
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Back in Tangier both Gummere and Nicolson were still

attempting to establish some basis by which to negotiate the
release.

captives'

despatched
wanted.

a

On the 19th Torres, with their backing,

relative of Raisuli to find out what the brigand

In the early morning hours of the 22nd the man re-

turned with letters from Perdicaris, as well as Raisuli
terms for the return of the two men.
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's

The first of these demands was for the
release of

large number of Raisuli's men held in Moorish
prisons.
ond,

the Governor of Tangier, Abd el Saduk

cousin and old enemy

—

—

was to be dismissed.

a

sec-

the brigand's

Third, the

government troops which had already been withdrawn
into

Tangier from their campaign against Raisuli in the
countryside were to be sent to Fez.

Fourth,

a

large ransom of about

$70,000 was to be paid, raised from the sale of properties

belonging to Abd el Saduk and his family.

The brigand would

not accept payment from any other source.

Fifth,

and most

importantly, the Sultan was to cede two districts to Raisuli
for him to govern as an almost independent fief.

Finally,

there were two other demands relating to free passage for
some of his men back to their villages, and the arrest of

three of his other enemies.
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Perhaps the most disturbing factor in the letter
was a request for American and British guarantees of the

Sultan's compliance with the terms.

Raisuli knew quite well

that if he released the two men without

a

great power guar-

antee of some sort there would be nothing to prevent the

Moorish government from reneging on its promises.
question of

great power guarantee was to be

a

a

This

major stick-

ing point in all further negotiations, as both the United
States and Great Britain consistently refused to make this

concession.

Neither had any wish to be in

backing such

a

a

position of

threat to the Moroccan government, as well as

becoming so deeply involved in Moorish internal affairs.
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Nicolson informed the Foreign Office that if Raisuli
were to be given all of what he wants "he would practically

become a ruling power in this part of the country."

Ke

thought the demands exorbitant, but felt that "without ad-

mitting them all, an arrangement /was/ possible."

He con-

ferred with Gummere and Torres and together they decided upon
the tactic of a counter-proposal to Raisuli.

The services

of the Wazan's were enlisted and the two young Shereefs of

that family were sent out with the offer.
as we have seen,

The Wazan family,

had enjoyed an amiable relationship with

Perdicaris, and it was mainly that which persuaded the two

young men to enter the affair as intermediaries.

The Wazan's

possessed religious and social prestige and commanded great
respect even though under French protection.

28

The counter-proposal offered less than what Raisuli

wanted.

It mentioned no territorial transfer and gave no

great power guarantees, except for

a

pledge of an American

It demanded that the two

and British-backed pardon.

prisoners be returned to Tangier by the 26th.

The reply came

on the 24th when a letter was received from Muley Ali, the

eldest of the Wazan brothers.

He said Raisuli not only re-

jected the counter-proposal, but also revealed that he had
-added two new demands -- including one of more territory

for his captives'

release.
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A letter was sent to Muley Ali the next day pointing
out that it would be in Raisuli

's

interest to release the

guarantee of
prisoners, and again offered a British-American

.

pardon.

Nicolson felt the brigand's acceptance of it
would
now be improbable, and he was proved correct
in this

when Al

replied on the 26th that Raisuli was inflexible.

Ali added

that Raisuli was in daily communication with persons
in

Tangier, and he suspected they were urging him to
resist.
The bandit had also received letters from many tribal
leader

exhorting him to use his prisoners to help gain the release
of their men from the Sultan's prisons.

Ali ended by saying

that he would stay at Terdants in order to "prevent as much
as it will be in my power any bodily harm being done to the

captives."

He urged that Raisuli 's demands be met.^°

Nicolson was baffled by this turn in events and
wrote the Foreign Office that he could see no end to

Raisuli

's

demands, for "/I7n all probability as time passes

/the^/ will increase."

The brigand was a desperate man and

quite willing, Nicolson felt, to carry out his threat of

killing the men.

As for the demands.

Sir Arthur saw them as

"difficult for any Government to accept, and are beyond
all

.

.

.

reason."

he should proceed,

guarantee

He then requested instructions on how
and whether Raisuli should be offered a
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Faced with the failure of their diplomacy as far as
Raisuli was concerned, the two diplomats turned toward the

central government in Fez.

They had previously written to

the Grand Vizier on the 19th demanding that orders be sent
to Torres giving him full authority to meet the demands of

Raisuli.

The American Vice Consul-General Hoffman Philip,
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near Fez on

shooting expedition, was contacted and ordered

a

by Gummere to make a direct approach to the government.

On

the 25th Gummere received a despatch from Philip telling
him

that he had not only seen the Grand Vizier, but had been

given a special audience by the Sultan.

Abd el Aziz ex-

pressed his outrage at the incident and directed Philip to
inform Gummere that "he would acquiece in every demand, in
every detail

1,9
.

.

.

Even with this vague verbal acquiescence there re-

mained two central and difficult problems.

First, Raisuli's

demands had now been increased and neither Gummere or

Nicolson was sure how Fez would re act to the change
especially the idea of handing over even

miore

—

territory.

Second, the bandit continued to demand a great power guaran-

tee from the United States or Great Britain

.

By the 27th

matters were stalemated and both sides settled down to

a

waiting game with the Moroccan government in the middle.
The situation of foreign residents in Tangier was

growing incre asingly precarious in the days after the abduction.

Most of the foreigners living outside of Tangier

poured into the city seeking protection.

Walter

B.

Harris,

writing in The Times (London), reported that "several people
have received warnings of future outrages," and that the

"demeanour of the natives towards Europeans seems daily to

become more arrogant."
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Gummere informed Washington of the declining situation in Tangier, calling it not reassuring, and adding that

.
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he had "a well grounded suspicion" that
other outrages were

in the offing.

warship.

He was almost desperate in his need of
a

He hoped that the State Department would
"pardon

his insistence on this subject," but "nearly
double the

time" had elapsed since the Department had said
a warship

would arrive.

"No vessel has been heard from/' he plain-

tively cabled, and

"I

am growing more and more anxious. "^^

The reaction in Washington to the stalemate in nego-

tiations and the apparently deteriorating situation in

Tangier was
might.

tude

a

decision to make an even stronger show of naval

In London, the Foreign Office also hardened its atti-

.

Lansdowne cabled Nicolson on the 28th that the
British government could not press the Sultan to bow to the
demands, but he asked him to inform Torres that the Moroccan

government would "be held responsible if any harm befalls
/a / British subject.

"

It was felt that the Sultan could af-

ford to make considerable concessions, but His Majesty's

Government would not demand the Sultan make these concessions

only hold Morocco responsible if any harm came to

Varley.

To back up this new diplomatic approach the Foreign

Office offered to send

a

warship, but Nicolson felt it would

not be needed at this time

35

In Washington a similar decision

that same day.

v/as

being made on

The President held a Cabinet meeting in the

morning where Hay told Roosevelt that Raisuli's demands were

.
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preposterous and the idea of guaranteeing
them "impossible
of fulfillment."
Roosevelt agreed and it was decided to
augment the naval force being sent by including
Jewell's war
ships as well as Chadwick's.
The primary reasons for the in
crease in force, Hay wrote Moody, were "the
disturbed con-

ditions in Morocco and the unsatisfactory progress
of the

negotiations

By now Hay was in complete agreement

with Roosevelt as to the necessity of

a

naval demonstration,

confiding to his diary that "a nation cannot degrade itself
to prevent ill-treatment of

a

citizen. "^^

Morocco was caught in the middle.

If it did not

act it would have to face the threat of British and American

intervention

—

if it did act and gave Raisuli what he

wanted it would create

a

powerful internal threat to itself.

In addition, the affair was beginning to assume larger pro-

portions not only in Fez, Washington and London, but also in
Paris

Initially French interest in the kidnapping was
minimal

,

in sight,

but as the crisis lengthened without any settlement
and with the arrival of American naval units immi-

nent, French concern began to deepen.

At first the French Minister in Tangier, Saint-Rene

Taillandier, thought that the situation might result in an

increase of French influence in Morocco.

In Paris the semi-

official newspaper Le Temps editorially agreed with this
view.

Taillandier also began meeting regularly with Gummere

and Nicolson,

and it was he who cleared the way for the
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Wazan brothers to act as intermediaries.^"^
The French Minister was soon sounding out his
col-

leagues on the idea of establishing a local European
con-

trolled police force.

He said he was in contact with his

government about this possibility, using the "infusion of
few experienced Algerian elements" as its backbone.
24th Le Temps was calling the kidnapping

a

a

By the

grave incident,

saying it showed "the necessity of assuring the assistance
of France to put an end to the anarchy and unrest which are

laying waste the region." 38
The French position was quite well understood in

Washington and at the same Cabinet m.eeting which decided to
send a second squadron to Morocco, Roosevelt ordered Hay to
cable our ambassador in Paris and have him officially re-

quest French good offices 39
.

The President was covering

both of his flanks with this maneuver.

It was Rooseveltian

diplomacy at its best with both the big stick and the soft
words.

The President was being very careful and was giving

himself as many options as possible.

He could either con-

tinue to apply an increasing measure of force

,

or

,

if

European reaction became hostile, dump the entire matter in
the lap of the French.

However, some saw another reason behind the American

request of French good offices.

The Times of London re-

ported that the request had actually been initiated by
feeler from the French government.

a

The New York Tribune

stated flatly that it was French overtures which prompted
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the appeal,

and that the catalyst was the President's de-

cision to send warships.

Whatever the origin of the American request for
good offices, the prospect of French involvement was well

received in the nation's press.
the action,

as well

into the affair.

as

The Sun (New York) praised

Hay's good sense in bringing France

It wrote of the "age-long friendship be-

tween France and her foster child," and felt French assistance was "the quick, the easy and, probably, the only means
of solving the Perdicaris problem."^-'"

The crisis entered a new stage after the events of

the 28th.

It was no longer simply a local matter, but in-

stead began to take on international implications.

A fleet

of American warships was heading for Europe, and part of

that armada anticipated daily in Tangier.

expected from them?
simply

a

IVhat

was to be

Was the sending of warships to Morocco

way in which the President was attempting to placate

public opinion as American Ambassador Porter in Paris assured
y

a

worried Delcasse; or was there something more to it?
From,

.

.
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his post in Madrid Jules Cam.bon, the French

Ambassador to Spain, apprehensively observed the development
of the crisis and the despatch of American warships.

feared, he wrote Delcasse on the 29th,

He

"the tendency which

the United States has shown at times to get into

Mediterranean questions," may be

a

cause for alarm, and "may

go contrary to the ideas and influence of which France has
A

made herself the promoter."

^

Cambon was not alone in his
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ruminations, and the events of the next few weeks would
cause them to be echoed in the foreign offices and chancelleries of Spain, Germany and Russia.

^

CHAPTER

V

EUROPE LOOKS ON

Chadwick's warships, strung out in

a

long line,

steamed toward Tangier at their top cruising speeds.
the way was the flagship Brooklyn

,

Leading

her powerful engines

moving her far ahead of the next vessel astern.

On May 30th,

some sixty-five hours after clearing the harbor at Santa
Cruz, Chadwick's white flagship emerged from the early

morning mist off Tangier and anchored in the harbor.

By mid-

afternoon the Atlanta arrived, followed in the early evening
by the two gunboats, Castine and Marietta

.

As each of the warships slid into the anchorage

their guns boomed salutes which were answered in turn by the

Moorish shore batteries.

All day long the sound of cannon

seemed to echo over the old port

—

an experience which

Gummere found impressive and reassuring.
Soon after the Brooklyn anchored Gummere came

aboard for a long conversation with Chadwick.

When the

Consul-General had fully explained the situation both men
agreed that "no further steps should be taken" until the attitude of the Fez government was known concerning Raisuli's

new demands.
afternoon,

Chadwick and his staff came ashore in the

and,

along with Gummere, went to visit Torres.

They impressed upon him the gravity
84

v/ith

which the United
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States viewed the situation, and urged him that
there be no

relaxation in his efforts to secure the release of the
captives.

3

As the old Moorish diplomat looked out over the
har-

bor, the presence of

squadron of powerful warships under-

a

lined the seriousness of the situation far more than could
Gummere's threats and demands.

Chadwick continued his busy day by meeting with

Nicolson and then Mrs. Perdicaris.

To calm Gummere's fears

of a Moorish attack upon him or the Perdicaris family he

ordered ashore four Marines, bearing sidearms but not rifles
Two were detailed to Gummere's residence and two to El
Minzah.

Also two navy signelmen were stationed at the

Consulate,

"in order to be able to communicate v/ith the ves-

sels in case of attack and need of assistance." 4

To Roosevelt and Hay Rear Admiral Chadwick was

a

known and respected quantity, and they would look to him
rather than the untried Gummere for
in Tangier.

Chadwick'

true picture of events

initial impressions

s

Washington the next day.
"a very serious one."

a

v;ere

sent to

The situation was, he reported,

He cautioned that the only thing

possible for the United States to do was to wait on events,
while "pressuring the Sultan to accept" Raisuli's demands.
The next two days brought more naval activity to

Tangier.

On the morning of the 31st the British despatch

vessel Surprise arrived from Gibraltar carrying on board
Rear Admiral Sir William Cecil H. Domville.

Domville com-

manded that part of the British Mediterranean fleet at

5
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Gibraltar (the other units were engaged in maneuvers off the
coast of Italy)

,

and he was soon ashore conferring with

Nicolson about the situation.^
On June 1st Jewell arrived with the European

Squadron, bringing the total American strength to seven warships.

Although both Chadwick and Jewell were rear admirals,

Chadwick was senior and thus took overall command while the
squadrons remained at Tangier.
For most foreign residents the arrival of the warships gave them that feeling of solid security lacking since
the 19th.

Gummere was much relieved, stating that the naval

moral support was of immense importance to his bargaining

position.

Nicolson also valued the arrival of the Americans.

The town's Europeans were somewhat reassured, he told the

Foreign Office, as they felt that the vessels could give
them protection by sending landing parties ashore in case
of serious trouble.

7

Al-Moghreb Al-Aska

,

a

Tangier weekly newspaper pub-

lished by and for Europeans, greeted the arrival of American

warships with pleasure, sorry only that the stay of the

Americans could not be of

a

more permanent nature.

It

openly called for the United States to join with Great

Britain and help to civilize Morocco.

"Perhaps no better

ornament could crown the pillars of Hercules," said Al-Aska,
"than the Star-spangled banner,

and the Union Jack.

The warships were also welcomed from a somewhat

more unexpected quarter.

One day while walking and
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conversing with each other, Raisuli and Perdicaris
were approached by a breathless messenger who described

to his chief

the arrival of "eight frigates" which had entered
the bay one
after the other.

He said the town was mkloub

.

or "upside-

down," and added that all feared an imminent bombardment.

Perdicaris watched Raisuli closely for he feared the news

would cause the brigand to move him and Varley deeper into
the mountains.

Surprisingly, Raisuli broke into

and turned to Perdicaris to congratulate him.

a

wide grin

Ion replied

that he did not understand, and Raisuli good naturedly an-

swered that the presence of these ships would now compel the
Sultan to grant his demands

—

"and then," he promised,

"you

will be able to return to your friends." 9
In the United States governmental vigor in having

despatched the warships ten days earlier had produced enormou
headlines, after which the story gradually faded from front
pages.
a

The arrival of the squadrons in Tangier touched off

new wave of journalistic enthusiasm.
Hearst's Evenin g Journal (New York), in

a

baroque

mixture of bombast and misinformation, informed readers on
June 1st that the "U.

S.

Threatens To Bombard Tangier" and

that "Fifteen American Warships Will Turn Their Guns On

Morocco."
the

Nev%^

In a more responsible but no less festive vein,

York Tribune heralded the arrival with

page picture of the Brooklyn

Chadwick.

,

a

large front-

including an insert of Admiral

The Tribune called it "the largest representation

of the American navy that has ever visited a foreign

port

.

•

.

The American navy, thundered the newspaper,

.

had returned to "the scene of some of its earliest glories,"
there to deal "with a brigandage on land no less detestable
than piracy at sea."

The Tribune added that not even the

"Little Americans"

a

reference to the anti-imperialists

-

could argue against the validity of our response in this
case.

10

The New York World,

a

political opponent of

Roosevelt and suspicious of his motives in Morocco, joined
the outbreak of martial speculation.

"anxious to stir up

a

It found Roosevelt

fight of some kind," hoping it would

aid him at the polls later in the year.
line proclaimed:

"U.

S.

A front page head-

Cavalry May Be Sent To Morocco."

The reason for the need of army cavalry, said the World

,

was that the marines from the fleet had no experience with

horses and would not be effective in the coming campaign.
The World believed that the invasion of Morocco "will be a

strictly friendly one so far as the Sultan is concerned."
The story optimistically assumed that the Sultan's army

would probably co-operate with the American invasion force,
"and act as

guides.""^"*"

The American warships, however, had

a

much larger

audience than the residents of Tangier and the American

reading public.

The Perdicaris incident and its naval after

math brought excited speculation to the press of Europe

—

particularly in Spain and France, the two powers which had,
along with Great Britain, the greatest interest in the
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future of Morocco.
In Madrid the arrival of the two squadrons created
a

sensation, and Le Temps (Paris) reported that Spanish of-

ficials considered the United States naval presence "unwise
and liable to aggrevate the situation."

Spain feared not

only American intervention but an international one.

The

latter, she felt, would upset the balance of power in the
region.

12

In a Europe of hungry colonial powers, Spain might

lose her preferred position in Morocco once the door was

opened to outside intervention.
On June 2nd

a

request was made in the Spanish Senate

that the government despatch a warship to Tangier.

Maura,

the Foreign Minister, while not committing himself to a naval

demonstration promised that measures would be taken to defend
Spanish subjects in Morocco
colonial rights.

—

and, by inference,

Spanish

Cambon told Delcasse on the 6th that rumors

were sweeping through Madrid of the imminent seizure of

Tangier, or some other Moroccan port, by the United States
^ ^
for use as a coaling station.
•

13

It had only been six years since Spain had suffered
a

disastrous defeat at the hands of the United States, and

the sensitivity of Spain to such a gathering of American

naval power so close to her shores was bound to excite an

adverse reaction.

The rumors were vehemently denied by the

State Department, as well as by Ambassador Choate in London.
de
The Spanish Ambassador to the United States, Don Emilio

American
Ojeda, publicly declared that as far as he knew the

90

government had no desire to seize

a

port in Morocco.

Finally,

the Army and Navy Journal reacted to the rumors by calling

them "both ludicrous and deplorable."
Journal,

It was,

said the

"a gross representation of the humane purpose" for

which the naval demonstration was

instituted."'"'^

Another rumor which originated in Madrid and made
the rounds of other European capitals concerned a supposed

exchange of notes between the great powers.
affirm, reported

Le_

Temps

,

The notes would

that the United States would be

allowed to take only those actions needed for the release of
Perdicaris; the notes were also said to assert that the great

powers would not consent to an extended intervention."'"^
If the exchange of notes and the American desire

for a coaling port were a fiction, the concern on the part
of the Spanish government to end the stay of American war-

ships in the area was not.

Ambassador Ojeda, while praising

the careful handling of the affair by the United States

government, precisely pointed out that he expected the purpose of the naval demonstration be limited to the release of

Perdicaris and Varley, and nothing else.
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Spanish concern was underlined in

a

more dramatic

way by the well -publicized movement of naval units toward
the Straits area.

As a result of 1898, Spain had few major

naval units remaining, but during the first two weeks of
-June these ships were suggestively concentrated at Cadiz
a

port which lay only

a

day's hard steaming from Tangier.

armored
On the morning of June 5th a squadron of three

o

.

vessels cleared the harbor at Malaga bound for an unknown
destination.

Led by Spain's only battleship, the Pel ay

(known af f ectionally as "El Solatario"), the squadron con-

sisted of the new armored cruiser Cardinal Cisneros and the

coast-defense ship Numancia

.

At first, it was reported that

this force was bound for Tangier, but on the 6th Foreign

Minister Maura publicly stated that the warships were to go
to Cadiz.

clear,
a

Nevertheless the meaning of the move was quite

and on the 8th it was underscored by the despatch of

second squadron to Cadiz, this time from Cartagena.

1

7

French anxiety would also lead to diplomatic and
naval maneuvering, although not so blatant as the Spanish.
The French government was uncomfortable with the situation
and it was generally felt she would view favorably the quick

departure of the American warships.

Temps wondered if

L_e

such a formidable demonstration of naval power was really
appropriate.

A front page editorial stated that "the pres-

ence of the American fleet complicates the situation," and
1

that it would not aid in a settlement.

Q

Since Le Temps was

generally considered to be an outlet for official opinion,
its editorials were seen as a reflection of the government's

views
Delcasse, on May 31st, played down exaggerated
rumors that France was planning

other radical action at Tangier.

purely fanciful.

Yet,

a

naval demonstration or
He called these rumors

as can be seen in his correspondence

with Taillandier on the 9th of June, Delcasse saw the

necessity for French participation if any landing at Tangier
by the United States or Great Britain was attempted.

The

day after he broached this possibility with his Moroccan
envoy, unconfirmed reports circulated in Paris that French

Minister of Marine Pelletan was in communication with Vice
Admiral Gigon at Loulon as to the possibility of sending one
or two warships to Tangier.

1

9

In the United States the authoritive Army and Navy

Journal again took editorial note that the appearance of

American naval might on

a

large scale had "provoked

deal of speculation in continental Europe."

a

good

It scoffed at

rumors that the fleet had been ordered to the Mediterranean
in connection with the Russo-Japanese war or to seize a

The Journal stressed that the plan for the

coaling port.

cruise had been made several months before and that the

American government had pointed this out informally to the
great powers.
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If some of the European powers could be said to have

had one eye on events in Morocco, the other was undoubtedly
drav/n to an

west.

occurrence some four hundred miles to the north-

At Lisbon, Portugal, another American force was en-

gaged in

a

different aspect of Rooseveltian naval diplomacy

not the gunboat diplomacy of threat as seen at Tangier
but the prestige diplomacy of display; not the naked fist

but the velvet glove.

It was a clear and pleasant first of June as

Barker's battleships steamed up the Tagus River in
column.

a

single

Anchoring off Lisbon the three ironclads (the Iowa

arrived three days later) and the Portuguese forts and batteries on the shore exchanged thunderous salutes.
sailors often referred to duty of this sort as

a

American
"permanent

yachting party," and events of the next two weeks would not
disappoint that belief.

7

1

Soon puffing steam launches filled with officers
in spotless dress white uniforms and cumbersome ceremonial

swords were shuttling between the battleships and the shore.

Barker and his captains made their first call at the American

Legation and met with the Minister, Charles Page Bryan.
Bryan was

a

former journalist turned diplomat.

A political

power in Illinois, he had started out in the foreign service
at the top.

In 1897,

at the age of forty-two, he had been

appointed by President McKinley as the American Minister in
China.

Bryan followed this with service as Minister to

Brazil, Switzerland, and, beginning in 1904, Portugal.

29

Bryan and Barker then called on the Prime Minister
©f Portugal and members of the Cabinet,

and Military Governor.

as well

as the Civil

Later that afternoon at the Arsenal

the Americans attended a ceremony in which the young second

son of the King, the Infante Don Manuel, was enrolled as

member of the Naval School.

a

After the ceremony Barker and

Queen
his naval contingent were presented to King Carlos and

Amelia by Bryan.

In the harbor the battleships were dressed
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in honor of the occasion,

and while sailors in dress whites

lined the rails, hundreds of multi-colored
signal flags were
raised, and for the second time that day
the battleships were
engulfed in white billowing smoke as their guns
roared out
the appropriate salute.

^"^

There ensued in the following days

a

glittering

round of balls and official ceremonies, at which Barker was

often accompanied by his wife who had sailed in
liner to be with him in Europe.

a

passenger

At one gathering the Queen

charmed the Admiral and his wife by telling them proudly
that her father, the Count de Paris, had been

a

member of

General McClellan's staff during the Civil War.^"*
On the 8th Minister Bryan gave

a

Grand Ball at the

American Legation which was attended by the King and Queen
and most of the court.

United States Marines from the bat-

tleships in full dress uniforms of red and blue, with spiked
helmets in the Prussian style, stood at attention on the

broad stairway leading from the entrance hall to the first
floor.

As each member of royalty entered officials of the

Portuguese Cabinet and the American Legation escorted them

up the stairway.
bra proceeded

Providing

a

a

Liveried attendents with lighted candelastately procession led by the Queen Mother.

suitable background a navy band sounded bugles

and drums, gave four ruffles, and then played the Portuguese

Bryan was very proud.

and American national anthems.

This

was the first time in some years that the royal family had

attended any legation ball

—

a

signal honor for both Bryan
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and the United States.
On the 11th King Carlos with his Minister of
Marine

and other officials visited the squadron.

Approaching in an

ornate State Barge, the King was greeted by

a

salute of

twenty-one guns as he came alongside the Kearsarqe

breakfast in the wardroom and

a

After

.

toast by Barker in which he

saluted the King, "as the mariner who maintains the traditional maritime glory to which Portugal is indisputably en-

titled," Carlos inspected the ship.

He expressed himself as

"much pleased with the condition of the ship and crew," and

later stood with Barker on the Quarterdeck as the ship's

company marched past.

Barker fancied that the King as

a

former naval officer "understood and appreciated what he
saw.

"

When the King departed in the afternoon he was cheered

by the men of the Kearsarge and the other battleships, and

with the rails manned and the Portuguese ensign at the main,
each ship fired

a

twenty-one gun salute.

The King would

later tell the British Minister, Sir Martin Gosselin, that
while the battleships were "fine specimens of their type,"
he found them lacking

m

homogeneity.

26

"In order to cultivate more carefully the friendly

relations" existing between Portugal and the United States,

Barker held another reception on board the Kearsarge
time for the "leading people of Lisbon."

,

this

At least a thou-

sand "gentlemen and ladies" crowded onto the battleship,

filling the compartments and passageways, and looking bemusedly, or, in some cases knowingly, at the great guns and

s

"

.
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gleaming machinery.

The Kearsarqe was awash, as Barker later

remembered, with "Dukes, Duchesses, Counts, Countesses,
Admirals, Ministers, Bishops, and Cabinet Officers."

By the

time the squadron left Lisbon it was little wonder that in-

stead of being refreshed by the visit the men "were pretty
well tired out

.
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Bryan was elated with the Portuguese response, and
wrote Hay of the "very favorable impression on the v/hole com-

munity created by the warships and their officers."

The

visit had, according to Bryan, "added greatly to the prestige
of our country in Portugal."

Roosevelt's personal interest

in the visit and its happy results was indicated by a much
28
appreciated telegram from the President to King Carlos.

The success of the sojourn was mirrored in the

Portuguese press.

For the Liberal the visit was a star-

tlingly vivid revelation of how in so short

a

time the United

States had entered into the international life of the great
"The world moves," said the paper,

powers.

and Europe

should not be surprised at "this march of American power."

Although the visit was

a

peaceful one, the Liberal

'

edito-

rial made clear that the fleet's call at the strategic

estuary of the Tagus would have its effect on the great
powers

29

Another newspaper, Novidades

,

acclaimed the visit

of
in glowing terms, and saw it as strengthening "the bonds

friendship betv;een the great Republic, and this smallest
pov7er of

Western Europe."

Tarde,

also applauded the visit

and its effect.

It reported that the King had come back to

Lisbon from his country palace at Cezimbra expressly to see
the battleships.

Both nev/spapers printed in full Roosevelt's

telegram to King Carlos, as well as the King's reply to the
President. 30
But events at Tangier and their effect on Europe

added a note of seriousness to the Portuguese sojourn.

The

Lisbon correspondent of the Madrid daily Impartial reported
on "rumors of the gravest character," which if unconfirmed

were "nevertheless received as true by well-informed persons."
The United States was in the process,

according to these ru-

mors, of obtaining the lease of a naval base in return for

America's payment of part of Portugal's national debt.

The

Portuguese government had been reported as having refused
this offer, as well as one for
of Portugal itself.

a

coaling station on the coast

Yet the cordial reception given to the

battleships, the story went on, lent "credit to rumors of

certain understandings whereby the North American Government
will secure important advantages."

31

Later the semi-official Berlin Post picked up the
rumor and saw in it the beginning of a portentous endeavor
by the United States "to obtain influence in the

Mediterranean."

The New York Times reported that "one of the

highest authorities in the Administration"
had denied such allegations.

—

probably Hay

"We may be negotiating for a

coaling station in the Mountains of the Moon and for

a

the
training station on Mount Atlas," the Time s quoted

—
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unnamed source, "but we are not after any of
the Azores or
any part of Portugal any more than we
are after a coaling
station in Morocco. ""^^
The Perdicaris incident also affected the
itinerary
of the Battleship Squadron.

Both Chadwick and Jewell were

sending regular reports on the developing situation
to
Barker.

On the 6th of June Barker was ordered by the Navy

Department to remain in Lisbon until the 16th, and later the
stay was extended until the 18th.
was scrapped,

The visit to Villefranche

and by the 12th the possibility of Barker

going to Tangier made exciting reading in American newspapers.

The Navy Department decided that, instead of pro-

ceeding directly into the Mediterranean after leaving Lisbon,
Barker's ships would steam to Gibraltar

Tangier -- and wait on events.

—

a

few hours from

3 3

For the officers of the Battleship Squadron the

anticipation of

a

coming clash in Morocco was

a

welcome one.

It was felt that even if the affair was settled without the

use of force, the navy would have to remain in Moroccan

waters to collect the expected indemnity.

Admiral Amaral

,

Portuguese Rear

the commandant of the Navy Yard at Lisbon,

was telling American officers that the best way to settle
the situation was for the United States to pay the ransom and

then compel Morocco to double the amount, or face the seizure
of one of its ports.

34
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While Europe puzzled over American naval concentrations on both sides of the Straits, the situation in Tangier

had settled down to

stand-off.

a

Weary messengers travelled

constantly between Tangier and Raisuli's camp, and between

Tangier and Fez, but little progress was evident.
The day before Chadwick's arrival the younger of the

Wazan brothers returned from Raisuli's stronghold, telling
Gummere and Nicolson that the brigand was now insisting that
all of his demands be immediately met.

would kill the two captives.

If they were not he

He set a time limit of two

days for a satisfactory reply.

The two diplomats quickly

informed Raisuli that they must be given more time as approval of the demands must first come from Fez before Torres

could act on them.

They also pointed out to Raisuli that if

he killed his captives he would have to deal not only with

but with two of the great powers

the Sultan

.

Gummere

poured out his frustration to the State Department over this,
saying that everything depended upon Raisuli's whim and that
any false step on his or Nicolson'

deaths of the captives.
At

a

s

part would lead to the

35

Cabinet meeting on May 31st Roosevelt, Hay and

Moody discussed this turn of events.

They viewed Chadwick's

initial despatch as inconclusive, and Roosevelt and Moody

agreed with Hay that

a

guarantee to Raisuli by the United

States was out of the question.

To deal with Raisuli's

latest threat Hay read to the Cabinet the draft of

a

sharp

despatch he was going to send Gummere. Later in the day

a

s
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despatch was received from Ambassador Choate
in England
which gave some hope for a settlement through
British and
French efforts, and because of this Hay toned
down the telegram.

As sent it called for Gummere to inform the
Moroccan

government that if Perdicaris was killed the United States
would demand the same fate for Raisuli.

It implied that if

the Sultan could not carry this out the American government

would be quite willing to do so.

The next day at a noon con-

ference Roosevelt and Moody chided Hay, saying "they wished

/his/ first draft had gone,

as it

would have sounded better

on the stump"; however, they felt the second would serve the

purpose.

36

Even the toned-down despatch created

a

flurry in

the nation's press when it was publicly released.

"Awful

Vengence Threatened By Hay," headlined the New York World
If Perdicaris was harmed,
//Raisuli/7 to his death,

years."

_/sic_/:

And Death If Ke Does."
colorfully stated:

"the United States will hunt

whether it takes weeks or months or

The Boston Globe

Hay To Fraissuli

.

'

front page proclaimed,

Must Not Harm Perdicaris:

"Secretary

Capture

The Washington Times somewhat more

"Raisuli's Head For Perdicaris

37

Beyond the supposed political effect of the despatch and the exaggerated newspaper interpretation of it,
lay a potentially serious problem.

Roosevelt was gambling.

How could he predict the Sultan's compliance to the demands?
Who could guess Raisuli's response to the threat against his

life?

Was he cowardly or proud, reasonable or insane?

And
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what if the elderly Perdicaris died of natural
causes while
in captivity?

In a largely unpredictable set of circum-

stances, Roosevelt had engaged his own reputation
for "pluckas well

as the honor of the

United States Navy.

He had

drawn the attention of the world to his fleet by committing
it at the focal point of the Perdicaris trouble.

With his

easy-going approval of Hay's toned-down despatch he had discarded the last of his options.

His hand was pat.

was no question of backing down.

There

War, involvement in

Morocco, complications with Europe -- all awaited the whim
of a daredevil Moroccan bandit.

In Tangier no quick solution to the problem had

presented itself.

Gummere and Nicolson, as well as Torres,

still waited on Fez for official approval of Raisuli's in-

creased demands.

Joined by the Italian cruiser Dogali on

June 3rd the seven American warships lay quietly in the harbor:

"/L/ean white ships," wrote the special correspondent

of the London Daily Mail

,

Edgar Wallace,

"flying

a

flag that

has absolutely no right to be within 3,000 miles of Tangier."

Nicolson was apprehensive over what the Moorish
government might decide.

He told the Foreign Office he could

not "say what might happen if the terms are refused
or if negotiations are prolonged."

....

He felt Perdicaris and

Varley were in no immediate danger, but he was not sure in
which direction the Fez government would decide to go.

He

informed Gummere and Taillandier that he was seriously con-

sidering asking the Foreign Office to send over

a

warship

"
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from Gibraltar, and he warned the French Minister of the distinct possibility "of landing men for the protection of the

British colony."

Nicolson realized that certain risks might

follow from such an extreme act, but he felt the alternative

would invite greater dangers.

Taillandier was vigorously

opposed to any measure which would mean American and British
marines landing in Morocco, and protested strongly to
Nicolson.

39

On the 5th Nicolson, feeling events were at
cal stage,

asked for a warship.

criti-

a

The Sultan's reply was due

in a day or two and if it was a negative one, force might be

needed.

On the morning of the 7th the Prince of Wales

weighed anchor at Gibraltar and steamed for Tangier.

Under

the command of Captain G. A. Callaghan, the black and buff

painted battleship was one of England's newest and most
powerful warships.

As she entered the harbor at Tangier

late that same morning the guns of the American ships

crashed out their answer to the Prince of Wales thirty-four
gun salute

—

for Chadwick.

twenty-one for the American flag and thirteen
40

The United States Consul in Gibraltar reported an

even more important development to the State Department.

British warships under Admiral Domville which had been

scheduled to join the rest of the Mediterranean Fleet at
until
Rapallo, Italy, had been "ordered to remain in port

further orders

.
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The
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The situation temporarily eased on
the 8th when a
letter was received by Torres from the Grand
Vizier, Sid

Abdelkrim Ben Sliman, agreeing to give in to
Raisuli's demands.

The Grand Vizier said the Sultan had
acquiesed in

order "to please the two great Nations and the
families of
the captives." Torres was instructed to see that
all the

demands were carried out as quickly as possible.

The Grand

Vizier also ordered Torres to ask for the removal of British
and American warships from Moroccan waters.

government, reported Gummere,

The Moorish

"hopes that we will send away

the vessels so the people will be calmed."

Gummere refused

this request, as did Nicolson, saying that the warships were
sent to show the gravity v;hich each nation felt as to the
affair,

and they would not be removed until the captives

were released.

Torres told Nicolson and Gummere that he doubted
Raisuli would be satisfied even now, and asked Nicolson for

suggestions on how compliance with the terms could best be
brought about.
strictly

Both diplomats emphasized that this was

a m.atter

between Raisuli and Morocco, and that they

would not interfere in any manner.

They could only reiterate

that their governm.ents would hold the Sultanate fully responsible if anything happened to the captives.

Torres, Nicolson

wrote, was "much depressed and agitated" over how to meet
all the demands.

He refused to send his son to act as an

intermediary as the Vizier had asked him to do, fearing
Raisuli would take him captive.

Torres' chief problem was

.

104

how to deal with the Sheikhs the bandit demanded
be arrested.
They were pov^erful tribal figures with many
well-armed
fol-

lowers, and the matter must be carefully negotiated
with
them.

Torres felt he would not be able to inform Raisuli of

complete compliance with the demands -- except, of course,
the great power guarantees

—

until at least the 13th,

time lag which Gummere found very dil atory

a

"^"^
.

While waiting for Torres to comply with the demands
two minor events occurred which briefly caused

excitement.

a

flurry of

The first took place when Perdicaris was re-

ported ill and plans were immediately made to send
doctor from the squadron to aid him.

ship's

Fortunately, word came

condition had improved.

that Perdicaris'

a

Yet the incident

was proof of what a frail reed the negotiations rested

upon

—

the old man's death, even of natural causes, could

have instigated American intervention.

By now even Nicolson

was telling the Foreign Office that more vigorous measures

than warships were necessary (Gummere was also dunning the
State Department for stiff er action).

Nicolson suggested

that Great Britain consult with France on using stronger

methods
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The other episode, while trivial, measured the state
of the tension in the United States.

On June 8th Chadwick,

at Gummere 's request, placed a Marine guard at the Belgian

The reaction in America was

Legation just outside Tangier.
instantaneous.

trumpeted the

"American Marines have landed in Africa,"
f^Few

York Tribune

.

"It was the first display

"
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of American force in Africa,"
echoed The World

Stephen Decatur, just

a

,

"since

hundred years ago, whipped the

Barbary pirates into submission."

The front page headline

of the Washington Post was simple and to
the point:

Marines Land."

"Our

The Belgian ambassador to the United States,

Baron Moncheur, could only express that he was greatly
sur-

prised at the entire event.
A somewhat red-faced explanation came the next day.
Only two Marines had made up the landing force.

The v/ife of

the absent Belgian Minister was an American, the daughter of
a

certain General Story,

a

high Army official in Washington.

She had received threats from some Moors and Gummere decided

that she needed protection.

Reports of busy naval activity on America's east
coast were associated in the press with the increasing seri-

ousness of the Perdicaris affair.

headlined

a

"Hurry Orders To Missouri

report from Newport News in the New York Tribune

on the 11th of June.

Cowles' battleship lay at dock

"awaiting the arrival of

a

ammunition at New York."

Missouri had taken on
the past few days

,

a

naval collier which is loading
The Tribune reported that the

considerable amount of ammunition in

and the supposition prevalent around the

naval base was that the battleship "is to carry a large sup-

ply of ammunition to Barker's squadron."
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That same day the Philadelphia Public Ledger re-

ported that officers at the League Island Navy Yard were

giving serious credit to

a

rumor sweeping the base that the

,
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new cruiser Denver

,

lying "fully equipped for

a

long voyage,"

was going to be sent to join Chadwick's squadron at Tangier.

The Ledger also intimated that the auxiliary cruiser Yankee

would sail with the Denver 48
>

On June 14th the situation in Morocco took its most

serious turn yet

—

Raisuli again increased his demands!

Even before Torres had managed to satisfactorily settle all
the previous conditions, the brigand's appetite had gotten
the better of him.
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CHAPTER VI
"PERDICARIS ALIVE, OR RAISULI DEAD"
The new crisis in negotiations began on the evening
of the 13th when Torres received a letter from the elder

Wazan brother in which Raisuli was reported to have again

demanded great power guarantees.

These guarantees were to

be written and signed by both Gummere and Nicolson.

The

brigand, Muley Ali wrote, feared that if he let the captives
go without the guarantees he and his men would be molested

by the Moorish government, and unable to till their fields
in peace.

Raisuli insisted that the Sheikhs be arrested and

their "detention in prison guaranteed" by Gummere and

Nicolson
On the 14th Torres received a second letter, this

time directly from Raisuli.

In it the requirement for the

arrest of the Sheikhs was repeated, and two more new demands

insisted upon.

The first was for the release of additional

prisoners from the government's dungeons; the second, that
four more districts around Tangier be turned over to him.
demands
Torres on behalf of his government agreed to the new
he still
only pointing out that he did so conditionally as

had to get confirmation from Fez.

As for the Sheikhs,

two of hi
Torres arrested one of them on the 15th along with

arrest the
brothers, but told Raisuli that if he wanted to
107

"
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others he had the authority to do it
himself as

the govern-

ment was incapable of doing so.^

Gummere wrote the State Department that Raisuli
was

probably going to insist upon receiving great power
guarantees
before he released the captives, and since neither
the United
States or Great Britain would do so the question of what
to
do then must be considered.

He said the Moroccan government

was impotent, and its army laughable and in no position to

punish Raisuli.

The only option open other than direct force,

Gummere wrote, was

firm warning by the United States that

a

Raisuli release the prisoners.

If the warning went unheeded

the ^'threat of punishment must be fulfilled to the letter or
the lives of all Christians in this country will be jeopardized.

In Washington the news of the new impasse created

consternation.

Hay'

s

reaction to the increased demands was

an observation in his diary on the 15th that Raisuli had a

bad case of megalomania.

To Roosevelt Hay was just as blunt.

"You see," he wrote in a note to the President on that same

day

,

"there is no end to the insolence of this blackguard.

Both men agreed that there would be no American guarantee.
"Of course/' Roosevelt wrote Hay,

"it would be out of the

question to surrender to the demands of those Moorish brigands."

He felt that the United States had "gone just as

far as we possibly can go for Perdicaris.

Our position must

now be to demand the death of those that harm him if he is
harmed.
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Strong words, but
swered:

a

basic question remained unan-

just V7hat action was the American government pre-

pared to take in backing up its position?

On the 15th

Roosevelt wrote Hay that he thought it might be advantageous
"to enter into negotiations with England and France,

looking

to the possibility of an expedition to punish the brigand,"
If Morocco was unable to do it.

On the very next day, the

16th, Rear Admiral Chadwick began drawing up a plan for the

seizure of Tangier.

There exists no record of Navy Department orders to

Chadwick concerning
is, however,

—

a

a

landing operation at Tangier.

There

good possibility that he received such orders

at least on a contingency basis

—

on the 15th or the 16th.

On the other hand, he may have gone ahead on his own in re-

action to Raisuli's increased demands.
the fact remains that Chadwick,

Whatever the reason,

after sitting in the harbor

at Tangier for over two weeks, now began serious preparations

for military intervention.

To be sure, Chadwick had landed

navy signalmen, and

a

Admiral and Gummere on

a

few marines and

plan had been developed between the
a

series of provisional signals, using

flares, to warn of trouble in Tangier.

On board the warships

"marines and one company of bluejackets /were_/ made ready for

landing if it should be necessary."

But beyond these meas-

action
ures little else had been done to prepare for serious

before the 16th.

"
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On that morning Chadwick appointed

sisting of Commanders

W.

Morrell (Marietta), and

H.
E.

Southerland

H.
J.

a
(

Board con-

Cleveland

a

Henry

.

Dorn (Castine) to "collect

strategic information and prepare without delay

military operations of

)

a

plan of

foreign power in Morocco."

The plan

was to be set up in such a way "as to be immediately
available for use in case of necessity."

Finally, Chadwick

ordered that great secrecy be observed in gathering this information.
and Jewell.

Copies of the order were sent to Admirals Barker
7

As ultimately established the plan called for

a

seizure of the port by a force of over twelve hundred armed

sailors and marines, further equipped with five three-inch

field guns, and fourteen machine guns.
to be divided into two brigades

—

The landing force was

one from the South

Atlantic Squadron and one from the European Squadron.
initial landing

v;as

The

to be made by the South Atlantic Brigade,

its marines seizing the Custom House and main pier.

In the

harbor the warships were "to be prepared to shell batteries
at Customs Pier and at north-east battery in case landing is

opposed

.

Chadv7ick began to take other preparatory steps in

addition to the war plan.

He asked Nicolson to recall the

Prince of Wales from Gibraltar (she had gone there on the 13th
for some repairs).

Nicolson agreed with Chadwick, "espe-

cially," he said, "as trouble may be caused when the guarantees to Russouli /s"ic7 are refused."

Chadv/ick also sent a

Ill

hurried request to the United States
Government Despatch
Agent in London asking him to send
"immediately two copies
/of7 Stanford's map /of? Morocco," a
topographical
study

compiled by the British Intelligence Department.

By the

18th he was requesting from the captain of the
Brooklyn his

plans on the composition of the landing force, as well
as
the "/n/umber and type of guns /with field mounts/
available

for light field artillery."^

While Chadwick was putting together his plan for
landing,

a

an occurrence in Tangier added to the instability

of the situation.

On the morning of the 16th two small

chartered steamers, the Spanish Millan Carrasco and the
French Moselle

,

pulled into Tangier after

coast from Casablanca.

a

voyage up the

On board were some three hundred

Moorish infantry and seventy cavalry.

Nicolson had been

notified of their departure by the British Consul at

Casablanca and had gone to Torres demanding that the movement be halted.

Torres complied and Chadwick was just about

to send out the Marietta to stop the ships at sea when they

steamed into the harbor.

"'"'^

One of Raisuli's first demands had been that the

government troops in the Tangier area be removed to Fez.
This had been done, but the new influx of soldiers could

threaten the negotiations by destroying Raisuli's belief in
the good faith of the Moroccan government.

message to Casablanca ordering

a

Torres sent

a

halt to the sending of more

troops, two hundred of which were rumored to be embarking.

112

The Moorish soldiers already landed were, in Chadwick's

words,
"^he

"a mere rabble in appearance."

Walter

B.

Harris of

Times was even more caustic in his description, calling

them "evil-looking, filthy specimens of the worst type of

Moorish soldiers, whose reputation during the time they have
been camping uselessly at Casablanca has been of the worst ."

Chadwick felt their arrival might cause

a

serious

complication in the negotiations, while Nicolson saw the
situation as having been needlessly aggravated.

The ques-

tion then arose as to why the troops had been sent.

At first

Nicolson thought orders to send the men had been drafted by
the Fez government under the supposition that the captives

would have been released by this time.

Soon, however, more

significant motivations were being suggested.

ported in The Times that

a

Harris re-

high Moorish official in Tangier

had told him that the French Legation in Fez had "urged and

practically insisted upon this course" to the Sultan and
Grand Vizier,

"in order to lessen the chance of the disem-

barkation of American and British marines."

12

Both Nicolson and Gummere agreed that French diplomacy was behind the landing.

Nicolson in

a

confidential des-

patch told the Foreign Office that inopportune pressure by
the French had evidently caused Fez to move in the troops.

In Washington Hay called in Jules Jusserand, the French Am-

bassador, and asked him why this army of Moroccan "tatterde-

malions" had been sent to Tangier.
ignorance of the entire matter.

Jusserand professed

Despite the presence of the soldiers some
progress
in negotiations was being made.
Raisuli had apparently decided to ignore the Moroccan landing and accepted
the terms
offered for the ransom part of the settlement.
All of the

brigand's other demands had been more or less acceded to,
ex
cept for the great power guarantees, and, probably realizing

that he was never going to get these, he had decided to settle.

Raisuli demanded that the money, as well as the men

being freed by the Moroccan government, be brought to his
village at Terdants where the exchange would take place.
Gummere and Nicolson strongly objected to this plan, feeling
that Raisuli would simply take the ransom and the freed

prisoners without releasing Perdicaris and Varley.

Torres

sent a message to the brigand on the 17th proposing the ex-

change take place at

neutral village six hours, or eight-

a

een miles from Tangier.

living in the area
Raisuli,

—

Zellal, the chief of the tribe

the Beni Msur

—

was friendly to

and his land would probably be acceptable as an ex-

change point.

Raisuli agreed, but hopes for

a

quick settle-

ment were dashed when Zellal, fearing repercussions, refused
to have anything to do with the exchange.

14

This new obstacle, imposed at such

infuriated Gummere.

a

promising time

He sharply told Torres that he and the

American government "were very much dissatisfied with the
manner of negotiations," and it was ridiculous that Morocco
"had no authority over a petty chief."

Gummere informed
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Torres he would be held responsible for every
hour's delay.
Torres, although much bewildered by this turn
of events, promised to send out a negotiator and attempt to
persuade Zellal
to change his mind."'-^

Meanwhile, the Battleship Squadron had left the
Tagus on the 18th and steamed south for Gibraltar.

Early

next morning, a Sunday, the four battleships were sighted

from the mainmast of the Prince of Wales as they sailed close
by Tangier heading east towards the Straits.

Barker took the

opportunity as he passed to use his wireless to inform
Chadwick on the Brooklyn and Jewell on the Olympia of his
presence.

Chadwick told Barker that Raisuli could be ex-

pected to release the captives in

a

few days; however, this

was before Chadwick had heard of Zellal

's

refusal.

On reaching Gibraltar Barker found the cruiser

Clevel and from Jewell's squadron in the harbor coaling.

After

a

series of salutes, official visits were exchanged,

and stores which had been awaiting the arrival of the battle-

ships were taken on board.

On the evening of the 21st

Barker and his captains dined with the Governor of Gibraltar,
Field Marshal Sir George White, the hero of the seige of
Ladysmith.

Barker found most informed opinion on the Rock

entertained grave fears for the captives, feeling that they
would "not be released as soon as expected."

Nevertheless,

Barker decided that, unless orders to the contrary arrived,
22nd
he would leave Gibraltar on the morning of Wednesday, June

.

No orders came from Washington.

There were more

than enough warships crowded into the small harbor
of Tangier
to deal with any possible emergency,

could return if needed.

and the battleships

The Roosevelt administration had

other uses for battleships at the eastern end of the

Mediterr ane an

The most critical point in the Perdicaris affair was

reached on the 21st.

Gummere sent to Washington that after-

noon his most gravely worded despatch.

He was convinved, he

stated, that Moroccan authorities were delaying the release
of Perdicaris and Varley.

Gummere accused them of "double

dealing and treachery," and felt the United States was being
put in an undignified and humiliating position.

If Zellal

refused to let the exchange take pi ace Gummere said he wanted
authority to present an ultimatum to the Moroccan government.

Specifically he advised the landing of marines and the
seizure of the Custom House.

Gummere ended his despatch by

saying that Rear Admiral Chadwick agreed, and "cables to
same effect

"''"^
.

But Chadwick did not agree, and it was perhaps this

lack of agreement which prevented Gummere

carried out.
the Castine

threat from being

's

On the morning of the 21st Commander Dorn on
w^as

notified by the watch that

a

signal from

Chadwick had been received ordering him to immediately come
aboard the Brooklyn

.

When he arrived Dorn found Chadwick and

the other captains of the two squadrons gathered in the
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wardroom.

The Admiral then showed them the
text of

a

tele-

gram in cypher which he said he was going
to send to
V7ashington.

The telegram, according to Dorn, informed
the

Roosevelt administration that Chadwick felt the
"negotiation
/were/ being thwarted by the authorities," and that
he,

Chadwick, considered "it advisable to seize the Custom
House
as /an/ indemnity for every day's delay in /the/
delivery of

the captives."

He then told Dorn that he was to command the

battalion of bluejackets and marines which would land.

A

happy Dorn hurried ashore "to lay out the principal points
to be seized," and soon established "a clear enough idea of
the surroundings" in which he and his landing force would

have to operate.

To be chosen to lead this expedition was a

feather in Dorn's cap, and if carried out successfully it

would be

a

great advantage to his career. 20

When Dorn came back on board the Castine in the lat

afternoon he was surprised to receive

a

signal from the

Brooklyn ordering his gunboat to Gibraltar the following day
for stores.

Early the next morning

a

confused and dis-

appointed Dorn went over to see Chadv/ick.

When asked about

the drastic change in plans Chadwick told Dorn he "had not

sent the /Tirst/ despatch but another /onej
its assessment of the situation.

much milder" in

Chadwick said that after

dismissing the meeting he had taken
nap,

,

a

short mid-afternoon

and on awakening decided to change his mind.

21

.
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Chadwick's decision was fortunate.

It is quite

probable that if he had sent the telegram to Washington im-

mediately after speaking to Dorn he would have been locked
into a course of action, and the seizure of the Custom House

could have taken place on the 22nd

—

the same day word came

that Zellal had agreed to the use of his village as an ex-

change point.

Chadwick had been given

a

great deal of leeway

by Roosevelt and Hay, and his judgement was respected by both
men.

Gummere, on the other hand,

v;as

an unknown quantity,

and his recommendation to use force without being backed up

by Chadwick simply did not carry enough weight.

However, if

Chadwick's first assessment had been sent it probably would
have been accepted by the President, resulting in

a

landing

at Tangier and opening up an entirely new situation.

Half a world away, at the very same hour that

Chadwick told Dorn of his intention to seize the Custom House,
the Republicans opened their Convention in Chicago.

The

nomination of Theodore Roosevelt by the party to be their
standard bearer in the election of 1904 was
clusion.

a

As the Republican faithful gathered in the windy

city on the weekend of June 19th they came for
a

foregone con-

a

coronation,

coronation to the "undisputed inevitably" of Theodore

Roosevelt

22

Some in the party's leadership did not look kindly

upon the President.

He was his own man and, travelling in

McKinley.
his own diirection, so unlike the more amenable
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Hov^ever,

just four months prior to the Convention
Mark Hanna,

the "Kingmaker," had died,

and this had left no one to rally

around in opposition to Roosevelt.
the President's pocket,

So the nomination was in

and he bestrode the Republican Party

like a latter-day Gulliver.

The Republican delegates were

left, reported The Times (London),

"idly watching the lake

from piazzas, and wondering why they came to Chicago. "^^
On Tuesday, June 21st, the Convention opened.

The

Chicago weather seemed only half-hearted in its approval of
the affair,

and there was a "suggestion of rain in the air

and the sun had a struggle with clouds banked up over the

lake."

From

a

The site for the Convention was Chicago's Coliseum.

distance it looked like

a

great medieval fortress

somehow mysteriousJy transported to the middle of this raw
and bustling American city.

Stone towers and castellated

walls decorated the outside while drawbridges led into its
dim and humid interior.

24

Reporters found few of the customary hoard of vendors of badges and souvenirs who usually inundated the streets
on such occasions.

Those who had come were not doing well.

"All the merchants are waiting for St. Louis

(site of the

Democratic Convention)," said one vendor, "we'll make up for
it in St. Louis."

For sellers of campaign buttons and other

such paraphernalia two or three candidates for the nomination
were needed in order to show

a

profit.

One of the more popu-

lar souvenirs being sold on the streets was an inch square

biography of the President titled The Candidate

.

As they

hawked the diminutive volume the vendors would
call out:
"Smallest life of the greatest man.
Put Roosevelt in your
vest pocket ."
Inside, the Coliseum was

a

great rectangular steel

girderedhall capable of seating nine thousand people.

A

single gallery ran around the periphery of the hall, and

hanging from it was a continuous strip of red, white and
blue bunting, adorned at intervals with pictures of

Roosevelt festooned with small American flags.

From a tem-

porary stand the First Regiment Band of Pullman, Illinois,

crashed out patriotic marches.

strung

a

At one end of the hall was

large flag decorated with an American eagle and the

Great Seal of the United States.
stated:

Above it

a

placard proudly

"Under this banner both Harrison and McKinley were

twice nominated."

Near the roof

scribed in gold, read:

a

great black banner, in-

"Home Market Club, Boston.

wages for American workmen.

American

Protection for American Homes." 2

Political etiquette of the period called for the

President to stay away from the Convention and be officially

informed of his selection later.

This did not much hamper

Roosevelt, for in the basement of the Coliseum the chief of
the White House telegraphic force had set up a direct wire
to the President's Office Building in Washington.

The

President was ensconced in his apartment in the southeast

corner of this structure, and could therefore "feel the pulse
of the convention as it proceeds, in addition to learning of
the more important transactions in committee rooms and

"

.
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hotels as they are completed

"Convention Dull And Delegates Wish To Go
Home

-

,

read the front page headline in The Sun (New
York) after the
Convention's first day. There were great patches
of empty
seats said the Sun, and applause at the first
mention of

Roosevelt's name was formal and brief.
came when

a

The greatest cheer

large painting of Mark Hanna was unveiled.

When

the same was done for a smaller portrait of the President
the

reaction, declared The World (New York), fell flat.^^
The image being presented over the telegraph must

have been an appalling one for Roosevelt.

Although the

nomination was assured, the election was not, and it was obvious that something had to be done to put

a

bit of life into

the delegates and gear them up for the coming campaign.

The

arrival of Gummere's alarming despatch gave Roosevelt his

opportunity
The next day of the Convention, the 22nd, featured

two of the Republican Party's biggest stalwarts.
a

First came

fighting speech by "Uncle Joe" Cannon, Speaker of the House

and the Convention Chairman.

After some intervening politi-

cal addresses Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts ap-

proached the speaker's lecturn.
all in black,"

"Tall and slender, dressed

and looking like the statesman and scholar he

was, Lodge began reading the Republican platform "sprinkled

with words that had the broad 'A's'

and twang of Yankee land."

One of the planks in the platform was

a

vigorous call for the

protection of American citizens in foreign lands, and it

"
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brought a loud cheer from the hall.^^

A perfect background

for what was to follow.

When Lodge finished he moved that the platform be
adopted.

Cannon put the question to the delegates, "and

after a rousing vote in the affirmative, declared the report

unanimously adopted."

It was now three in the afternoon and

the proceedings were just about to be adjourned for the day

when Cannon moved to the lecturn and began reading aloud
from a copy of

a

telegram Hay had just sent to Gummere.

This

government, said Cannon as he finished reading it, wants

"Perdicaris alive, or Raisuli dead." 30
The announcement was greeted with wild cries and

cheering, the delegates rising to their feet, clapping and

stamping with loud abandon.

This act of Cannon's closed the

Convention's second day, and the delegates surged out into
Chicago's streets in

a

fighting mood.

delegates talked about the telegram.

All that evening the

The platform and the

speakers of the day had been forgotten, and only the
President and Hay stood at the center of attention.
"It was good,

hot stuff,

31

and echoed my sentiments,"

said Congressman John W. Dwight of New York.

"The people

want an administration that will stand by its citizens, even
if it takes a fleet to do it."

Senator Depew called the

message magnificent, and Representative Sereno

E.

Payne,

Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, felt that
there was "no use fooling around with those people any
longer

.

j2

"

,
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One delegate, W. A. Elstun of Moline,
Kansas, when

approached by
replied:

a

.

reporter and asked if he liked the telegram

"Bet your bottom dollar

I

like it.

Roosevelt is

behind that cable message to that fine old body-snatcher
Raisuli.

Out in Kansas we believe in keeping the peace but

in fighting against wrong."

A member of the national com-

mittee later commented that the Convention would go down in

history as the "catch him dead or catch him alive convention.

33
"-^-^

Reaction in the nation's press was predictably split
along party lines, for the telegram was quickly recognized as

primarily

a

domestic political ploy.

The Daily True American

(Trenton) called the message boastful,
to fit a party gathering."

and "evidently coined

It felt that the State

Department "should have been above playing to the galleries
in a partisan convention."

headlined the story:

The World (New York) humorously

"Convention Yells At Cry For BL-O-O-D!"

It factiously pictured the delegates screaming "Fee, Fi
Fum, give me the blood of a Mussulman."

,

The World also com-

posed its own series of telegrams from famous figures in

Indianapolis from Hay and read:

him.

them.

'

a

One went to the Mayor of

parody of Kay's message.

stole Senator Beveridge

Fo

s

"Produce the miscreant who

railroad passes.

Use an axe on

Put the mutilated remains in a cask and let me have
1.34

The Springfield Republican saw the telegram as more
a

political expedient than

a

valid diplomatic initiative.

e

It reminded the newspaper of the fiery queen in Alice
in

Wonderland.

"

it thrill you?

•

Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead'
Mr.

—

doesn't

Perdicaris might not approve of such

sentiments regarding his charming host and friend, but then,
Mr.

Perdicaris doesn't understand the exigencies of our

politics. "^^

Historians have tended to emphasize the telegram as
a

strictly domestic political move with little or no relation

to events in Tangier.

Luella Hall, for example, goes so far

as to write that Perdicaris and Varley had already been re-

leased before the despatch reached Tangier.

In the part of

the telegram not read to the Convention, Hay ordered Gummere'
not to "arrange for the landing of marines or seizing

/_the_/

Custom House" without specific instructions from the State
Department.

This has often been cited as

telegram's lack of serious intent.

a

proof of the

Also, Hay's slightly

superior entry in his diary saying how curious was the way
"a concise impropriety hits the public," has added to the

opera bouf f

aura surrounding the incident.

36

Yet, if the despatch was an obvious domestic political response, it also had a very serious side.

Roosevelt

and Hay were unaware that the most recent roadblock to the

release had been overcome

—

word only reached Washington on

the evening of the 22nd, four hours after the telegram had

been read in Chicago.

In addition Perdicaris and Varley

were not freed until the 24th,

and until the exchange was

Raisuli
completed no one in Washington or Tangier knew if
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would go through with it.

The brigand had increased his de-

mands in the past and could easily do so again.

The still

serious nature of the situation in Morocco can be understood
when one remembers that Hay's famous message could have been
even more momentous.

Except for Chadwick's afternoon nap,

the 22nd might have seen American bluejackets swarming over

Tangier, negotiations probably ended, and an even more riotous response at the Convention.

On the same day as Hay's telegram to Gummere, Zellal

told Torres'

negotiator that he would allow his village to be

used for the exchange, but only on receipt of

a

written prom-

ise by Torres that no harm would come to him or his people.

This promise was duly forwarded, and

a

courier sent to

Raisuli telling him to start out for Zellal
next morning.

's

village early

Gummere felt prospects for the captive's re-

lease rather more promising now than a few days ago, but he
still was not completely confident

upon the whim of Raisuli.

—

everything depended
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The younger Wazan brother, Muley Ahmed, took the

ransom money out from Tangier in the early morning hours of
the 23rd,

and headed for Zellal 's village.

With him went

the forty-two Moorish prisoners who were to be freed to

Raisuli, as well as some forty armed mounted guards.

The

courier to Raisuli had for some unknown reason been delayed
on the road and did not deliver the letter setting up the

exchange until late on the 23rd.

Because of this Raisuli and

his captives did not start out until the morning
of Friday,
the 24th.

This was just as well for the younger Wazan's

party also encountered problems in getting to the village.
It was still dark on Friday morning when Raisuli

left Terdants and headed down the mountains with his prisoners.

Perdicaris was understandably elated that his six

weeks of detention was coming to an end.

The sun rose as

they left the village and the recollection of that last sunrise at Terdants remained etched in Ion's memory.

He would

later remember the white swirling mist which remained around
the base of the mountains, while the "peaks and turrets were

now flecked

v/ith

crimson or lilac, now shaded with purple,

by some passing cloud."

On his left rode Muley Ali in a

spotless white silk bournous
a

grey charger.

,

and on his right Raisuli riding

The brigand was in an expansive mood at his

success and engaged Perdicaris in long rambling conversaAt one point when complimenting Ion on his horseman-

tions.

ship he told him

t?iat

European fads, and had

if the Sultan "indulged in fewer
a

little more grip, and would use the

spur more freely, he would have

saddle

a

better seat in the

""^^
.

As the sun continued to rise Perdicaris could see

both the Mediterranean and Atlantic, as well as the Spanish
mainland.

Once Raisuli pointed to

a

white fleck on the

African coast and said it was Tangier.
themselves at Zellal's village,

a

At noon they found

"semi-fortified place,

hanging on to the steep hillside," half castle, half village.

Raisuli sent out scouts to make sure that the
government had
not laid an ambush for him.
Entering the village they found
it empty of government representatives,

for Muley Ahmed, held

back by his prisoners, had not yet arrived.

They were quite

weak because of their long imprisonment and, as they had to
walk, unable to keep up the

pace.'^"'-

Soon, however, Muley Ahmed's party arrived and the

prisoners and ransom were exchanged.

Raisuli was given $20,

000 in Spanish silver dollars and $50,000 in certified checks

drawn on the Comtoir d'Sscompte, the French bank in Tangier.

Perdicaris assured Raisuli the checks were valid and the

brigand accepted Ion's word.

Fortunately Raisuli made no

mention of the great power guarantees.

Wlien

Ion took leave

of Raisuli the bandit told him that he had now come to look

upon him as

a

friend,

and promised that if ever Perdicaris

ran into trouble his men would hasten to his relief.
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Ion made the trip to Tangier in a litter that had

been especially provided for him, but as he came near the
town he mounted

a

horse and rode to his home.

It was early

Saturday morning, just past midnight, when he reached El
Minzah.
v/ell

Chadwick and Gummere were there to meet him,

as his wife

and family.

as

The armed escort rode into the

courtyard first and raggedly presented arms as Perdicaris
and Varley entered through the gateway.

dismounted both

v/ere

surrounded by their friends, "shaking

hands and talking with them."

talked for

a

As soon as the men

Afterwards, in his house. Ion

while recounting his adventures; and then, as
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Chadwick wrote to Hay, "Perdicaris was sent to bed,
the rest
took a little supper, and the incident closed. ""^^
Reaction in the United States to the release of the
captives generally gave full praise to Roosevelt's and Hay's
diplomacy.
release,

The Sun (New York) headed its editorial on the

"Flag Follows The Citizen."

To The Sun the large

naval demonstration was the key to the release.

Although

its size was criticized in some quarters as inordinate, the

newspaper felt that this "is what ships are for."
President's action was

a

The

practical success, and an "impres-

sive illustration of a fixed national purpose with regard to
all who have the right to claim the protection of the

American flag."

The New York Tribune said of the release

that long ago America's rule with respect to the Barbary

pirates had been, "millions for defense, but not one cent
for tribute."

It was a good rule,

and "the sending of war-

ships to Tangier and the demand for 'Perdicaris alive or

Raisuli dead' were simply a worthy twentieth century revival,
or,

rather maintenance, of the same spirit."

The London

correspondent of the Tribune reported great relief in official circles in Great Britain over the settlement of the
affair,

and Roosevelt was receiving "full credit for his

resolute and determined action."
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Looking over his shoulder as his battleships steamed
into the Mediterranean, Rear Admiral Barker was even more

appreciative of the settlement.
of us," he said,

"It was fortunate for all

"including the Government and people of the
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United States" that Raisuli gave Perdicaris up.
gand had kept him

a

prisoner,

penny to reach him with

a

If the bri-

"it would have cost a pretty

force of sailors and marines. "^^

Curiously, the telegram had nothing to do with the
exchange.

The brigand would certainly not have been aware

of its existence until long after the release had taken place.
He had already decided to exchange the captives some days before; however, in all fairness, no one outside of Terdants

knew this for sure.

Roosevelt's telegram was, although out-

wardly directed at Raisuli, really meant for the Moroccan
government.

At this stage the only action the United States

could take, or would want to take, was

a

seizure of Tangier.

The port could then be used as a pawn to put pressure on

Morocco to deal with Raisuli.

It would indeed "have cost a

pretty penny" to track the brigand down, and with the recent

experience of the Philippine insurrection in mind, Roosevelt
would have had little desire to engage American power in an

expedition to the Atlas Mountains.

There was one small dark cloud on the horizon for

Roosevelt in the midst of his small coup, and it had to do
with Perdicaris' citizenship
lack of it.

—

or,

to be more precise, the

It had been made f righteningly clear to the

President and Hay during the affair that Perdicaris just
might not be an American citizen.

If this information was

to prove correct and become public, the resulting laughter

could put

a

large dent in any election victory Roosevelt
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hoped for in November.
The first intimation that something was amiss came
at the beginning of June when Hay received a letter from a

Mr. A. H.

Slocomb of Fayetteville

North Carolina.

,

Mr,

Slocomb raised certain questions concerning the citizenship
of Perdicaris,

and on June 5th the State Department asked the

United States Minister in Athens, John
vestigate Slocomb'

s

allegations.

B.

Jackson, to in-

Jackson in

a

confidential

despatch on the 7th informed Hay that an lonnas Perdicaris
had been naturalized a Greek citizen on March 19, 1862.

This

individual, wrote Jackson, was described in the records as
"an artist, unmarried,

aged 20."

The Minister was "unable to

—
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ascertain anything in regard to /his othe_r/ antecedents."
-7

On the 10th Jackson cabled Hay that although he could

not find any positive proof that both men were the same person, he felt it highly probable that they were.

that while he was in the navy

a

Jackson said

warship he was aboard had

pulled into Tangier in 1883, and he remembered that Perdicaris
"was frequently spoken of in a contemptous /sic/ manner as a

•Greek who had run away from New Jersey with another man's

wife.'"

At the time Jackson had not thought of Perdicaris as

an American citizen.
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By now Roosevelt and Hay had no choice but to con-

tinue playing out the game, having already made the commit-

ment to intervention, and having no real proof that both
Perdicaris' were the same individual.

counsel until after the release.

They kept their

On June 28th Hay cabled
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Gummere ordering him to sound out Perdicaris
about the
validity of the allegations. Gummere quickly
contacted Ion,
then in Paris, and was informed by him on July

18th that the

charges were true.

On July 24th Gummere forwarded this em-

barrassing confession to Washington."^®
The Roosevelt administration's reaction was to bury
the problem.

Hay called it

a

bad business.

He felt that we

"must keep it assiduously confidential for the present."

So

successfully was the damning information hidden, including,
as Hay wrote,

"Paregoric /~s7" confession, that it did not

surface until twenty-nine years later.

tration introduced

a

In 1905 the adminis-

bill, probably inspired by the

Perdicaris problem, which when passed in 1907 covered the

questions raised by Ion's ambiguous citizenship.
issued

a

He was

passport as an American citizen and was recognized

and registered abroad as such.
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The players in the drama soon went their separate
ways.

Perdicaris, old now, and most of his desire to remain

living in Morocco gone, settled in Chiselhurst, England.

He

died there some twenty years later at the age of eighty-five.

Gummere later served as the second-ranking member of the

American delegation at the Algeciras Conference, and was
made the first United States Minister to Morocco when the

government raised the status of American representation to
the Sultanate.

He retired in 1909 to the life of a country

gentleman in Wimbledon, England, and died in 1920.

Sir
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Arthur Nicolson went on to greater service
in the Foreign
Office, eventually becoming Under Secretary
for Foreign
Affairs, and Lord Grey's right hand man in the
early days of
World War I.
For their services the two Wazan brothers
each
received an appropriate gift from Roosevelt
Winchester

—

lever-action repeating rifles with

a

suitable engraved in-

scription.

Raisuli's later career was even more adventurous.
He became the most important power in the Tangier area as

a

result of the kidnapping, acquiring such prestigious titles
as,

"The Sultan of the Mountains," and "The Eagle of Zinat."

His reputation became legendary among Moroccans and many

natives firmly believed that only

a

gold pistol ball cast in

the holy city of Mecca could kill him.

He even acquired a

fleet of small ships to prey on coastal traffic.^"''
In 1906 Abd el Aziz tried to depose Raisuli from his

position, but the wiley brigand pulled an old trick from his

pocket and kidnapped the Sultan's chief general, Kaid
Maclean, and quickly checkmated the attempt.

In the years

that followed Raisuli sometimes fought the Spanish, some-

times took their subsidies, but always maintained his independence.

Strangly this independence was ended not by

foreigners, but by a fellow Moor.

bellion achieved

a

Abd el Krim's native re-

great deal of success against both the

Spanish and the French in the early 1920'

s,

but a jealous

Raisuli refused to recognize him as the one leader of the

Riffian state and Krim was forced to march against him.

Raisuli made

a

last stand in his fortress palace at

Tazrat in January, 1925.
old brigand,

Captured after

a

fierce battle, the

"/i/wollen with dropsy and constantly in pain,"

was carried away to confinement in a litter.

When the

American correspondent Vincent Sheean talked to him, Raisuli
said he wanted to die.
want," he said,
dogs."

"I

have asked to die.

I

do not

"to be the prisoner of dogs and sons of

He declared that he would never "be a prisoner and a

slave to dogs in

a

place where Raisuli reigned as

They have taken my horse and saddle.

a lord.

Let them take the rest.

The Prophet will receive me in Heaven."

By April he was

dead, within a few months of his old captive Perdicaris,

But what of the long range diplomatic impact of the

Perdicaris affair?

The incident gave France the chance to

introduce the armed force which was the necessary first step
in the eventual French control of the Sultanate

.

The excuse

would have undoubtedly been found even if the kidnapping had
never taken pi ace
convenient-

—

the Perdicaris incident simply made it

On June 28th the Foreign Office was informed by

the British Legation Secretary in Tangier that Tailandier

had confidentially informed him that France had reached

agreement with Morocco on "a police force for Tangier with
By the end of July a French

French and Algerian advisors."

naval force arrived composed of the armored cruiser Kleber
and the smaller cruiser Galilee

.

They were, Gummere told

the State Department, to remain at Tangier for some time.

,

.
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The significance of the affair for the United States
lay not in its relationship vis-a-vis Morocco, but in what it

showed about the potentialities of Roosevelt's naval diplomacy.

It was the naval power which the President had con-

centrated in Moroccan waters which was important.

In itself

the kidnapping of an American would not have caused the re-

action it did in the United States, and especially in Europe,
if the fleet had not been involved.

travelling abroad, including

a

Americans living and

number of missionaries, had

been kidnapped or killed before

v;ith

much less fuss.

1904 the coincidence of an aggressive President and

But in
a

new

naval policy had combined to give the Perdicaris affair a

meaning far beyond the rescue of
quaint

najne,

a lone

citizen with a

and of dubious national heritage.

American involvement might have gone much further,
but Chadwick's last minute decision not to land troops pre-

vented this.

If they had landed it is probable that they

would have been there

a

long time.

Chadwick could hardly

have gotten away with simply seizing the Custom House, and
the taking of the entire port would have in all probability

followed -- plans for such

a

contingency were already in the

works
The central government in Fez, its authority al-

ready weakened by rebellion and anarchy, could not have
own
given any more to Raisuli without jeopardizing its

existence.

diffiMorocco would also have found it extrem.ely

cult. If not impossible, to use force.

The brigand was well

.
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protected in his mountain eyrie, and in addition
held
Perdicaris and Varley as valuable trumps. Landing
Americ an
marines and bluejackets in Tangier to put further
pressure
on the Sultan would have had little effect on
the situatio•n
as the

did;

Moroccan government did not control events

—

Raisuli

and if he had decided to bide his time all the
blus-

tering by the United States and all the promises from Fez

would have meant little.
would have been

a

The best that could be hoped for

stalemate, with the negotiations suspended

for the time being and Perdicaris and Varley still held

captive
Once in, could the United States have gotten out,
or,

would Roosevelt have wanted to?

The British would have

certainly landed forces to protect their special interests
in the port,

and Spanish and French naval units most as-

suredly would have been sent.

In one way the British might

have been perfectly happy to have the Americans in Tangier.

This was the period of the Anglo-American rapprochement, and

having the United States there, even permanently, would have
been much more acceptable than France or Spain controlling
this key port.
But these are only speculations.

What was estab-

lished by the Perdicaris affair was the introduction of

American sea power to Europe; not just as touring naval
units, but as

a

force which had been used in a vigorous and

practical way, and which would be used again.

At the other

end of the Mediterranean lay another Sultanate, with more

American interests and
a citizenc,
citizens 4-^
to be protected, and
four of
Roosevelt's battleships were
steaming toward it.

CHAPTER

VII

"A BATTLESHIP TO PLAY WITH"

The length of the Perdicaris affair seriously dis-

rupted the planned itinerary of the three squadrons, but none
more so than Chadwick's.

The Navy Department and he decided

that because of the time lost the South Atlantic Squadron

should not proceed into the Mediterranean, but immediately
head south along the African coast.

Chadwick requested that

the Brooklyn be allowed to go to Genoa, Italy, for

visit, and join the rest of the squadron later.

a

brief

This per-

mission was granted and the Brooklyn left Gibraltar on June
29th, while the other warships left for the Canary Islands

It was here that Chadwick rejoined them,

on the 30th.

and

on July I5th the reconstituted squadron steamed south for

Sierra Leone.

1

Meanwhile, Jewell's European Squadron left Tangier
on the 29th for Gibraltar and remained there until July 5th.

Jewell had intended to follow Barker's squadron to Greece,

but the Navy Department ordered him to take on stores in

Gibraltar and await the arrival of the battleship Illinois
and the auxiliary cruiser Mayflower

.

Roosevelt's desire

as
"that the fleet be made as imposing as possible," as well

on the
the Perdicaris incident had combined to hurry repairs

Barker had
two battleships, Missouri and Illinoi s, which
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lost earlier.

Both had left the United States in
mid-June.

The Misso uri crossed the Atlantic at
an average speed of almost fourteen knots
an amazing performance for a battleship in this period
and arrived at Gibraltar on June 23rd.

—
—

Here Captain Cowles found that the Battleship
Squadron had

already left for Greece and that events in Morocco were

rapidly drawing to

a

satisfactory conclusion, so after taking

on coal and stores he quickly hurried after Barker.

The

Illinois was late in arriving at Gibraltar, and because of
this Jewell decided it would not be feasible for him to take

his ships to Greece;

accordingly he cabled the Navy

Department and Barker that he would join with the Battleship
Squadron at its next port of call, Trieste.
It took Barker seven days to steam through the

Mediterranean to Greece, and on the morning of June 30th his
four battleships and the collier Abarenda sailed into

Phaleron Bay at Piraeus.
a

This visit to Greece had not been

part of the original plan for the Mediterranean cruise.

When Moody wrote Hay on February 20th, asking that the State

Department prepare the way for the fleet, no mention was
made of
to go

a

v.'as

stop at Athens.

The farthest east the fleet was

Trieste in the Adriatic.

At the time Hay made no

effort to add Greece to the itinerary, and indeed he went so
far as to warn United States legations in Europe that re-

quests for the fleet to visit would be inconvenient and em-

barrassing.
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Sometime between the end of February and
the be-

ginning of May

a

decision

Athens to the cruise.

xvas

made in Washington to add

Unlike the visits to the other ports

there exists no record of diplomatic preparations
for the

Greek sojourn.

The arrangements were in all probability

discussed and decided upon during the month of April
when
the American Minister to Greece, John B. Jackson,
returned

from Athens and held conversations with Hay in Washington."^
Why this need for

a

visit to Greece, and why the

apparent necessity for secret consultations in laying the

groundwork for the visit?
Turkey.

The reason was to be found in

In order to settle outstanding problems with the

Ottoman Empire the Roosevelt administration had elected to
use the fleet in order to put diplomatic pressure on the
Sultan.

Chief among these problems was the ambiguous status

of American-run missionary schools and institutions in the

Empire.

The administration was under increasing pressure

from missionary societies to settle this question, and the

failure of

a

naval demonstration to obtain results in 1903

only made Roosevelt's resolve to gain
ment stronger.

a

satisfactory settle-

A confidential letter from Hay to the United

States Minister in Constantinople, John G. A. Leishman, on

May 24th made crystal clear the primary reason behind the
Greek stopover.

Hay bluntly informed Leishman that

fleet would be cruising near Turkey in about

a

a

month,

large
and

that Leishman "ought to be able to make some judicious use"
of this concentration of warships in his negotiations with

.
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the Turkish government.

The Roosevelt administration was being very careful
in its use of battleship diplomacy.

Leishman was ordered by

Hay not to commit the fleet to any direct action.

The ap-

pearance of the warships off the Turkish coast was to take
the form of an implied threat.

four hours away from Piraeus

Smyrna

—

—

The Straits lay only twentyas

did the great port of

and Turkish authorities could hardly fail to draw

the obvious conclusion

Reports of a coming clash with Turkey began to ap-

pear with increasing regularity in the nation's press during
the month of June.

The New York Times openly speculated

that after the Perdicaris affair had been satisfactorily

settled the fleet would sail on to Turkey.

The Public Ledger

of Philadelphia in an editorial on June 22nd wrote that

/^erica's relationship with the Turkish Sultan "at times
grows unbearable,"

It called for the fleet to be used

against Abdul Hamid, saying its appearance in Turkish waters

would show the displeasure and dissatisfaction of the
American government, and "might be fruitful of good results."
As early as June 3rd the New York World reported

that the "strenuous Roosevelt hand will fall next upon

Turkey," with the likely bombardment of Smyrna or Beirut if
the Sultan did not come to terms.

headlining:

By the 26th the World was

"Turkish Sultan's Turn Comes Next."

With the

conclusion of our problems with the Sultan of Morocco, it
warned, our warships will go east.

"Abdul Hamid owes us

a
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big bill long overdue," and "Yankee guns are expected
to inspire the Turk with a desire to settle."®
Just as the appearance of American warships in

Morocco caused

a

vigorous response from Spain and France,

the two powers with the greatest interest in the area, so
the possibility that these same warships would soon be

heading for Turkey occasioned

similar reaction from another

a

European power.

Russia was engaged in

a

life and death struggle in

the Far East, but the imminent movement of a large American

fleet toward Turkey and the vitally strategic Straits area

brought forth

a

warning from the Czar's government.

approach was an unofficial one.

The

Count Cassini, the Russian

Ambassador to the United States, met with Hay on June 11th
and attempted to sound him out on reports that the Roosevelt

administration was about to send warships into Turkish
Hay admitted the reports were true, and Cassini

waters.

then unofficially informed him that this act would be offensive to Russia and if carried out would undoubtedly bring a

formal and vigorous protest.

It was reported that Cassini

also told Hay that while Russia would not object to one or
two warships, the Czar's government would certainly challange
the arrival of a fleet of battleships.

The battleships

v/ere

sent and Russia, beset by war,

could do nothing except grumble.
ence of

a

9

For Abdul Hamid the pres-

fleet in Phaleron Bay was

a

display of naval power

ignore.
which he and his government could not afford to

How
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long did they intend to stay?

Where would they go next?

And how far was Roosevelt prepared to go in using them?

All

were unanswered questions which hung over the Topkapi
Palace,

where the Sultan and his ministers pondered on how they
would
deal with these barbarians from the Y enghi Dunia (New World).
It was just a little over one hundred years before

that the first official contact between the Ottoman Empire
and America had occurred and it too had involved the navy.

Before the United States went to war with the Barbary powers
it,
a

like many of the nations of Europe, had paid tribute for

number of years to these pirate states.

In 1801 the

corvette George Washington under the command of Captain

William Bainbridge sailed into the harbor of Algiers with
that year's tribute installment.

After the money had been

turned over the Dey of Algiers informed Bainbridge that he
was to take his special ambassador to Constantinople under
the flag of Algiers.

Bainbridge at first refused, but as

his warship lay helpless under the guns of the Dey

'

s

harbor

forts he was finally obliged to give in."^^
Soon the George Washington was playing host to the

ambassador and his wife.

Also crowded on board the small

corvette was the rest of the ambassador's suite, consisting
of one hundred men, one hundred Negro female slaves, four

horses, twenty-five cattle, four lions, four tigers, four

antelopes,
one,

and four parrots.

The voyage was an unpleasant

and the frustrated Bainbridge took particular delight

began
in tacking his corvette wildly as soon as the Moslems

.
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their prayers, forcing them "to swing
round like pinwheels"
as they tried to continue facing
Mecca.
When the George Washington arrived at
Constantinople
Bainbridge was told he was lying when he informed
Turkish

officials which nation he came from.
country.

They knew of no such

It was only when Bainbridge explained that he
came

from "a new world discovered by the Italians and belonging
to the English" that he was believed.

quite different.

In 1904 things were

The Turk now knew full well where and what

America was, and the humiliating circumstances of that first
meeting promised not to be repeated under President Theodore
Roosevelt

If an observer had looked out over the European con

tinent on New Year's day of the year 1500, his attention

would certainly have been drawn to what was happening in the
Balkans.

Up this mountainous land mass in the last half

century had poured

new and dynamic threat to Europe.

a

In

the eighth century the Franks had beaten back an earlier

Moslem tide, but this new invasion promised to be even more
formidable.

The expansion of Turkish power received a tre-

mendous strategic and psychological victory when the armies
of Muhammed II took Constantinople in 1453, and in the years

that followed they marched steadily up the Balkans menacing
the very heartland of Europe.

Yet within

a

century this power was in decline and

by the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was steadily
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contracting under continuous European pressure.

Only jeal-

ousy between the great powers over control of the Straits
and a vague protection offered by Great Britain allowed this

"sick man of Europe" to survive.

Like its sister Sultanate

at the other end of the Mediterranean,

Turkey in 1904 was

a

colonial pie v/aiting to be divided.

Nothing could typify the chaotic condition of this
formally great state better than its current ruler and the
sad plight of its once proud navy.

Abdul Hamid II was an

absolute despot in the fullest sense of the word.

His em-

pire still stretched from the Adriatic to the Indian Ocean,

but it was fatally riven by exploding internal nationalisms.
He had come to the throne in 1875 and soon proved himself to
be the most reactionary of rulers.

There had been

number

a

of attempts to rejuvenate the Empire in the nineteenth cen-

tury, but with the accession of Abdul Hamid these efforts

largely petered out, and Turkey slumped back into

lethargy and decay.

a

state of

13

The Sultan was a living proof of Lord Acton's dic-

tum on the corrupting influence of absolute power.

Like

Sultan Abd el Aziz of Morocco, Abdul Hamid had his little
ways.

His physical appearance suggested a calculating and

sensual character.

A great hooked nose dominated a face made

more striking by heavy lidded eyes,

brightly rouged cheeks.

a

dyed beard, and

He personally ran the foreign af-

the
fairs of his nation through the Sublime Porte (named for

administered).
gate of the Sultan's Palace where justice was

.
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In this absolute monarchy it was his decision
which counted

—

often to the despair of the more moderate and forward-looking

officials of the Porte.

"^"^

He suffered from insomnia, constantly smoked pungent

cigarettes and drank endless small cups of sweet Turkish
coffee.

Great rages alternated by severe fits of melancholia

dominated his waking hours.

Living under the constant threat

of being overthrov/n or assassinated he had developed into a

deeply fearful and suspicious monarch, and was quick to see

menace where there was none.

He always carried a pistol with

him and once killed a young slave girl when he caught her

playing with another pistol which he had left on

a table.

Visitors were often warned before an audience with Abdul

Hamid not to suddenly strike

a

match in his presence as he

had a tendency to confuse the sound made with that of
tol.

tion

a

pis-

The consequences were left to the visitor's imagina15

Yet he could be charming on occasion.

He loved

collecting birds, and was often to be found puttering around
a

carpentry shop which he had installed in the Palace.

One

of his favorite occupations was having Sherlock Holmes

stories read to him.

Lounging in his well-stocked harem,

playing with his angora cats, and idly talking with his
favorite wife, a fairhaired little Belgian, Abdul Hamid had

whiled away almost thirty years of rule watching his shrinking
empire slide toward its inevitable destruction.

16

8
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Between the 1840 -s and the 1870-

s

the growth of

Ottoman sea power had been one of the more
concrete expressions of Turkey's attempt to modernize her
institutions in
the face of a resurgent Europe.

Under the reign of Abdul

Hamid the navy, which at one time was the third strongest
in
the world

—

after Great Britain and France

to fall into decay and disrepair.

—

was allowed

The British engineers and

advisors who had formed the backbone of the navy were sent
home,

and by the end of the century this rusting fleet of

ironclads had settled into the mud of the Golden Horn.

Care-

takers grew flowers on the decks and raised families and
goats

m

the ship's interiors.

1

7

Only once did Abdul Hamid'

s

warships (those still

afloat) dare emerge from the Straits.

During

a

war with

Greece in 1897 some of the best were sent to the mouth of
the Dardanelles but not allowed to go further.

Even if the

Sultan had wanted them to steam into the Bahri Safid (Aegean)
they probably would not have been able to get back

—

in

their decripit state the greatest enemy was the sea itself.

1

In demonstrating American naval power against Turkey

Theodore Roosevelt had little to fear.

Turkey, with her

rusting, immobilized ironclads, could be counted upon not to

interfere with the exercise of Rooseveltian naval diplomacy.

Relations between the United States and Turkey in
the nineteenth century primarily revolved around that formi-

dable figure of Western civilization, the Christian missionary

.
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Indeed, according to the American diplomat
Lloyd G. Griscom,
the words American and missionary in Turkey
were practically

synonymous with each other.

These mainly Protestant mis-

sionaries were looked upon with deep suspicion, and
in recent years a long and bloody series of revolts by

some of the

Empire's numerous Christian minorities had made the figure
of
the missionary even more suspect in Turkish eyes.

The first important outrage against American mis-

sionaries occurred in 1862 when two of them were murdered by
bandits.

The speed with which the authorities tracked down

the killers won for the Grand Vizier of the day a gift of

two solid silver pistols from President Lincoln as
of American appreciation.

a

token

In 1879, when the next American

missionary was murdered, the Turkish government seemed less
eager to bring the culprits to justice.

An attack on some

missionaries in 1883 led to the first United States demand
for an indemnity.

This demand was haughtily dismissed by the

Porte because "the laws of the Empire in no case permit
it.
•

A number of other attacks against American citizens

and their property occurred in the early 1890' s.

In April,

1895, the American cruisers San Francisc o and Marblehoad

called at Turkish ports, including Beirut and Smyrna, in

a

thinly veiled warning to the Sultan and the Porte that the

United States was able and willing to protect its interests
in the Empire

"
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Another serious occurrence took place
in November,
1895, during the great Armenian revolt.
At Harput and Maras
there was extensive damage to missionary
property, prompting
the United States to demand an indemnity of
$84,519.

The

Porte denied any responsibility for the destruction
and

categorically refused to pay the indemnity.
caused

a

The attacks

tremendous stir in the United States, and Congress

reacted by passing the Cullom Resolution.

This invited

President Cleveland to ask the great powers to "stay the

hand of /th£/ fanaticism and lawless violence" of the Turk,
and it pledged congressional support for the President "in
the most vigorous action he may take for the protection and

security of American citizens in Turkey, and to obtain redress for injuries committed upon the persons or property of
such citizens

.

22

Abdul Hamid was now sure that the Armenian rebellion was

a

plot by Christian missionaries, and he reacted by

trying to end their influence.

In America missionary pres-

sure on the State Department to intervene was intense.

Lloyd

Griscom, serving in Constantinople as United States

C.

charge

d'

affaires at this time, later v;rote that almost

every instruction to the American Minister from State in-

cluded an exhortation to "get that Armenian indemnity."

The

Secretary of State, said Griscom, "used to quake when the
head of

a

Bible Society walked in."

23

The American Minister in Constantinople in late
1897, James B. Angell

(former president of the University of
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Michigan), asked for some warships "to rattle
the Sultan's
windows." Any temptation for President McKinley

to agree to

this course of action was sidetracked by the
Spanish American
war and the need for United States warships in the
Caribbean.
Even the firing on the gunboat Bancroft by Turkish
shore bat-

teries as she entered Smyrna in December, 1897, did
not produce a strong American response.

However, the victorious

conclusion of the war and the appointment of John Hay as
Secretary of State promised the missionaries a more sympa-

—

thetic hearing in Washington

Hay was

a

cousin of George

Washburn, the president of Robert College in Constantinople
and the most powerful missionary presence in Turkey.^'*

In December,

1898,

a

new United States Minister

managed to secure from the Sultan an admission of Turkish
responsibility on the claims, and was led to believe that the
indemnity would be paid.

But Turkish procrastination con-

tinued and it soon became evident that the Sultan did not
wish to pay the claim outright, but to do so "behind
screen."

a

Other powers had similar claims against Turkey and

if the government publicly gave in to the Americans it would

have to submit to the rest.

The screen was to be provided

by the purchase of a protected cruiser from a private ship-

building company. Cramp of Philadelphia.

The indemnity would

be secretly added to the final bill for the warship.

25

Even this face-saving device was now subjected to
the inevitable Turkish delaying tactics.

In September,

1899,

the American Minister was informed during the course of an
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audience with the Sultan that the purchase was
still being
studied by the Minister of Marine, but he was
assured that
it would be favorably passed on.

In January, 1900, the

Sultan again promised that the contract would be
signed

within

a

few months.
The settlement of the indemnity and the purchase of

the cruiser was finally brought about through the efforts of
a

twenty-eight year old American diplomat, Lloyd

G.

Griscom.

As the American legation in Constantinople was between minis-

ters for the better part of 1900 Griscom found himself the

senior United States representative, and he used his position
as only a younger man with a name to make in the diplomatic

service might be tempted to do.

In April Hay had sent a

handwritten note to the legation which, among other things,
told Griscom that he might "make as unprincipled
as you please."

was needed.

a

settlement

For the brash young diplomat nothing more

He imposed upon a young friend of his who was

temporarily in charge of the Reuter's Telegraph Agency in

Constantinople to send out to the world

a

series of inflama-

tory reports, written by Griscom, about the growing troubles

between the United States and Turkey.

These reports achieved

their purpose and caused a great deal of newspaper comment
in America and Europe.

Rumors swept Constantinople that a

force of three American battleships was steaming for Turkey.
Griscom'

s

target was the Sultan who he knew was an

avid reader of foreign newspapers and periodicals.

In the

Uriited States Hay refused to deny the rumors of a fleet

27

"
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movement, and, according to Griscom,

"subtly encouraged

them.-

However the Sultan still refused to commit
himself
on the cruiser or the indemnity.
On May 23, 1900, Griscom
submitted a formal demand and hinted at an
ultimatum if the
answer was not satisfactory.

with the excuse that

a

Again he was put off, this time

Turkish admiral was in the United

States inspecting cruisers and that the Porte would have
to
wait for his report.

Of!

Griscom still did not give up.

In October, 1900,

he wrote Hay and asked him if he could persuade the Navy

Department to send

a

cruiser to Turkey.

"nothing unpleasant would happen."

He assured Hay that

Writing some years later

Griscom was still amazed at his cheek in taking this action.
"Had
a

risk
•

been older," he wrote,

I
1

.

"I

would never have taken such

..29

Again Griscom caused infl amatory reports to be
leaked to the world's press through Reuters.

This time he

got an immediate response in the form of a Palace courier

with

a

message from Abdul Hamid asking him to have the

American press stop printing these stories.

Griscom refused,

saying that it was not within his power to do this.

Within

a

few days he had more good news for Hay cabled that the battle-

ship Kentucky

,

on her way to the Philippines by way of the

Mediterranean, would make an unscheduled four day layover at
Smyrna.

30

The main problem now for Griscom was "to frighten
the Turks enough to make them sign /the cruiser contract^/,
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yet not stir them up so that they really
would defy us.-

Cleverly using the battleship as

a

powerful pawn Griscom be-

gan to put increasing pressure on the Turkish
government.
One of Griscom'

s

friends wrote him during the crisis that

"/f/ew boys of twenty-eight are given
with.

battleship to play

a

Be very careful it doesn't go off."

On December 2nd

the Kentucky steamed into the harbor at Smyrna cleared for
action, with her guns run out.

The Governor of Smyrna tele-

graphed the authorities in Constantinople that he feared the
port was in immediate danger of being bombarded.

The roads

leading out of Smyrna were clogged with panicked refugees
fleeing the city with their belongings.

After

a

O

1

few day's delay the Sultan gave in, but

asked that the Kentucky come to Constantinople.

This was

a

way for Abdul Hamid to save face, as it would publicly show
the visit of the battleship to be a friendly one.

Griscom

received approval from Hay and the Navy Department to extend
the stay of the Kentucky

Constantinople.

,

and the battleship proceeded to

Captain Chester and Griscom were royally

entertained by the Sultan at
on December lOth,
age to the Orient.

a

state dinner in the Palace

and the Kentucky then continued on her voy32

As days passed without any new word on the contract

Griscom'

s

initial satisfaction turned to gloom.

He met with

Tewfik Pasha, the Turkish Foreign Minister, on the evening of

December 24th and demanded that the contract be signed.

If

not, he said, he would feel his utility in Turkey to be at an

.

end and would ask his government to withdraw
an answer by midnight.

hirn.

He demanded

This last ditch threat worked and one

hour before Griscom's deadline word came from the Palace
that
the signing of the contract would take place at ten the
next

morning. 33

it was a welcome Christmas gift.

Griscom had proved himself

a

master of bluff,

willing to take the desperate chance in order to gain success.
Some months later in Washington, where he had gone for re-

assignment, he met with Hay.
vice, Lloyd,

I

suppose

I

"As head of our foreign ser-

ought to reprimand you for some of

those chances you took," said Hay, smiling quizzically.
O

know we might have landed in

a

"You

A

lot of trouble."

Hay was undoubtedly pleased with the work of his

young diplomat and his willingness to take

—

a

calculated risk

it was a quality he was to bemoan as missing in the new

American Minister to Turkey.
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For as one problem with the

Empire had been solved another one had taken its place; this

would lead to more naval diplomacy by the United States and
on a much larger scale.

What had been successful once could

very well be successful again

,

CHAPTER VIII
THE SCHOOL QUESTION
John

G.

A.

Leishman's appointment as Minister to the

Ottoman Empire in early 1901 initiated
relations with Turkey.

a

new phase in America

The great problem which Leishman had

to confront revolved around the rights and protection of

American schools and property in the Sultanate, and most of
his efforts in the next few years were to be directed toward

this issue.
mat.

Leishman was

former steel baron turned diplo-

a

He had been born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1857

and raised in an orphan asylum.

Apprenticed as an office

boy in an iron and steel works at the age of twelve the

young Leishman rose to

a

clerkship, saved his money, and

entered the steel business on his own.
notice of Andrew Carnegie

,

Soon he came to the

joined the Carnegie Steel Company
Like Carnegie he was

and later became its president.

a

physically small man, and like him completely self-made.

In

1897 the wealthy Leishman left the steel business and en-

Prior to coming to

tered the diplomatic service.

Constantinople he had been Minister Plenipotentiary to
Switzerland for almost three

years."*"

Before Leishman could settle down to dealing with
the school question he was faced with another, more immediate

problem.

On September

3,

1901,

a
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certain Miss Ellen Stone

and a companion, both Protestant missionaries, were kid-

napped near Salonika in European Turkey.
came from the kidnappers demanding that

On the 28th word
a

ransom of $100,000

be delivered by October 8th, or Miss Stone would be killed.

Unlike the Perdicaris incident the United States government
did not send a fleet to Turkey and instead of pressuring the
Porte to pay the ransom allowed

m

organized

private campaign to be

a

America to raise the necessary funds.

During October $66,000 was collected by missionary
societies and handed over to the State Department.

In

January, 1902, the brigands agreed to accept this amount, and
by the end of February it had been turned over and Miss Stone
released.

3

The American government acted with great restraint

during the incident, as well as understanding the great difficulties faced by the Turkish authorities.

Roosevelt had

only just recently come to the Presidency with the death of

McKinley in September, 1901, and he was still unsure of himself in this new seat of power.
no naval units in the area.

Also the United States had

By 1904 Roosevelt was a much

more confident President, and he had

a

new naval policy with

which to back up this confidence.
In November, 1901, France showed one way to influ-

ence Abdul Hamid.

During that month a French fleet seized

part of the island of Mytilene (Lesbos) and held it as ransom for a satisfactory settlement.
in the face of such a vigorous move,

The Sultan capitulated
and French schools and

protection.
property in the Empire were given full rights and

"
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By 1903 all of the other great powers
had come to similar

agreements with Turkey, but not the United
States."^
The need for American intervention to humble
Turkey
was forcefully expressed in an article in the North
American

Review in late 1901.

"To show the Bloodstained Sultan

few

a

battleships," wrote Urbain Gohier, "and warn him that every
human head that falls under the knives of his assassins will
be paid for by the destruction of one of his palaces

would not be the work of
noble heart

.

this

conqueror, but the action of a

a

5

Roosevelt himself had no great love for the Turk.
In 1898 he wrote William Wingate Sewell that "Spain and

Turkey are the two powers
the world."

I

would rather smash than any in

During the Balkan War of 1912-13 Roosevelt told

Henry Cabot Lodge that the conflict would be "a benefit to

humanity because it will put

a

stop to that chronic condi-

tion of massacre, murder and bloodshed" existing in the

Ottoman Empire.

Yet, the President was fully aware of the

hazards present in any general military involvement with
Turkey.

He once warned Elihu Root about the dangers of re-

cent talk in the United States about "pushing matters to

conclusion with Turkey and taking Smyrna."

a

While he felt the

Turkish navy was absolutely impotent and could not oppose an

American fleet, he cautioned that the army was
matter.

a

different

Turkish ground forces were "a most formidable body,"

and man for man there "are no better fighters in Europe."^

Roosevelt would not forget this earlier judgement, and when
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he came to deal with the Sultan, first
in 1903 and then in
1904, he would use naval power.

In the summer of 1903

a

large delegation of promi-

nent Americans representing missionary opinion in the United
States,

and led by the Reverend Stuart Dodge, came to

Washington and laid before Roosevelt

a

memorial which urged

the President to gain for the United States the same rights
and protection already "secured by the ambassadors of the

Great Pov/ers of Europe /for7 their subjects" in Turkey.

other powerful leader in this protest was John

W.

former high State Department official, and now

a

lobbyist for missionary interests.

An-

Foster,

a

fervent

Roosevelt, hov;ever, was

continually frustrated by the inability of Leishman to get
satisfactory solution to the problem from the Porte.

7

a

It

had taken over five years of protests, threats, and finally
a

naval demonstration to settle the Armenian claims; and the

much more serious matter of the school question promised to
take even longer to resolve unless some type of strong action

was initiated.

Roosevelt found an excuse to use something more than
mere words in August, 1903, when

a

cable was received from

Leishman reporting that the American Vice-Consul in Beirut,
William

C.

Maglessen, had been assassinated.

harbor at Villef ranche

,

Lying in the

France, was the European Squadron

under Rear Admiral Cotton composed of the cruisers Brooklyn
and San Frsncisco,

The President did not hesitate to make

use of them,

and they were immediately ordered to steam for

Beirut.^
The assassination report turned out to be a false
alarm, but as the warships v/ere already on their way the

decision was made to make use of their presence in order to
put pressure on the Sultan.

The news of the squadron's des-

patch to Beirut brought the Turkish Minister in the United
States running back to Washington from vacation.

Chekib Bey

expressed his anxiety over the incident and begged Hay to

understand the chaotic conditions now existing in the Empire.
In an interview with the Washington correspondent of The

Times (London), Chekib Bey compared what was happening in

Turkey to some of America's internal problems.

"Unhappily

massacres sometimes occur," he declared, "but do they not
Nobody would be so foolish as to

occur in Christian lands?

hold the United States Government responsible for the
lynchings of negroes."

Turkey deplores these incidents and

was doing all she could to prevent them.
he said,

must be patient.

The outside world,

9

On August 31st Hay told Roosevelt that the sending
of the squadron had,

according to Leishman, "made a profound

impression" on Turkey.

Leishman felt confident, Hay re-

ported, that the Turks would now make an effort to settle the
school question.

Four days later Hay informed the President

that the government should be able "to finish up our little

chores" in Turkey within

a

few days.

He said that he had

him
recently had two long meetings with Chekib Bey and told
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that if the Sultan did not want American
warships in Turkish
waters it would be very easy to make them
depart
just set-

—

tle the school question and a few other
matters "which have

dragged on /for/ too long."^*^
Most of the American press supported the administration's action, although some like the New York Times
ex-

pressed concern over the impression made by this aggressive
move on the European powers.

Their "sensibilities might be

ruffled" should Cotton remain in Turkish waters for any

length of time.

"We cannot afford," affirmed the Times

,

"to

give any of the European Powers occasion to say or suggest

that we are meddling over there.

The incident," it warned,

"would surely return to plague us.

""'""'

A slightly more acid view of Roosevelt's gunboat
diplomacy was expressed by the Berliner Neueste Nachrichten

,

when it charged that the United States appeared to be fol-

lowing in Russian footsteps with its aggressive policy
The newspaper tartly pointed out that this

against Turkey.

action was being initiated by "the same American Chauvinists
who want to forbid European intervention in American affairs
on the ground of the Monroe Doctrine."

States raise such

Venezuela,

a

How could the United

terrible outcry when Germany acted in

and yet expect to freely get away with the same

performance in the Mediterranean?
Hay left for
Newbury, N. H.

,

a

12

short stay at his vacation home in

regretfully leaving Assistant Secretary Adee

and Roosevelt "to struggle with the Beirut proposition."

He
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humorously wrote Adee that after his last
"long tussle with
that poor writhing worm of a Turk," Chekib
Bey,
he almost

did not have the strength of wind to go,
but wanted "to give
up my ticket, dismiss my carriage, ring my
wife and

stay in-

definitely."

On September 14th he wrote Adee that as
he saw

it things were going pretty well for us in
Turkey,

and the

administration should certainly be able to "make something
out of /the/ incident."-'-^

But Hay had not counted on the age-old Turkish maxims of Bakalum (We shall see!) and Yarum gel

which had defeated other diplomats.

(Come tomorrow!)

Leishman's "wordy and

not very helpful" despatches brought Washington no news of
a

settlement, only accounts of constant delays.

of September no solution had presented itself,

American squadron at Beirut settled in for
The next move was up to Roosevelt.

Machi as

and the

long

stay."'"'*

If the Sultan refused to

settle what could the President do?

Beirut?

a

By the end

Bombard and seize

Cotton's squadron (recently joined by the gunboat
)

had obviously not impressed the Turks enough.

haps it should have been larger?
away from Constantinople?

Per-

Perhaps Beirut was too far

Roosevelt was understandably

loath to take the next obvious step -- the use of force.
a

As

result the American v/arships just stayed in the area while

Leishman fruitlessly tried to persuade Abdul Hamid and the
Porte to come to terms.
The next two months passed fairly quietly.

There

was a brief flurry of activity in early December when the
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American Consul in Alexandretta, Turkey,
was set upon by
local police as he was escorting an
Armenian (a naturalized
United States citizen) on board a steamer.
Immediately
after the incident the Consul lowered the
American flag and
left for Beirut by the same ship.
Cotton, who had taken his

squadron to Alexandria, Egypt, for stores and repairs,
was

ordered north.

Taking the Brooklyn Cotton picked up the

Consul and brought him back to Alexandretta where the

Governor of the port offered an official apology.
cident ended, Cotton sailed back to Beirut.

The in-

'"^

The lack of any settlement despite all of this naval

activity caused increased pressure on the State Department
and Roosevelt by the missionary lobby.

In answer to a let-

ter from the Reverend Stuart Dodge urging action, Adee com-

plained that the main problem was the "inertia of the

Turkish Government."

He forcefully impressed upon Dodge that

he did not think it would be of any use to bring his commit-

tee to Washington again for another protest,

as both the

President and Hay were in complete accord with his views.
Adee told him that the United States would keep up the pressure on the Sultan,

always hoping that "circumstances may

arise which will enable" the government "to profit by the

situation to the advantage of the Missionaries."

One im-

mediate problem, he informed Dodge, was that Cotton's warships had been overseas for quite

a

long time and the Navy

Department wanted "our men-of-war elsewhere.""'"^

8

"

Leishman's year-end report to the State Department
was a bleak one.

He called opposition to an agreement on

the school question bitter and determined.

There was n,o

sign of an immediate settlement, and he had "no confidence
in the daily promises which are broken with as little com-

punction as they are lightly made."
a shuttlecock,

He compared himself to

constantly passing back and forth between an

"irresponsible Porte and an invisible Sultan."
were no longer considered
only

a

nuisance.

The warships

threat, complained Leishman,

a

In some ways the continued presence of the

squadron without it being forcefully used was "more of

hindrance than an assistance

.

a

17

With the Sultan apparently unimpressed by Cotton's
squadron,

and the Navy Department pressuring to have the war-

ships withdrawn, Roosevelt and Hay were faced with finding

a

way of removing the vessels without seeming to have given in
to Turkish intransigence.
in mid-January,

1904.

The decision to withdraw was made

Informed of this, Leishman wrote State

that a withdrawal without having obtained a settlement would
be bad, but since the administration was not prepared to

"adopt more drastic measures" he had no objection to their

removal.

The Turkish government had made up its mind that it

could "hold off with safety resting easy under the impression
that forcible measures will not be resorted to."

1

In reply the State Department asked Leishman to in-

timate to Turkey that the ships were being "withdrawn for the

.

time being," in order to facilitate
discussions.

Later

Leishman was told to present the withdrawal
as evidence of
Roosevelt's good will. The Minister was also
ordered to

ex-

press to the Sultan and the Porte the President's
warm interest in the school question.

Leishman replied that giving

this face-saving impression would be difficult as
the Turks

were well aware why the United States was withdrawing
its

warships

—

all they had to do was read American newspapers

On January 30th Leishman cabled Hay that Tewfik

Pasha had written to the Sultan recommending

a

settlement,

but he believed that Abdul Hamid would never receive the

letter as his chief advisors would keep it from him.

Leishman said that as the Sultan had now made it

a

rule not

to give audiences to any foreign diplomat below the rank of

ambassador, it was impossible to deal with him personally.
The raising of American representation in Turkey to the am-

bassadorial level was another one of those small problems
with which Leishman was attempting to get the Porte to agree.
The unusual tactic of seeing only ambassadors appears to have

been a devious ploy especially designed to isolate the perBy February,

sistent Leishman.

faced with delay after delay,

he was plaintively writing Hay that everything was "so dif-

ferent here from other countries that one is seldom in

position to give

a

good reason for thinking anything

a
"

.

.

.

.

At the beginning of April the final blow fell.

Leishman cabled Hay that the Porte had officially declined to
take favorable action on the schools.

Leishman was terribly
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disappointed "after so many months of hard work and
constant
labor and patient waiting" to reach this dead end.
The

Grand

Vizier, he felt, was the chief culprit.

It was his influence

on the Sultan which had offset the favorable position
of the

Porte.

Back in the United States missionary pressure on

Roosevelt and the State Department to do something remained
strong.

The domestic correspondence of the Department of

State for this period contains many soothing letters sent
out to irate clergymen by Hay and Adee

One from Hay to a

.

certain Reverend Judson Smith of Boston might stand as an
example.

Hay defended Leishman against

a

charge of "not

having acted with sufficient energy," and told Smith that the

United States had been given promise after promise, but
nothing was ever done.

He ended the letter by declaring that

the government would continue its pressure "to get justice

done," but said we "have not yet come to the point of using

measures of violence."

22

But if not violence, what then?

It was during April

that Roosevelt apparently decided to use his navy again -this time in an even greater demonstration of naval strength

—

to try and force Abdul Hamid to come to terms.

Faced with

the seemingly intransigent attitude of the Turkish government
as outlined by Leishman on April 1st,

as well

as pressure

from missionary interests, Roosevelt began unlimbering the

big stick in the form of his battleships.
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With

a

display of American naval might in the

of--

fing Leishman told Hay on June 5th that
the visit "would
prove more irritating than beneficial, as in
the absence of
an ultimatum the Porte would be very apt
to treat another

visit with the same outward tranquillity and
indifference,"
To get the maximum benefit he suggested the
American govern-

ment play upon the Turk's suspicious nature.
that he ask the Porte if the fleet could pay
to several Turkish ports.

—

at things

He proposed
a

Given the Turkish way of looking

they "generally view frankness as

hide covert intentions"

than an open approach.

—

a

cloak to

this would worry them much more

23

The morning of June 8th Hay had

with John W. Foster.

friendly visit

a

stormy interview

Foster, representing American mission-

ary societies, told Hay he wanted the government "to growl"
at Turkey.

Hay informed him of what the Roosevelt adminis-

tration was proposing to do with the fleet and Foster went
away in a more reasonable frame of mind.

sent Leishman

The next day Hay

strong cable ordering him to ask for an

a

immediate audience with Abdul Hamid and put the school question before him

.

He said to ask for the audience "in the

name of the President."

Hay confided to his diary the hope

that this solemn v^arning and the arrival of the battleships

—

-r
would have "some effect on /^Leishman '_s/ negroes."

24

Tev/fik Pasha quickly responded to this new threat

by promising Leishman to bring the school question up before
the Council of Ministers for review,

and begged Leishman "to

grant him sufficient time to have the
matter reconsidered."

Leishman felt this response, while not completely
satisfactory, offered some promise.

He gave Tewfik Pasha to the end

of June to produce an acceptable response.

On the evening

of the 16th the Grand Vizier informed Leishman
that the

Council of Ministers had reviewed the case and referred
it
to the Minister of Public Instruction "with a favorable
rec-

ommendation."

Leishman was by now very optimistic, and gave

full credit for the apparent success to the demand of the

9th as well as the approach of the battleships.

He found

the Sultan and the Porte rather disturbed by recent events,

and both were now attempting "to find a way of backing

gracefully."

dovvm

But in Washington Hay, remembering his past

experiences with Abdul Hamid, still had reservations.^^
As the end of June approached a confident Leishman

wrote Hay that the Secretary's "medicine /was_7 working."
The Sultan was quite alarmed over the approach of the fleet,
and was unsure of just what would happen when it arrived in

Turkish waters.

26

The strategy appeared to be successful,

but with Abdul Hamid no one could be sure of this until the

royal decree on the schools had actually been signed.

Roosevelt's options in the event of continued

Turkish obstinacy were fairly limited.
fleet directly to

what would he do?

a

Turkish port, possibly Smyrna, but then
He certainly would not bring his battle-

ships home in this election year without

tlement.

He could send the

a

satisfactory set-

The example of the French in 1901 might have been

.
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in his mind,

for their seizure of the island of Mytilene

(lying just off the coast of Asia Minor near Smyrna) had

gained them

a

successful settlement.

Roosevelt had little

desire to engage the Turkish army in battle and this would

apparently rule out the seizure of

a

mainland port; but

along the coast of Turkish Asia Minor in the Aegean lay
neckl ace of small isl ands

,

a

one or two of which could easily

be taken and held with the superior American naval strength.

However

,

all depended upon the response of the Sultan

Would he give in as he had done in December, 1901, to the
presence of an American battleship, or, was this
portant matter of principle to Abdul Hamid than

demnity?

Only time would tell.

a
a

more im-

simple in-

CHAPTER IX
ROOSEVELT GAMBLES

Barker's leisurely week-long journey across the

Mediterranean was necessitated by the presence in Phaleron
Bay of a large French fleet.

During the slow passage Barker

took the opportunity of engaging his battleships in various

maneuvers and drills, including

a

number of torpedo exercises.

Except for a lone Russian corvette the anchorage at Phaleron
was empty as the American warships steamed in on the after-

noon of June 30th.

It was on these same protected waters

that ancient Athens had first launched its galleys.

It

\;as

here too that the shattered fleet of Xerxes had fled for

safety after being defeated by the Athenians under

Themistocles at the battle of

Salamis."'"

The American Minister at Athens, John

B.

Jackson,

was a graduate of the Naval Academy and a former naval officer.

In 1886 he had resigned his commission, studied and

practiced law for
matic corps

.

a

few years, and in 1890 entered the diplo-

Prior to coming to Greece in 1902 he had

served in Berlin as legation secretary and charge
for almost twelve years.

2

d'

affaires

When the battleships arrived it

was Jackson, like Bryan in Lisbon, who was to officiate over
the visits and festivities which v/erc to follow.

167

168

On July 3rd Barker and his officers
met with King

George of Greece in
Palace.

a

special audience held at the Royal

The meeting marked the renewal of
an old acquain-

tance, for Barker had met with a recently
crowned King

George and his new wife Queen Olga in 1873
while he was executive officer on the Wachusett. At the audience
the King

expressed his pleasure to Barker and Jackson at the visit
of
the battleships, only regretting that the stay would be
so

short and that during the hot season the officers might find

things

a

bit dull socially in the capital.

Barker took the

opportunity of extending to the King an invitation to call
on the squadron, v;hich George enthusiastically accepted and

asked if he could come aboard as soon as possible.

This was

acceptable to Barker and the visit was scheduled for the
next day, the Fourth of July.
The afternoon of the 3rd the battleship Missouri

arrived at Phaleron bringing the squadron's strength up to
five armorclads, and the next morning all were dressed with

flags and booming out salutes over the bay celebrating the

nation's birthday.
the Kearsarge

,

In the early evening Jackson came aboard

followed shortly by the King, Prince Andrew

and his wife Princess Alice,

and a number of high officials.

As King George's party was piped over the side the Royal

Standard was hoisted to the main truck of the Kearsarge
each of the battleships roared out
ade.

a

,

and

twenty-one gun carron-

All were completely outlined with electric lights and

in the fading sunlight they made a splendid sight on the bay.

4
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Before sitting down to dinner Barker took
the King
and his party on a brief tour through
the Kearsa rqe.
Be-

cause of the warm weather tables had been set
out on the
Quarterdeck, and the banquet was held under a covering

of

white canvas.

The entire affair, Barker wrote Moody,

"passed

off pleasantly," and a little after eleven the Royal
party

left the flagship, its way along the water to the shore

brightly illuminated by the searchlights of the battleships.
Other searchlights played on the large American flag hanging
from the stern of each vessel, as well as the Royal Standard,
and for a second time that evening each of the battleships

fired off

a

twenty-one gun salute.

On the shore of the bay

and in the port of Piraeus the entire nightime tableau was

witnessed by thousands of Greeks who lined the wharf area
and sandy beaches.^

The next day Barker and Jackson headed

twenty-three officers from the squadron on

a

a

group of

journey to

Tatoie, the King's country residence about twenty miles from

Athens, for

a

luncheon.

Tatoie lay in

a

forest at the foot

of the mountains enclosing the Attic plain,

took place outside under the pines.

and the luncheon

Afterv;ards the King

graciously escorted Barker and his officers through the extensive grounds surrounding the Palace.^

Jackson told Kay that one of the more favorable im-

pressions made by the squadron on the Greeks was the exemplary behavior of its enlisted personnel.

The twenty-five

hundred sailors who streamed ashore on liberty had just

,
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received

a

month's pay, and their conduct in Athens
and

Piraeus compared most favorably to that of the
French crews
who had preceeded the Americans a few days before.
On
the

afternoon of July 6th the battleships steamed out of
the bay
and headed for the Greek island of Corfu in the
Ionian Sea.'^

Meanwhile, in Constantinople, Leishman was still unable to give Washington any satisfaction on a settlement.

The end of June passed without a definite reply from the
Porte, only the usual promises.

Leishman informed Hay on

July 2nd that he would wait for a few more days and then, if
an acceptable response was not forthcoming, he would demand
a

meeting with the Sultan. 8
When the Battleship Squadron left Phaleron on the

6th it still appeared that the naval display had had

tary effect on the Turkish government.

a

salu-

The Porte had agreed

to review its earlier refusal to deal with the school cues-

tion

,

and although it was continuing to delay a final deci-

sion there were still grounds for optimism.

More importantly

the fleet was scheduled to be in the Mediterranean for

a

month or more, and, if nothing came of the American diplomatic
initiative it could easily be sent back to Turkish waters.

The five battleships reached Corfu on the morning
of July 8th,

and after calling on the local American Consul

and engaging in a brief round of sightseeing Barker left the

next day bound north into the Adriatic.

He reached Trieste

early on the 12th, followed in the afternoon by Jewell's
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three cruisers and the Mayflower.

The battleship Illinois

came in on the 13th and her arrival finally brought the
fleet together for the first time in its full strength.

white warships, and six of them

Missouri

,

Iowa,

and Alabama

—

—

K earsarqe

Maine

.

,

Ten

Illinois

battleships.^

Jewell had gotten himself into

a

bit of hot water

with the Navy Department by his decision to proceed directly
to Trieste and not join Barker in Greece.

The Roosevelt ad-

ministration wanted the fleet at Athens to be as imposing

as

possible for the purpose of impressing Turkey, and the

halving of its num.erical strength by Jewell did not sit well
at

all in Washington.

The Navy Department cabled Barker on

July 6th that since Jewell had already sailed from Gibraltar
it could not override his decision, but it would certainly

request "an explanation in the matter."

Jewell's decision

to let the Illinois proceed to Trieste on her own also came

in for criticism.

The navy's allegiance to the tactical con-

cept of concentration gave "the greatest importance that

vessels should at all times, when practicable, cruise and
make passage in com.pany," and by letting the

I

llinois steam
.

T

alone Jewell quite obviously violated this principle.

10

On his way to the Adriatic Jewell attempted to in-

tercept Barker's warships at sea and accompany them to
Trieste.

On July 9th and lOth he spread his four vessels

across the entrance to the Straits of Otranto where the ships
the
were to keep in touch by wireless while they searched for

battleships.

Unfortunately, Jewell's exercise failed due to

,

engine trouble on the Baltimore and
2iYELEia'_s_

a

breakdown of the

wireless, and Barker's squadron slipped through the

net.^1

Lying in the crescent-shaped bay of the port of
Trieste the ten warships were an impressive sight.

From the

great medieval castle on the steep hill called the Schossberg

below which the old town had been built, the battleships and
cruisers looked like miniature model ships in
setting.

a

storybook

Although Trieste was the chief seaport of the

Austrian Empire, it was Italian at heart and the atmosphere
was Latin.

— San Giusto,
Nuovo — further pro-

The names of the city's churches

Santa Maria Maggiore, and Sant' Antonio

claimed the Italian spirit of the city.

It was through

Trieste that most of those citizens dissatisfied with conditions in the Empire had immigrated to America, and it was
from here in 1853 that the Archduke Maximillian and his

v/ife

Carlotta had left their pseudo-Norman castle of Miramar,
four miles up the coast, in search of an illusory empire in

Mexico.
One immediate problem which Barker ran into was the

Austrian government's impression that the primary reason for
the fleet's presence in the Mediterranean was instructional,

and therefore official entertainment would be limited.

Barker promptly corrected this notion and there soon began
the usual series of dinners and receptions; the first given

by Admiral Jedina, the commander of the naval base, followed
by

a

grand fete by the Governor of Trieste, Count Goess, two

days later.

On the 18th Barker gave a dinner for Austrian

officials on board the Mayflowe r.
a

He then left Trieste for

few days and joined his wife at Cortina in the Austrian

Tyrol for

a

brief vacation.

"^^

While its Admiral was absent the fleet received
serious scare when
the Kearsarge

.

a

a

number of cases of typhoid broke out on

Luckily, the outbreak was confined to the

wardroom, and an investigation pointed to

taken aboard in Piraeus as the cause.

a

supply of ice

Officers feared the

total water supply taken on in Greece was infected, and knew
that typhoid racing throughout the fleet would end its ef-

fectiveness.

The humiliating spectacle of the heart of the

United States Navy lying helpless and isolated in the harbor
of Trieste v;ould have quickly terminated any benefits which

the Mediterranean cruise had brought the Roosevelt adminisand it would have certainly emerged as an issue in

tration,

the election.

Contamination, as it turned out, was limited

to the ice.
On July 24th the fleet left Trieste,

and while the

Battleship Squadron and the Mayflower continued on to Fiume
the European Squadron steam.ed for Corfu.

There Jewell would

coal his cruisers and then sail for Villef ranche

"""^

The

.

visit to Fiume was another stopover not originally

a

part of

The American government, bowing to

a

strong

the itinerary.

hint from the Austrian foreign office, decided to honor the
port as

a

nod to Hungarian national sensitivities.
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Fiume lay on the other side of the
Istrian penin-

sula

Trieste.

frora

Situated at the head of the Gulf of

Quarnero this chief port of Hungary, like Trieste,
was essentially an Italian city.
Sir Osbert Sitwell once visited
Fiume and wrote romantically of "its clustered
houses
and

its bay,

spur of hills sinking into the opalescence of the

a

far seas,

and the quivering misty outlines of the islands."

Its chief historical sights were

a

Roman triumphal arch

erected in the 3rd century A.D. in honor of the emperor
Claudius II; the Austrian Emperor's Palace; and the Municipal Palace.

The latter, wrote Sitwell, was "built in the

well-known Renaissance-elephantoid style that is the dream
of every Municipal Council the world over.""^^

The six battleships and the Mayflower arrived at

Fiume in the early morning hours of the 25th.

Barker and

his staff first called on the Governor of Fiume, Baron Evin

Roszner,

and then the American Consul-General in Budapest,

Franklin Chester, who had come to Fiume especially for the
visit.

Baron Roszner came aboard the flagship later that

same day and brought with him a telegram from Count Stephen

Tisza, the head of the Hungarian state, welcoming the fleet
to Hungary.

On the evening of the 26th the Governor gave

a

large reception at the Municipal Palace for Barker and his
officers.

The Facade of the Palace was resplendently

lighted, while the extensive grounds around it were illumi-

nated by hundreds of colored Japanese lanterns.
flowers abounded," wrote Barker,

"Palms and

"and a fountain of crystal

'

.

water played in the bright moorxlight
Inside the Palace

a

.

large American eagle with out-

stretched wings formed by electric lights was the center of
attention, while the national flags of Hungary and the United
States were prominently displayed on the walls.

A concert by

the celebrated Hungarian Opera Troupe of Budapest was follov^ed by

dancing and refreshments.

The cobblestoned streets

outside the Palace were densely packed with people all hoping
to catch a glimpse of the festivities as well as the

Americans 18
The next evening it was Barker's turn to entertain.

At a dinner on the Mayflower the Admiral in
v/as

brief speech

careful to salute the Apostolic King of Hungary, the

Hungarian title for Franz Josef.
care

a

v/as

All during the visit great

given to Hungarian sensibilities, even to the

playing of the Hungarian national hymn on all occasions.
However, one small gaffe did occur.

When Barker's guests

sat down to dinner on the Mayflowe r Baron and Baroness

Roszner pointed out to the Admiral that the menu and the
musical program had been printed,

"Fium.e,

pressed themselves, only hal f -humorously
ism was wounded at this slight,

,

Austria."

Both ex-

that their patriot-

and an embarrassed Barker

immediately sent his flag secretary over to the Kearsarge to
have new menus and programs printed.

This was quickly done,

and before the dinner had ended the new programs were being

passed out to the delight of the Hungarians.

19
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Another incident which could have been potentially
damaging occurred when the Kear serge lost one of her torpedoes in the harbor.

The Whitehead Torpedo Company had

a

large factory and practice area at Fiume and the director,

Count Hoyas, had invited the American officers to visit and

inspect the plant and its eguipment.

On the 26th the

Ke arsarge test fired two Whitehead torpedoes from her tubes.

Both contained explosive but did not have primers.

Boat

crews managed to recover one but the other could not be
found,

and it was believed that it had sunk to the bottom of

the harbor.

Nevertheless, watches were set and

sm.all

boats

continued to hunt the waters in the area while the warships

remained in port.

Even though not primed for firing the

torpedo did contain explosives and could have possibly detonated if jarred forcefully enough.

The loss or damaging of

an American battleship by one of its own torpedoes was not
an experience which would have resounded to the glory of

Roosevelt's navy.

20

On the 30th Barker and his staff made their parting

calls upon local officials.

Baroness Roszner graciously told

the Admiral that she wished he were the American Minister to

Austria.

The visit to Fiume had been an outstanding success

and Barker told Moody that the "greatest curiosity was shown

by the people to see the Americans and their white ships."
All during the cruise, he wrote Admiral Dewey, he was con-

sistently told how "pretty your ships look painted white."
his warships
To which Barker always replied that although
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were always "prepared for war we believe in peace -- and

paint our ships accordingly

man-of-war was drawing to

a

Alas, the day of the white

close.

The nations of Europe

were already turning toward less conspicuous coloration for

their warships.

Within

a

few years the more practical and

less visible hues of grey's and green's would predominate

display giving way to utility.
As Barker steamed back across the Mediterranean

toward Gibraltar he could be well satisfied with both the
performance and excellent effect created by his battleships
and cruisers.

Leishman, however, could not claim the same

success for his diplomacy.

With the removal of the fleet

from Turkish waters at the beginning of July the seeming

willingness of the Sultan and the Porte to come to terms beand Leishman was face to face again with

gan to dissipate,

the same old series of delays and procrastinations which he

thought had ended.

Leishman called on Tewfik Pasha on July 5th and,
finding that the Foreign Minister could still not offer him
any conclusive sign of an immediate settlement, he asked for
an audience with the Sultan in the name of the President.
Tev/fik Pasha tried to dissuade him,

saying that the school

question was being reviewed by the Porte and would be brought
before the Council of Ministers the following day.

Leishman

refused to be mollified and the audience was scheduled for
Friday, July 8th.

27
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The meeting was not to take place.

Early Friday

morning Leishman was informed by an official
from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the audience

with Abdul

Hamid would have to be postponed.
tigued and unable to see anyone.

The Sultan was very faIt was a much chagrined

Leishman who later found out that the Sultan's incapacities
had not prevented him from seeing both the Austrian and

Russian ambassadors that very same day.^^

The reason for

this deliberate insult -- the other two audiences could not
have been concealed nor did the Turks try

perceive.

—

was not hard to

On the 5th there had been five battleships at

Piraeus; by the 8th they had gone.

Turkish sensitivity to

American diplomacy was directly related to the amount of
coercion Roosevelt was willing to apply.
When Leishman next saw Tewfik Pasha "prudence and

policy," he told Hay, forced him to make no mention of his

knowledge of the ambassador's visits.
/_his_/

indignation and express

.

.

.

"Com.pelled to swallow

sorrow at the ill health

of the Sultan," Leishman asked for an audience with Abdul

Hamid as soon as he was feeling better.

He informed Hay

that he still felt "the Turks are slowly awakening" to the

idea that they could not continue putting the United States
off, but thus far he could report nothing of substance except

the usual broken promises.

24

On July 15th Leishman again attempted to see Abdul

Hamid,

and this time he was apprised that the Sultan would

not receive him that day "on account of important visits in

the harem."

The Turks were laughing, no longer inventing

serious excuses.

Adding to the affront was the Sultan's re-

ception of the Persian Ambassador the same day.

Leishraan was

now in the position of having been twice refused an audience

with Abdul Hamid, both times with undisgijised discourtesy,
even after asking for the meetings in the name of the
President.

He resentfully declared to Hay that he felt it

"beneath the dignity of the American Government" to again
ask for an audience under these conditions,

and requested

that the State Department send him further instructions.
In response to this state of affairs Leishman was

ordered to again ask for an Imperial audience in the
President's name at

a

fixed date and time in the near future.

He was also instructed to tell Tewfik Pasha that the govern-

ment of the United States failed to comprehend the delay in

according its representative the treatment which should exist

between
a

tvio

supposedly friendly powers.

Implicit in this was

threat that if the audience was not granted it would be

taken as an unfriendly act.

In anticipation of a refusal the

State Department asked Leishman which of the Turkish ports

would be best suited for
Faced with

a

a

visit from the fleet.

fresh and strong demand from the United

States the Turkish government granted Leishman'
an audience.

26

s

request for

The meeting took place on Friday, July 29th.

In a long and outwardly friendly interview Abdul Hamid "spoke

very favorably" with Leishman about the school question,

promising to take "matters under immediate consideration and
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to give /J7 definite reply not later than Tuesday
next."^"^

The problem would have to be settled now or never.

There could be no more delays as Roosevelt was about to
lose
the strong position given him by his battleships.

Barker

was steaming toward Gibraltar where, after taking on coal,
he would be heading back across the Atlantic.

Jewell's

European Squadron was at Villefranche and would stay for

a

few more days, but soon it too would be leaving the

Mediterranean.

If the Sultan could manage to hold off these

insistent Americans and their white warships until then, he

would be safe for at least another year.
In the United States there was a great deal of hope

that a satisfactory settlement would now be gained since

Abdul Hamid finally had been brought personally into the

negotiations.

The New York Times reported that because of

this the State Departm.ent was very optimistic.
the Sultan's present amicability, said the Times

The key to
,

was a

direct result of the pressure exerted by the American fleet,
"so that the cruise of the squadron has served its purpose,

and it is not regarded as necessary now to extend the trip

into Turkish waters."

28

Hay sincerely hoped Leishman could get
"now that we have given him such

ships/ to play."

a

a

settlement,

handful of trumps /battle-

Assistant Secretary of State Loomis in-

formed Leishman that the Sultan's response on the 29th was
gratifying, but just in case problems arose Barker's six

battleships were going to be held at Gibraltar "in readiness
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subject to orders."

He was also told by Loomis that the

American government fully expected its wishes to be complied
with and he was ordered to keep Washington advised about the

situation as it developed.

09

Tewfik Pasha sent his secretary to see Leishman on
the evening of August 1st to tell him that Abdul Hamid would

not be able to see him the next day.

He blamed this delay

on rhe fact that the Council of Ministers had not yet con-

cluded its report on the school question, but he promised he
would definitely have

a

reply on Thursday, the 4th.

was disturbed but still optimistic.

Leishman

"The active considera-

tion which the m.atter is now receiving," he explained to Hay,

"warrants the belief that a definite decision will be reached

before the end of the present week."

His confidence, how-

ever, was misplaced for the 4th passed without the promised

reply,

and no word was offered on when one could be ex-

pected.

For Roosevelt this was the final insult.

It

v;as

nov/

auite evident that the display of warships alone had not
worked.

Something stronger was obviously needed, and on the

5th orders were sent to Rear Admiral Jewell at Villefranche
to immediately steam for Smyrna.

Barker's battleships would

be held at Gibraltar.

Roosevelt had been actively trying to settle the
school question with Turkey for well over

a year.

His use

and he had been
of the navy had not met with success in 1903

embarrassingly forced to withdraw his warships.

In 1904 the
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President attempted to end the sLalemate
by the display of
a much larger naval force, but had
been again rebuffed. Al-

though often accused of engaging in

a

blustering, half-

cocked diplomacy Roosevelt, as far as Q?urkey was
concerned,
had acted with great restraint and had been very
careful in
his manipulation of force against the Empire.
He had
not

sent the fleet directly to Turkey in 1904, but instead
to

neighboring Greece in the hope that the Turks would draw the
obvious conclusion.

They did, but their reaction had been

simply more delay while giving the surface appearance of

trying to come to terms.
The decision of August 5th to send warships directly
to Turkey was not the hair-trigger response of a warrior

President, but an integral part of

buildup of pressure.

Yet

a

a slow,

purposeful

gamble was involved.

As in

Morocco, Roosevelt was apparently locking himself into

situation

wi.th

only two alternatives:

only two months away

—

v;as

either he or the

Roosevelt had done the sur-

Sultan would have to back down.

rendering in 1903, but 1904

a

a

year of election

—

now

and it was doubtful he would with-

draw this time without some kind of settlement.

CHAPTER

X

"THE PRIMACY OF THE WORLD"
It was August and the city which L' Enfant had laid

out in the swamps beside the Potomac River sweltered in the

humid, tropical heat of late summer.

The House and Senate

were in recess, and the broiling weather had managed to drive

most of the rest of official Washington to its vacation
abodes by the sea or in the mountains.

Just about all of the

foreign community had also left the city, and even the dutiful Hay managed to slip away to his summer residence in New

The great diplomat was not well and indeed had

Hampshire.
less than

a

year to live.

A few months earlier Henry Adams

had watched the sculptor St. Gaudens modeling Hay's head as
well as John Singer Sargent painting his portrait,

"tv/o

steps

essential to immortality which," Adams observed, Hay "bore

with

a

certain degree of resignation."

The failure of the

Sultan to give Leishman an answer on August 4th brought the

weary Secretary of State hurrying back to Washington from
his mountain retreat by a fast

train.''"

On the morning of the 5th Roosevelt gathered the

Cabinet in a special session given over entirely to dealing

with the Turkish problem.

After considering all the options

available to the government it was finally decided to order
the European Squadron to immediately steam for Smyrna,
183

and
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Hay cabled Leishman
sion.

Hchat

afternoon of the President's deci-

In the evening Hay dined with Roosevelt at the
White

House where they again discussed the crisis.^

When the European Squadron separated from Barker's
force on July 24th Jewell headed for the island of Corfu from
where,

France.

after spending

Arriving

a

at the

few days taking on coal, he left for

Riviera port of Villefranche on

August 3rd he planned to spend about eight days, then steam
out of the Mediterranean and head for northern Europe.

The

Navy Department's order of the 5th to take his three cruisers
to Smyrna caught him off guard.

Most of the squadron's of-

ficers and men were scattered ashore on liberty, and the warships were

].ow on

provisions and coal.

By the time the men

were gathered back aboard and stores taken on there had been
a delay of almost forty-eight hours.

Around noon on Sunday,

August 7th, the cruisers led by the flagship Oly mpi a cleared
the harbor at Villefranche and headed south along the eastern

coast of Italy bound for the Straits of Messina.''

Compared with the despatch of warships to Morocco in
May the sending of the European Squadron to Smyrna created

much less of an impact in the nation's press.

The New York

Times reported that the Roosevelt administration was exasperated by the course which the negotiations had taken, and had
"become i^sary of the persistent evasions and obstruction"

being practiced by the Turkish government.

The American list

of grievances was real but not impressive, said the Tinie^,

yield
however, it hoped that the Sultan "v;ould come down and

"
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the satisfaction required."^

The New York Tribune gave the news front
page coverage and carried pictures of the Olympia

.

Baltimore and

Cleveland, as well as an insert of Rear Admiral Jewell.

Under the headline "A Warning To Turkey," and "Guns Back
Of
Demand," the Tribune wrote that the State Department had

taken this necessary action after having been "exasperated
to the last degree by the dilatory and unsatisfactory methods
of the Porte

.

The Tribune argued that only a pov/erful show of

naval might could force the Sultan and his government to
come to terms.

Unfortunately raw power seemed to be the

only message the Turk could understand.
in December,

It pointed out that

190 3, it was only the arrival of a v/arship at

Alexandretta which persuaded Turkey to officially apologize
for that incident.

Jewell's squadron should be enough,

if more warships were required Barker's command,

but

"the most

powerful fleet in the American navy," would be standing by at
Gibraltar.

High administration officials, confided the

Tribune, were seen as feeling confident that Barkers' battleships would not be needed, but their appearance in Turkish

waters

"m.ay

be necessary for its moral effect."

A report in the New York Times from Paris said that

official French opinion viewed the despatch of warships with

equanimity, and did not expect their use to cause international complications.

It was felt that the Americans would

not be "as promptly successful" in Turkey as they had been
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in Morocco.

"The Sultan of Turkey is a greater
master of

the art of temporizing than the Moorish
potentate," these

sources believed, "and the satisfaction which
America demands
from him involves a much more complicated problem
than the

freeing of Mr. Perdicaris."

The reason for this spate of

naval activity was seen in France as being directly related
to the presidential campaign,

and that Roosevelt's "reputa-

tion for a strenuous European policy needs to be main-

tamed.

"

7

Early Monday morning, the 8th, Hay went to see

Roosevelt to discuss the developing situation.

immediately showed him

a

The President

letter he had just received from

General Daniel Edgar Sickles protesting the "hostile demon-

stration against Turkey."

Sickles was one of the more color-

ful figures produced by America in the nineteenth century.

A Union Major General in the Civil War, he fought at the
battle of Getteysburg, lost
the diplomatic service.

a leg,

and after the war entered

His career was short but included

a

controversial tour as United States Minister to Spain during
the V irginius affair.
the House,

He later entered politics, served in

and became a power in New York.

Q

Beyond sending warships to Smyrna nothing had been
apparently decided Friday or over the weekend about what they
should do once they got there.

If left to his own ends

Roosevelt might have been prepared

l-.o

overreact as he had

done in Morocco, but the presence of the experienced Hay pro-

vided the President with an ingenious compromise between the

.
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actual use of force and abject retreat in case the
Sultan re-

mained adamant.

Hay advised Roosevelt that when the squadron

reached Turkey Leishman should be instructed to "demand an
answer to our claims," and if the Turks refused to do so he

should come away on one of the warships.

Hay counseled there

should not be a hostile demonstration, and the withdrawal of
the American Minister would suffice for now.

Later the en-

tire matter could be put before Congress for appropriate

action

Roosevelt agreed to adopt Hay's strategy, and in

a

letter written that same day to Sickles the President answered his complaints and outlined the steps he was prepared
to take.

He told Sickles that because of Turkish intransi-

gence it was "imperative that

som>e

action should be taken"

by the American government, but assured him that he knew he

had no right to start

a

war with Turkey,

and had "not the

dimmest or remotest intention of doing so."

The President

ended by informing the General of the conservative course of
action he had earlier in the day decided upon; i.e., to withdrav; the

American Minister and lay the matter before Congress

if Abdul Hamid refused to agree to a settlement

"''^
.

The strategy was extremely adroit for the serious

consequences of

a full

scale incident

at least for the time being

—

v;ere

to be avoided

—

while the domestic benefits to

be gained from withdrawing Leishman and placing the problem

before Congress would be as satisfactory as an actual bom-

bardment of Smyrna, or the seizure of an island.

It would

.
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satisfy the missionaries for

a

while, quiet the jingoes,

and

answer those critics who were attacking Roosevelt
for in-

dulging in a too aggressive foreign policy.

Putting the is-

sue before Congress would also keep the matter
alive as an

election issue.

Neither the Sultan nor the Porte, hov^ever, knew of
this decision, and there still remained an excellent chance
the Roosevelt administration could bluff an acceptable agree-

ment out of them without having to actually withdraw

Leishman
When Hay returned from seeing the President that

morning he found the Turkish Minister, Chekib Bey, waiting
for him at the State Department.

That "poor writhing worm

of a Turk" was full of "great perturbation about the fleet."

Hay attempted to set him somewhat at ease but told him
"things could not continue as they were," and that the United

States had been forced to act by his government's dilatory
Before Chekib Bey saw Hay he

action on the school question.

had told waiting reporters there was nothing to recent reports that Jewell's ships were being sent to Smyrna to menace Turkey.

After the meeting he refused to discuss what was

said, but admitted he would be staying in Washington instead
of leaving on vacation as originally planned.

To the re-

porters he appeared nervous and anxious.
The same day Hay cabled Leishman that the European

Squadron would be at Smyrna in

a

few days, and that he should

use the time before it arrived attempting to obtain

a
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settlement.

If none could be gained he was ordered
to leave

on one of Jewell's warships, putting the
legation in charge
of the legation secretary."^

Next morning Hay found on his desk an unusual
des-

patch from Constantinople.

In it Leishman told him that late

the previous evening the Turkish Under Secretary of State
for

Foreign Affairs had called on

liim

and asked that he use his

influence to prevent the fleet from coming, promising
on the school question "not later than Thursday."

a

reply

Leishman

was certain that the sending of the navy had achieved its

purpose, and begged Hay to detain it for

Hay was just

a

a

few

days."*-"^

bit baffled by this despatch, for the

day before Leishman had sent a cable in which he told the

State Department "that unless strong measures are adopted to

force fulfillment, matters may continue to drag along in-

definitely."

Hay felt that Leishman, who had been begging

for over a year for firm action, was now being inconsistent,
and he advised him that as the squadron was at sea it could

not be communicated with until it reached Turkey.

Hay also

told him that he was to be governed by his instructions of
the 8th if he had not obtained a settlement by the time the

warships arrived.
Late in the evening of the 9th

a

second cable from

Leishman reached Washington repeating the Turkish hope that
the fleet's visit would be deferred.
v/as

The Minister added he

quite sure the Turkish authorities were "at last thor-

oughly alive to the situation and most anxious to avoid an
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unfriendly demonstration."

He again requested that vTewell

be ordered to come no closer than Piraeus; however, he
did

acknowledge Hay's most recent cables and said he would fol-1

r-

low the instructions of the 8th.

During the afternoon of the 9th Jewell's warships

passed through the Straits of Messina, and by the morning of
the 10th the squadron was steaming across the Ionian Sea at
a steady speed of ten knots.

Press reports in American news-

papers were optimistic about a quick settlement now that the

administration had opted for stronger measures.
Times

,

The New York

although conceding the demonstration had not been

simply made for

a

mere parade, felt there v/ould be no hostile

action and that Washington expected "the presence of the war
The worst

vessels at Smyrna will produce" good results.

which could happen would be a severance of diplomatic relations.

The New York T ribune agreed with this estimate and

headlined its report of the situation on the 11th:

"Turkey

Likely To Yield, Another Triumph For Secretary Hay's
Diplomacy In Prospect."

16

But Europe, like Turkey, was unsure of just how far

Roosevelt intended to go in this affair.

limited were his aims.

It did not know how

It only knew that within the past

nine months the American President had used his navy aagres-

sively in Panama and in Morocco; and with American warships

steaming

dov/n

upon Turkey, seemingly bent on

obvious intimidation, it expected the worst.

a

mission of

"
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In London The Dail y Express was anything but opti-

mistic and commented on the uneasy feelings prevalent in

European diplomatic circles over the direction in which

Turco-American relations were evolving.

It stated that the

cruisers had received imperative orders from Washington to
stay clear of a British fleet under Admiral Donville operating
in the area.

The American government "desire it to be known

they are acting entirely on their own initiative."

1

7

The conservative Daily Telegraph (London) said that
the United States had no desire to seize Smyrna as a coaling

station, and claims to that effect appearing in the European

press were unwarrented.

The Telegraph reported that

Roosevelt's critics in America and elsewhere, faced with the
President's vigorous use of naval diplomacy in the past few
months, along with accusing him of waving the big stick were

now describing him as "brandishing the marlinspike

.
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The official attitude of the British government to

this new American exercise of naval power in the Mediterranean
was, unlike the rest of Europe, quite mild.

The close diplo-

matic co-operation shown by Great Britain and the United
States during the Perdicaris affair was again being repeated.
Indeed, the British view of the fleet's activities was

throughout looked upon both in the press and by the government with generally benign or approving interest.
The British Am.bassador to Turkey was Sir Nicholas

Roderick

0'

Conor.

Born in Ireland, he had previously served

before coming to
as British ambassador to China and Russia
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Constantinople in 1898.

0-

Conor informed the Foreign Office

that he expected Turkey to yield to the
American naval demonstration, but in the event it did not he was
concerned a}^out

how the United States Minister would leave
Constantinople.
He did not think the Turks would allow an American
warship
to enter the Dardanelles under these circumstances,
and

rather than inflict upon Leishman the humiliation of taking
the regular mail steamer

0'

Conor asked if he could offer the

American the use of the British cruiser Imoqene which was
anchored at Constantinople.

He did not feel Turkey "v;ould

take it in ill part," but wondered if the United States would

consider "its acceptance consonant with their dignity."

Lansdowne approved

0'

Lord

Conor's request, but cautioned him to

make sure the "Turkish Government will not be offended," as
"it would be a pity to vex them."
0'

1

9

Conor assured Lansdowne that Leishman had shown

great patience during the negotiations, and the Sultan's refusal to negotiate in good faith was "difficult to explain."

The ambassador still expected that the movement of American

warships and the "veiled threat of coercive measures" would

bring about

a

speedy settlement.

0'

Conor was also confident

British support of the American position (not to mention the
offer of the Imogene

)

,

as well

as the

friendly relations

existing between him and the United States legation, would
gain for England "a powerful support for our views and

policy" in Turkey.
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On the Continent, however,
speculation about

Roosevelt's Turkish diplomacy
tering.

v.as

rife and none too flat-

AS with the Moroccan incident less
than three

rr.onth

before the presence of American naval power
in the

Mediterranean being used aggressively stirred up
deep misgivings.

The New York correspondent of the Berliner

Tageblatt cabled home that the entire incident was
nothing
more than a gross election maneuver designed to
increase the

President's standing at home.

Le Temps

(Paris) reported of-

ficial circles in Germany had expressed hostility at recent

American moves against Turkey, and in Vienna it was rumored
that the government "vigorously disapproves the idea of

a

naval demonstration."
But it was in Russia that the greatest fear of

American intervention was most evident.

Turkey lay within

Russia's sphere of influence and an American fleet bellig-

erently nosing around near the Straits was something to be

watched carefully.

The St. Petersburg daily Russ condemned

the energetic response of the United States as unnecessary

when compared with the unimportance of the question involved
It cautioned the Americans not to become "too enterprising

in trying their strength on the various weaker powers of

Europe,

as this might easily lead to a combination of the

stronger powers against them."

viewed the action as

a

Novoe Vremya (St. Petersburg!

blatant attempt to gain influence in

the Near East while Russia was engaged in

Japan
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a

war with

19/1

Another newspaper, Birzhevi ya Viedomoriz
(St.
Petersburg), warned that Europe was now
faced with a new and
worrisome diplomatic problem. The United
States, not con-

tent with her hegemony in the Western
Hemisphere, was seeking
to apply the Monroe Doctrine to the Near
East
an applica-

—

tion which could easily produce an "explosion of
fanaticism"

among the Moslems with grave consequences to the Christian

population in the area.

Not only was Turkey being menaced

by the naval aggression of the Americans, it admonished, but
the very peace of Europe itself.

Russian fears of what the Americans might do if the
Sultan failed to give way apparently took
turn than impassioned editorials.

a

more practical

In a report from

Constantinople by the correspondent of The Daily Telegraph
the Russian Ambassador was said to be urging the Sultan and
the Porte to yield to American demands,

"in order to leave

no pretext for interference by the United States, whose

methods are more drastic than those of the European Powers.

"^'^

In Washington European concern about the developing

situation was vividly expressed by the hasty gathering in the
capital of a number of diplomats who had hurried back to

their posts from vacation.

Both The Time s (London) and The

Daily Mail (London) informed their readers that the signatory
powers to the Treaty of Paris (which had ended the Crimean
War,

and contained vital clauses concerning the neutrality of

the Straits) were beginning to take an active interest in the

affair.

The Times said they were pressuring the Sultan to

5

give in "rather than force the issue to

point at which the

a

United States might regard the use of force
On August 9th Baron Kengelmuller

,

as

necessary .'• ^

the Austrian

Ambassador, returned from his summer vacation home
at Bar
Harbor, Maine, ostensibly, as he told reporters, to
present
to Roosevelt "a compilation of Austrian statistics
v/hich

Emperor Francis Joseph has sent to the President with his
compliments."

The very same day he had a long luncheon at

the White House with Roosevelt, Hay and Senator Spooner of

Wisconsin.

The latter was a prominent member of the Senate

Foreign Relations committee and had been summoned back to

Washington by Roosevelt because of the crisis.

What was dis-

cussed at the luncheon was not announced and Hay's diary is
siJ.ent on the meeting,

but it seems obvious that the conver-

sation was not given over to an exposition of Austro-

Hungarian agricultural and industrial production figures.
Later in the day the German Ambassador, Baron Speck von
Sternberg, arrived from his summer hideaway in the

Massachusetts Berkshires at Lennox, and had dinner with
Roosevelt and Hay.

He told reporters that he had come back

to Washington "to attend some business of an unofficial

character."

The next morning Fortes de la Fosse, counsellor

of the French Embassy,

arrived at the State Department for

a

meeting with Hay.^^
This sudden return to

European diplomats all "imbued

a

humid capital of numerous

v;ith

a

desire to see President

Roosevelt" did not pass unnoticed, and although none of those
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involved would admit the cause for this
precipitate burst of
high level diplomacy it was patent the reason
was
Turkey.

Two days before, the New York Time s reported,
Washington had
been "almost completely deserted by the diplomatic
body,"
but since then "representatives of the German,
Austrian and

French Embassies have appeared here, and all of them have

communicated with the State Department or the White House.

"^''

What the diplomats obviously wanted from the

President was some knowledge of just what he was up to in
Turkey,

and how far was he prepared to go.

It is not known

just what Roosevelt and Hay said to them, but it seems rea-

sonable to assume they were given assurances that American

intervention in the Empire would be limited and would not at
this time include force.

One fairly reliable indication that

this segment of the crisis had been successfully dealt with
was the disappearance of the stoi-y from American newspapers

after August 12th.

While intensive diplomatic activity was taking place
in Washington Jewell's squadron was steadily nearing Turkey,

and Leishraan had still not cabled any word of a break in the

negotiations.

Almost a week had passed since Roosevelt had

ordered the navy to Smyrna, but beyond

a

plea by Tewfik

Pasha to hold off the warships the Turks had remained obstinate.

It remained to be seen whether the physical presence

of three cruisers would spur them to give in.

a

.

The port of Smyrna, now called Izmir, was the third

largest city in the Empire and the one most accessible to
sea power.

Founded by Alexander the Great it was known to

the Turks as the "eye of Asia Minor."

It had been built on

the slopes of a large, steep hill called the Pagos

crest of which sprawled the ruins of
^
del1

a

,

on the

great Byzantine cita-
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When Jewell arrived off the old port on the morning
of August 12th he was prepared for any eventuality.

The

previous day, while steaming across the Aegean, all the ships

had held preparedness drills, including General Quarters.
On the Olympi

there had been an ammunition drill with live

rounds being placed in the hoists and tested.

In the harbor

at Smyrna the Turks could only muster a single opposing war-

ship, the small gunboat Sureyya

.

Going ashore in the after-

noon with his three captains the Admiral was received by the

Governor of the port "with much ceremony,

being paraded and

a

a

guard of honor

band playing 'Hail Columbia.'"
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Meanwhile, in Constantinople, the imminent arrival
of the navy had finally forced the Turkish government into a

sort of conditional capitulation.

Realizing the squadron

would not be withdrawn or stop at Piraeus, and that the old
gam.e

of delay would no longer suffice

present

—

—

at least for the

Abdul Hamid gave in as he had in November, 1901,

to the advent of naval power.

diplomacy had succeeded again.

Rooseveltd.an marlinspike

198

On the afternoon of the 11th the Sultan sent one
of
his private secretaries to see Leishman,

and after a long

conversation the secretary submitted an informal memorandum.
In it Abdul Hamid declared "that there should be no distinc-

tion between American schools and those of other nationalities."

However, the Sultan also informed Leishman that

Turkey would be unable to raise the rank of its Minister in

Washington to the ambassadorial level because of financial
considerations.

This, of course, would in turn prevent the

United States from raising its representation in
Constantinople

—

a

condition which did not at all appeal to

the ambitious Leishman.

30

He cabled Hay that the capitulation, once one had

delved beneath its surface compliance, was "rather ambiguous
and misleading."

In his conversation with the secretary

Leishman had come to the conclusion

thait

the memorandum gave

less than what the French had secured after the Mytilene incident, and that there still would be many problems for

American schools in the Empire.

He was none too happy with

the Sultan's refusal to raise the level of Turkish repre-

sentation,

and he saw problems if he was denied access to

Abdul Hamid in the future.

Leishman told the secretary he

wished his objections to the memorandum be submitted to the
Sultan,

and an acceptable answer be "furnished by formal note

through the Minister for Foreign Affairs."
The general tenor of Leishman'

s

31

interpretation of

warned Hay
the Turkish submission was a negative one, and he

"
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that if matters were "not definitely settled"
he would ask
Je\sfell

"to send a ship to take me off."^''-

Leishman once described himself as feeling like

a

shuttlecock flying between the Sultan and the Porte,
but his

performance in the past few days could be equally given
that
same interpretation.

Previously an advocate of strong meas-

ures, he had temporized when they were finally introduced.
Now, faced with a partial success, he had again hardened his

attitude.

For Roosevelt and Hay the problem was similar to

Griscom's in 1900; i.e., to force the Turkish government to
act, but not force it into a position which did not allow it

enough room to save face.
Unlike his minister. Hay felt the Sultan had
"virtually agreed to all our demands," and that the surrender
was sufficiently complete.

He did not share Leishman's sus-

picions, and in any case they "did not justify a break of

diplomatic relations."

Roosevelt agreed and when Hay showed

him a cable he intended to send Leishman, ordering him to
accept the first note, the President, fearing he still might

leave his post,

"seized /the_7 despatch and wrote it all over

again „33
.

The cable which Roosevelt rewrote informed Leishman
that the United States did not regard the first memorandum

unfavorably, and because of this he "would not be justified
to leave" Turkey.

The matter of raising American represen-

tation was to be left in abeyance.

Allowing the Turks to

win on this point would permit them to keep a modicum of face.
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Leishman was further instructed to inform Jewell
that his
warships were no longer needed and he could withdraw

from

Smyrna.

He was told to advise the Porte that the fleet
was

being withdrawn because of the acceptable response contained in the note of the llth; however, if these agreements
were not carried out Leishman was to warn Turkey that the

President would be forced to lay the entire matter before
the Congress.

it was a threat which, by its very ambigu-

ousness, could mean anything

—

even a declaration of war.

On the morning of the 13th Leishman cabled that he

had received another note, this time directly from Tewfik
Pasha, which attempted to answer Leishman'

the first memorandum.

s

objections to

The Foreign Minister especially tried

to make clear that it had "never entered into the intention
of the imperial Government to treat on a different basis the

schools, the institutions and the citizens of the United

States in the Empire."

Leishman told Hay he hesitated to

recommend the administration accept this clarification.

He

would have been willing to take what the Turks now offered
before the present crisis, but since the United States had
the Sultan quite obviously on the run perhaps even greater

concessions might be gained.
When Hay received this last despatch it was at once

evident that Leishman had not gotten the Secretary's cable
of the 12th and was still pressing the Turkish government for

more concessions.

Hay immediately sent

a

second despatch

directing Leishman "to accept the Porte's /first/ note with
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our own interpretation," and repeating his
order to have the

warships withdraw.

The Secretary wrote in his diary that he

hoped this would close the school question for
he noted ominously,

a

while.

But,

"not forever, for the Sultan must grow

wise and honest, before we can be at peace with him altogether.

"

A somewhat chagrined but still obstinate Leishman

finally replied, accepting Hay's orders, but hinting that if
he had been allowed to take matters to the breaking point he

might have obtained

a

better settlement.

Leishman told

Tewfik Pasha on the afternoon of the 13th that the United
States accepted the agreement outlined in the Sultan's memo-

randum of the 11th and v/ould order its warships to immediately
leave Smyrna.

37

In a despatch sent on the 15th Leishman again

pointed out that the agreement was "not as satisfactory as
/^he_/

hoped for, but was the best obtainable without resorting

to extreme measures which
to avoid.

"

/^he_/

judged the Department wished

He reasoned that the main problem now would be to

have the agreement "put into execution."

For Leishman the

apparent end of the problem only increased his disenchantment
in trying to work with the Turkish government.

One could not

deal with them, he wrote Hay, as one could deal with other

nations.

He seemed to be unsure how he should act with the

Sultan and the Porto in the future, and he asked the State

Department to send him instructions "as to the line of action
it wishes me to pursue."

33
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Leishman's doubts were answered in part by

a

soothing letter sent by Kay on August 22nd
which attempted
to put the settlement into its proper
perspective.

Hay ad-

mitted the agreement had "not brought in the
millenium," but
the United States had "accomplished a great deal"
and
had

put itself in

much better position in Turkey.

a

He told him

the President could go to Congress during the winter
"and
get authority for the next step required."

Hay did not elab-

orate on what this next step might be, but to Leishraan it

obviously meant stronger action.

As for now, Kay wrote, he

should not do or say anything which would throw doubt on the
idea that the United States had received anything but

a

satisfactory settlement. 39
The apparent triumph of Roosevelt's and Kay's diplo-

macy was, on the whole, greeted enthusiastically by the nation's press.

The New York Tribune called the settlement,

"A Triumph For Mr. Hay."

In an editorial it said the

President and the Secretary of State had "gained

a

noble

40
victory for the rights and honor and dignity of the nation."

The Brooklyn Eagle

,

however

,

saw the guns of

Jewell's squadron aimed more at Judge Parker, Roosevelt's

Democratic opponent in the campaign, than Abdul Hamid.

We

could have attained an adequate settlement "at pretty nearly
any time," avowed the Eagl e

,

and it seemed quite suspicious

that the incident had suddenly burst upon the nation so near
the election.

The Detroit Free Press, like the Eagle a

newspaper

Democratic sympathies, took

v/ith

a

different view.
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"That drastic measures should have become
necessary just on
the eve of a political campaign may perhaps be
unfortunate,"
it judged,

"but it does not necessarily follow that there
is

any political significance

It

V7as

"^•'
.

the New York Times which came closest to the

mark when it prophesied that there would be no permanence in
the solution gained by Roosevelt.

The Empire had been hu-

miliated by the American display of naval power, and it
warned that an "exhorted assent leaves him who yields it in
no amiable frame of mind."

The Times judgement was to prove

correct, for as soon as Jev/ell's warships departed the same

old series of delays and procrastinations began anew, and

Leishman soon found himself more or less back in the same
position he had been before. 42
for Turkey.

There was to be no next step

By 1905 the election was over and Roosevelt had

moved on to playing for larger stakes in the world, and the
President was too perceptive to involve himself permanently
in a minor backwater at the expense of other, more profitable, game.

In truth, the Ottoman Empire was almost in-

capable of dealing with other states on
level.

a

rational diplomatic

Its internal order was rapidly breaking down, and the

central authority in Constantinople unable to look beyond the

narrow world of palace intrigue.

With the incident seemingly settled Barker's battleships left Gibraltar on August I3th and headed back across
the Atlantic.

Before dispersing his command for

a

much needed
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refit he took the Battleship Squadron
to New York in
September in order to celebrate the
launching of the new
battleship Connectj_cut. It was perhaps as
good a way as any
to officially end the largest and most
wide-ranging voyage
of American warships ever seen outside
of the Western

Hemisphere, for the Connecticut was to be the
flagship of
another, even greater, fleet which Roosevelt
would send on
an epic round the world cruise three years later.

President the Turkish affair had been
and,

a

To the

qualified success,

when added to the international prestige gathered by

the cruise and the rescue of Perdicaris, it could only be

viewed as an eminently felicitous employment of the new
American naval power.

This first use of the big stick in

the Mediterranean would give Roosevelt increasing confidence
in the power and range of his fleet,

and it would be in-

creasingly employed by him in the next four years.
At home Roosevelt would use the success of the

cruise as an election issue with which to attack the opposition.

At one point the Democrats accused him of not pro-

viding adequate efforts to protect Am.erican citizens abroad.
Roosevelt answered that in making this charge the Democrats
were shov/ing "ignorance of the facts or insincerity.

object," he charged,

Do they

"to the fact that American warships ap-

peared promptly at the port of Beirut when an effort had been
made to assassinate an American official, and in the port of

Tangier when an American had been abducted, and that in each
case the wrong complained of was righted and expiated, and
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that within the last few days the visit of an
American squadron to Smyrna was followed by the long delayed
concession"
from rn
Turkey? 44 it was a record of minor triumphs which few
-P

could argue with, and all achieved at little cost.
In Europe the cruise had a much more important impact.

The sudden appearance of the fleet in the Mediterranean

during the summer of 1904 gave Europeans notice that the

United States was

a

world power in the fullest sense-

No

longer would it be confined to its own hemisphere and to occasional and halting inroads into the Far East.

now confront this power in its own province.

Europe must

The uneasiness

felt in Europe was mirrored in apprehensive press comment

after the fleet had left.

Nachrichten

,

In Germany the Hamburger

conveniently forgetting the recent proclivities

of its own ruler, complained that "American arrogance in re-

cent years has been increased to an unendurable extent."
The National Zeitung (Berlin) saw strong imperialistic pressure in America as forcing "Roosevelt to vindicate the free-

dom of the American citizen even beneath the crescent."
Le Figaro (Paris) agreed,

and

VN^rote

4=.

that "these

movements of the American fleet /were/ dictated by considerations of domestic policy rather than by diplomatic necessities."

These "repeated interventions in European politics,"

it acidly reported,

"singularly flatter Yankee Jingoism."

In Russia the departure of the fleet from the Mediterranean
was greeted with undisgu.ised relief.

Vienna daily Fremdenbl att

'

s_

The semi-official

analysis of the cruise contained

,
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a

warning for the European powers.

The American navy, it

said, was the primary instrument of Roosevelt's foreign
policy,

and the President unfortunately had come to view this

fleet of his "as

a

bulwark of peace."

Europe must be cau-

tious in reacting to it for "the laurals of war are highly

prized in this modern Carthage
Only in England was the new American naval presence

greeted with something less than fear and suspicion.
"America," affirmed The Spectator
great civilized Powers,

,

"has become one of the

and the first claim of every such

Power is that it is entitled to act throughout the world as
seems best to itself in pursuit of its own purposes and the

general interests of civilization."

Europe had no right to

order the United States not to interfere in its politics
and it must instead treat her "as an honoured member of that

great European family which claims the primacy of the
world.

The editorial judgements found in the European pres

added

a

fitting postscript to the cruise of the fleet.

The

Roosevelt administration had proved the long-range effective
ness of the American navy, and the President's decisions to

use the fleet in naval demonstrations against Morocco and

Turkey underlined this effectiveness.
a

The voyage had been

first-hand exhibition that the United States was

power.

a

Europe could hardly ignore its implications.

world

„

,
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